Levy v. Superior Court, S035538

Citation896 P.2d 171,10 Cal.4th 578,41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878
Decision Date22 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. S035538,S035538
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 896 P.2d 171 Abraham LEVY, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT Los Angeles County, Respondent; Joseph H. GOLANT, Real Party in Interest.

Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman & Machtinger, Michael K. Collins, Harvey R. Friedman and Patricia A. Millett, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Ollestad, Freedman, Taylor & Miller, Morse Taylor, Michael Miller and Scott R. Ames, Santa Monica, for real party in interest.

KENNARD, Justice.

At the time relevant here, Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (hereafter section 664.6) provided: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in writing or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement." (Italics added.) 1 In this case we

address an issue on which the Courts of [896 P.2d 172] Appeal have issued conflicting decisions: whether the written stipulation must be signed personally by the litigant, or whether the signature of the litigant's attorney is sufficient to create a settlement enforceable under section 664.6. We conclude that section 664.6 requires the signature of the litigant.

BACKGROUND

The following summary of facts is derived from the pleadings and the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to petitioner/litigant Abraham Levy's motion to enter judgment to enforce the settlement agreement signed by the parties' attorneys.

Levy invented the "Auto-Shade," an accordion-fold device that can be placed on a car's dashboard to protect the interior from the sun. Real party in interest, attorney Joseph H. Golant, represented Levy in a number of matters between 1985 and 1991. During this period, Golant received more than $2,500,000 in attorney fees and costs. Following a dispute regarding the amount of attorney fees owed, Golant, represented by Robert B. Owens, filed a lawsuit against Levy on November 20, 1991, to recover $360,000 in attorney fees and costs. Levy, represented by Harvey R. Friedman, filed an answer and a cross-complaint.

Shortly before the scheduled trial date, attorneys Owens and Friedman started to discuss settlement of the case. The discussion culminated in a five-page letter Friedman faxed to Owens. At Friedman's request, Owens confirmed the contents of the five-page letter by writing on it, "This document, with the few changes we discussed, is acceptable. [p] Rob Owens." When Owens's client, Golant, refused to sign the formal settlement agreement, Friedman, on behalf of his client, Levy, filed a "Motion for Entry of Judgment to Enforce Settlement and for Sanctions."

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court found that it was undisputed that Friedman had sent Owens a letter purporting to confirm a settlement between the parties, that Friedman requested Owens to confirm that the terms of the settlement were acceptable, and that Owens did so confirm. The court then noted a division of authority among the Courts of Appeal on the issue of whether a settlement agreement signed by a party's attorney, but not the party, was enforceable under section 664.6. The court denied the motion. It relied on Nicholson v. Barab (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 285 Cal.Rptr. 441, a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, which held that the signature of the attorney alone, without that of the client, is insufficient to create a binding settlement agreement under section 664.6. The trial court observed that because the procedure to enforce a settlement under section 664.6 was not exclusive, the parties could pursue other avenues of relief, such as a motion for summary judgment, a separate suit in equity, or an amendment of the pleadings.

Friedman, on behalf of his client, Levy, sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, contending that Nicholson v. Barab, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 285 Cal.Rptr. 441, on which the trial court had relied, was incorrectly decided and was in direct conflict with another Court of Appeal decision, Diaz v. May (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1268, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 409. After a summary denial of the petition for writ of mandate, Friedman sought relief in this court. To resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeal, we issued an alternative writ.

DISCUSSION

At the time relevant here, section 664.6 provided in its entirety: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in writing or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement." (Stats.1981, ch. 904, p. 3437, § 2, italics added.) The sole question before us is whether the term "parties" literally means the litigants personally or whether it also includes the litigants' attorneys of record. As we mentioned earlier, the Courts of Appeal have reached conflicting decisions on this issue.

The first decision to interpret the term "parties" in section 664.6 was Haldeman v. Boise Cascade (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 230, 221 Cal.Rptr. 412. In that case, the Court of Appeal interpreted the term "parties" to mean the litigants as well as their attorneys. In Haldeman, the attorneys for the parties agreed to a settlement at a judicially supervised settlement conference, and then placed the terms of the settlement on the record in court. When the plaintiff, who had not been present at the proceedings, refused to sign the release that was an integral part of the settlement, the trial court granted the defendant's motion under section 664.6 to compel enforcement of the settlement. (176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 232-233, 221 Cal.Rptr. 412.)

In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the settlement could not be enforced because she had not personally agreed to the settlement, the Haldeman court pointed to the statute governing summary judgments (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c ["Any party may move for summary judgment ..."] ) as an example of certain provisions in our Code of Civil Procedure that use the term "party" but nevertheless have been generally understood to include the litigant's attorney of record. (Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 233-234, 221 Cal.Rptr. 412.)

Thereafter, the contrary view--that the stipulation to settle must be signed personally by the party litigants and not solely by their attorneys--was adopted in Gallo v. Getz (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 329, 252 Cal.Rptr. 193. In support of its holding, the Gallo court cited two decisions, Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1175, 222 Cal.Rptr. 658 and City of Fresno v. Maroot (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 755, 762, 234 Cal.Rptr. 353. (Gallo, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 333, 252 Cal.Rptr. 193.) The Gallo holding was followed in Nicholson v. Barab, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 1681, 285 Cal.Rptr. 441, the decision upon which the trial court in this case based its ruling.

Recently, in Diaz v. May, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 1268, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, the Court of Appeal, after noting the conflicting decisions on the issue, sided with the court in Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 230, 221 Cal.Rptr. 412, in concluding that the term " 'parties' was intended to have the same meaning in section 664.6 as it generally has in civil procedure, i.e., that it includes the parties acting through their duly authorized attorneys of record." (Diaz v. May, supra, at p. 1273, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 409.)

To resolve this conflict among the Courts of Appeal, we must determine whether the Legislature intended the term "parties" as it appears in section 664.6 ("If parties to pending litigation stipulate ... for settlement of the case ...") to mean only the litigants personally or to include the attorneys representing the litigants. To ascertain such intent, we look first to the words of the statute. (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 885 P.2d 976; Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613, 807 P.2d 455.) When the words are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the statutory context and the circumstances of the statute's enactment, in determining legislative intent. (See, e.g., People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323.)

The word "parties" is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. As noted by the Courts of Appeal in Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pages 233-234, 221 Cal.Rptr. 412, and Diaz v. May, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at page 1273, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, the term "party," as used in a number of our civil procedure statutes, is commonly understood to mean not only the actual litigant, but also the litigant's attorney of record. (See, e.g., Code Civ.Proc., §§ 437c ["Any party may move for summary judgment"]; 438, subd. (b)(1) ["A party may move for judgment on the pleadings"]; 2017, subd. (a) ["any party may obtain discovery"].) Motions under these particular statutes are routinely made by attorneys in the course of representing their clients.

But the word "party" is also susceptible of a narrower meaning, namely the specific person or entity by or against whom legal proceedings are brought. (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1119, col. 2 [defining parties], p. 1122, col. 1 [defining party].) This meaning of the term "party" can also be found in our statutory law. For example, Code of Civil Procedure section 2033, subdivision (g) provides: "The party to whom the requests for admission are directed shall sign the response under oath, unless the response contains only objections." (Italics added.) When, as in this particular instance, the subject of the statute may affect the substantial rights of the litigants themselves, the term "party"...

To continue reading

Request your trial
206 cases
  • Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 18, 2021
    ......Gerald L. Nunn et al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court of Napa County, Respondent, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al., Real ...at p. 287, 30 P. 529 [Code Civ. Proc., § 283, subd. (1) ]; Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 585, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 896 ......
  • Ford v. Krug, A116327 (Cal. App. 5/14/2008), A116327
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 14, 2008
    ......v. . EDWARD KRUG, Defendant and Appellant. . A116327 . A118824 . Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division One . May 14, ...[Citations.]" ' [Citations.]" ( People v. Superior Court ( Gregory ) (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 324, 329, italics omitted; see ...( Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 583; Blanton v. Womancare, ......
  • Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • October 24, 2012
    ......No. B230817. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California. Aug. 10, 2012. Review ...Horvitz & Levy, Robert H. Wright, Jeremy B. Rosen, Encino, and [145 Cal.Rptr.3d ...In Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 896 P.2d 171( Levy ), ......
  • Flannery v. Prentice, S080150.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • August 13, 2001
    ....... No. S080150. . Supreme Court of California. . August 13, 2001. .          110 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 ...[y]' is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation." ( Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 582, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 896 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 books & journal articles
  • CHAPTER 6
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Zalma on Property and Casualty Insurance
    • Invalid date
    ...Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1167, 1174 (2001); Caro v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 4th 725, 731 (1997); see also Levy v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 4th 578, 583-584 (1995).) As with other types of agency relationships, “[t]he law of misrepresentation applies to lawyers.” (Rest.3d, Law Governing Lawyers (20......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Litigating Neck & Back Injuries Content
    • May 18, 2012
    ...S.E.2d 554, 1948 W.Va. 616 (1993), § 3:530.60 Levan v. Dines , 153 A.D.2d 672 (N.Y.App.2d Dep’t 1989), § 7:110 Levy v. Superior Court , 896 P.2d 171 (Cal. 1995), § 8:332 Lewis v. Roderick , 617 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1992), § 7:110 Linden v. Huestis , 247 Mont. 383; 807 P.2d 185 (1991), § 11:310 Lo......
  • Dealing with Defense Team: Insurers, Defense Counsel and Impartial Medical Experts
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Litigating Neck & Back Injuries Content
    • May 18, 2012
    ...the settlement terms; • the settlement agreement should be signed by both the attorneys and the parties. See Levy v. Superior Court , 896 P.2d 171 (Cal. 1995); Murphy v. Padilla , 49 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct.App. 1996). For further information on how to succeed in mediations, see Cravez, “Eight M......
  • Settlement
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Personal Injury Forms: Discovery & Settlement
    • May 3, 2011
    ...an affirmative act or refrain from a specific act. g. Signatures of both the attorneys and the parties. See Levy v. Superior Court , 896 P.2d 171 (Cal. 1995); Murphy v. Padilla , 49 Cal.Rptr. 722 (Ct.App. 1996). Note: To avoid disputes, the agreement may state that the mediator is the final......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions
  • Chapter 856, AB 1950 – Liability: construction defects: insurance defense
    • United States
    • California Session Laws
    • January 1, 1998
    ...terms of the settlement. (b) It is the intent of the Legislature that this section modifythe holding of Levy v. Superior Court (1995), 10 Cal. 4th 578,regarding the authority of counsel in a construction defect action tobind a party to a settlement. (c) For purposes of this section, "constr......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT