Lewis & Clark Cnty. v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 16 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. DA 13–0420.,DA 13–0420.
• Citation: 333 P.3d 205,376 Mont. 137
• Parties: LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Greg L. HAMPTON, Respondent and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

376 Mont. 137

333 P.3d 205

LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY, Petitioner and Appellant,

v.Greg L. HAMPTON, Respondent and Appellee.

No. DA 13–0420.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 2, 2014.

Decided Aug. 5, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 2014.

For Appellant: Leo J. Gallagher, County Attorney, Katie Jerstad, K. Paul Stahl, Deputy County Attorneys, Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: David K.W. Wilson, Jr., Robert Farris–Olsen, Morrison, Sherwood, Wilson & Deola PLLP, Helena, Montana.

Justice BETH BAKER delivers the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Lewis and Clark County appeals the judgment of the First Judicial District Court following a jury trial, along with the court's previous orders granting Greg Hampton partial summary judgment and denying the County's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 2 We address the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Whether the District Court erred in ruling on summary judgment that the Countyconsented to revocation of an agricultural covenant on Hampton's property.

¶ 4 2. Whether the District Court erred in denying summary judgment to the County and allowing a jury to decide whether Hampton had notice of and failed to complete the conditions attached to the County's revocation.

¶ 5 3. Whether the District Court erred in its entry of final judgment.

¶ 6 We affirm the District Court's decisions on the cross-motions for summary judgment and affirm its judgment in part. We remand for modification of the final judgment.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 7 This action arises from a restriction placed on a parcel of real property located in the South Hills of Helena. Hampton, a developer, divided a forty-acre parcel into at least a dozen lots utilizing various exemptions allowed by the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act (Act). Hampton conveyed an approximately 14.2–acre parcel to John and Carol Turner. The Turners retained, and later sold, 1.9 acres for residential purposes. In an attempt to avoid the subdivision review process, they placed an agricultural covenant on the remaining 12.3 acres in 1993. This covenant stated that the land would be used exclusively for agricultural purposes. It ran with the land and allowed revocation only by “mutual consent of the owners of the parcel ... and the governing body of Lewis and Clark County.” The Turners previously had agreed to reconvey the restricted 12.3–acre parcel to Hampton and did so in 1996. At that time, Hampton requested the County's consent to lift the covenant. The County denied his request. In 1997, Hampton again requested lifting the covenant and the County again denied the request. In 1998, Hampton filed an action for declaratory relief, requesting that the court declare the covenant void and unenforceable. We affirmed the district court's determination that the covenant was not void. Hampton v. Lewis & Clark Co., 2001 MT 81, 305 Mont. 103, 23 P.3d 908.

¶ 8 In July 2004, Hampton again requested the County's consent to revoke the agricultural covenant. At a regularly scheduled public meeting, the County Commission decided to hear the request and scheduled a public hearing for September 9, 2004.

¶ 9 At the public hearing, the Commission heard a presentation from its staff about the parcel and the agricultural covenant policy. The County Planning Director recommended denial of Hampton's request to lift the covenant based on his past misuse of the Act's exemptions. The Commission deliberated and requested input about how it might conditionally approve Hampton's request. Prior to the next meeting, County staff circulated a memo outlining fifteen conditions of approval if the Commission chose to lift the agricultural covenant. A revised memo listed thirteen conditions. The conditions mirrored those required of other minor subdivisions in the South Hills and were designed to bring Hampton's property into compliance with applicable laws and regulations by mitigating impacts or eliminating hazards resulting from subdivision of the property. Two conditions of particular importance involved access to the parcel. The Act requires that approved subdivisions have both legal and physical access. Section 76–3–608(3)(d), MCA.

¶ 10 At the September 23, 2004 meeting, the Commission voted on the “Revocation of Agricultural Covenant.” The minutes from the meeting reflect that “[t]he motion to approve the revocation subject to 13 conditions as amended carried unanimously.”

¶ 11 Of the thirteen conditions, the following are at issue in the litigation:

5. A plan to improve Lodgepole and/or Sweetgrass Road to the specification required by the County Subdivision Regulations ... from the west edge of the proposal to the intersection with Lime Kiln Road ... submitted to the County Planning Department ...;

6. Evidence that Lodgepole and/or Sweetgrass Roads are public access easements ... submitted to the County Planning Department for review and approval; 7. An Approach Permit ... granted by the County Road Department ...;

...

11. A Certificate of Survey ... submitted to the Planning Department for review and approval.

¶ 12 The County sent Hampton a letter approving the lifting of the covenant subject to the thirteen conditions. The letter stated, “Prior to any development, Mr. Hampton and his successors must submit their proposed development to the Lewis and Clark Planning Department for its written approval. Approval will be granted only upon a determination by the planning department that the ... conditions have been met[.]”

¶ 13 Shortly after the County's action, Hampton began working on developing his residence. The parcel is located on Sweetgrass Road, which is a dead-end accessible from Lodgepole Road. He submitted a comprehensive permitting application to the County Office of the Permit Coordinator for a “new home—building on parcel.” In December 2004, Hampton submitted a Montana Department of Environmental Quality/Local Government Joint Application Form for the “Greg Hampton Homesite.” On April 14, 2005, the Montana Department of Environmental Quality sent Hampton a letter approving his proposed development for “water supply, sewage, solid waste disposal, and storm water drainage.” The letter indicates that a copy was sent to the County Planning Board. In April 2005, Hampton received his address assignment from the County. Soon afterward, the County granted approval for Hampton's septic drainfield. Hampton's tax classification changed from agricultural to residential in 2005. His property taxes reflected the change—rising from $150 to approximately $5,000 per year. The 2006 County tax records include a photo of Hampton's residence and his address.

¶ 14 In September 2006, Josh Chisholm, a developer, applied to subdivide Hampton's parcel. As the property owner, Hampton also signed the application. In the process of reviewing Chisholm's application, the County realized that Hampton may not have completed the conditions placed upon him in 2004. On January 5, 2007, the County sent a letter to Chisholm rejecting the application and stating that the parcel was “subject to an agricultural covenant.” The County Planner who discovered this testified at trial that although a survey had lifted the agricultural covenant, there was no evidence that the conditions had been completed.

¶ 15 On January 16, 2008, the County sent a letter to Hampton informing him that it had not received any verification that all of the conditions had been met. The letter gave Hampton ten days to complete and verify with the County that all of the conditions were satisfied. Hampton spoke with the County's Director of Community Development and Planning, Kelly Blake, on January 22, 2008. Hampton informed her that he was unable to comply with Conditions Five and Six to make the road public as he had not obtained the neighboring property owners' approval. Blake forwarded the matter to the County Attorney's Office for enforcement.

¶ 16 On June 10, 2009, the County filed a complaint in the District Court requesting injunctive relief and an order requiring Hampton to complete the conditions. The County's amended complaint, filed a year later, requested the following relief:

1. Order one of the following alternatives:

a. Order Hampton to satisfy all 13 conditions of approval within a reasonable amount of time;

b. Order Hampton to remove the residential dwelling on his property;

c. Permanently enjoin Hampton and any present or future owners of the property from using the property for residential purposes, including the use of the residential dwelling currently on the property;

d. Order Hampton to pay to County an appropriate monetary penalty to be established at trial;

2. Order Hampton to pay County's costs and attorney's fees in this matter; and

3. Order such other and further relief as the Court deems proper and just.

¶ 17 Hampton moved for summary judgment on numerous issues, including whether the agricultural covenant had been revoked. Prior to a ruling on Hampton's motion, the County moved for summary judgment on the issues whether Hampton had notice of the conditions and whether he failed to meet all of the conditions prior to development.

¶ 18 On November 16, 2011, the court granted partial summary judgment to Hampton, ruling that the County had agreed to lift the agricultural covenant. Then, on February 1, 2012, the court denied the County's motion for summary judgment because there was “substantial disagreement about the status of the conditions.”

¶ 19 A four-day jury trial began April 2, 2012. The two issues were whether Hampton had notice of the thirteen conditions prior to building his home and which conditions, if any, remained unmet. The jury determined that Hampton did have notice and that he failed to complete four conditions (Five, Six, Seven, and Eleven) prior to development.

¶ 20 Following trial, the County moved for final judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(c), along with costs and attorney's fees. The District Court issued its memorandum and order on...