Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. Cnty. of Northumberland
| Decision Date | 30 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-02126 |
| Parties | HOPE LEWIS, individually and on behalf of the estate of CYRUS LEWIS, deceased, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NORTHUMBERLAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
Before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants PrimeCare Medical, Inc. ("PrimeCare"), and three PrimeCare employees: Dr. Thomas Weber, Mikelanne Welliver, and Caitlin Henrie (collectively, the "PrimeCare Defendants"), and by Defendants Northumberland County, Roy Johnson, Brian Wheary, Jason Greak, Jennifer Lashomb, and Northumberland County Board of Prison Inspectors (collectively, the "County Defendants"). (Doc. 54; Doc. 58). Both sets of Defendants have filed Statements of Facts and Briefs in Support of their motions, and Plaintiff has filed Briefs in Opposition to the motions, along with Statements of Fact in response to those filed by the Defendants. As such, these motions are ripe for disposition.
Hope Lewis ("Plaintiff"), mother of Cyrus Lewis ("Lewis") and administratrix for his estate, brought a wrongful death action on November 5, 2014. (Doc. 1). On June 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming two sets of defendants - the County of Northumberland, Roy Johnson, Brian Wheary, Jason Greak, Jennifer Lashomb, and the Northumberland County Board of Prison Inspectors, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc., Dr. Weber, Mikelanne Welliver, and Caitlin Henrie. (Doc. 25). In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken by the County Defendants and the PrimeCare Defendants caused Lewis to commit suicide in his cell on June 15, 2014; five days after Lewis was committed to the prison to await trial. (Doc. 25). Plaintiff alleges Fourteenth Amendment claims against the PrimeCare and County Defendants, a Monell claim against PrimeCare Defendants, and state law claims under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death and Survival Acts.
Following a period of discovery, both sets of Defendants have moved for summary judgment. As those motions have been fully briefed, they are ripe for disposition.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations,weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 F. App'x 384, 389 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential).
The relevant facts are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. This matter arises out of the suicide of Cyrus Lewis on the fifth day of his incarceration at the Northumberland County Correctional Facility (hereinafter, "NCP") which suicide took place on June 15, 2014 (Doc. 55, ¶ 1; Doc. 72, ¶ 1; Doc. 60, ¶ 5; Doc. 70, ¶ 5). On June 2, 2014, Lewis was arrested by Coal Township Police after he took his wife's car without her permission and crashed it into a tree. (Doc. 55, ¶ 6; Doc. 72, ¶ 6). At the time of the crash, Lewis wasintoxicated and stated that he wanted to kill himself. (Doc. 55, ¶ 7; Doc. 72, ¶ 7). He totaled the vehicle, told the responding officer that he wanted to kill himself, and stated that he wanted to die. He also had a knife on him. (Doc. 72, ¶¶ 8-9). On June 9, 2014, Lewis was arrested by Shamokin Police in relation to charges of burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful taking. Specifically, he was intoxicated, stole a vehicle, and wrecked it. (Doc. 55, ¶ 10; Doc. 72, ¶ 10). In relation to these charges, Lewis was committed to NCP. (Doc. 55, ¶ 12; Doc. 72, ¶ 12).
At the time Lewis's suicide on June 15, 2014, Northumberland County had a Comprehensive Health Services Agreement with PrimeCare Medical, Inc., to provide comprehensive medical care including mental health services for individuals incarcerated at the prison. (Doc. 55, ¶ 3; Doc. 72, ¶ 3). The Comprehensive Health Services Agreement between Northumberland County and PrimeCare encompassed mental health, medical and related health care services to the inmate population, including the development and application of policy associated with basic mental health services to be applied to PrimeCare's provision of mental health services to the inmates at Northumberland County Prison, including Cyrus Lewis. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 13-15). Throughout the record, testimony indicates that the care for inmates was a collaborative effort between corrections officials and the Medical Department, and that they worked as a team, "hand-in-hand." (Doc. 70, ¶¶ 12, 13, 47, 75; Doc. 60, ¶ 47, 75, 111). While the level of observation and whether an individual should be either placed on a suicide watch or downgraded from suicide watch must be done by the mental health clinician and not a correctional officer, the officers and supervisors worked with the medical department and were responsible for alerting them to behaviors or information important to determining the properwatch level. (Doc. 60, ¶ 56; Doc. 70; ¶ 56). As of the date of Cyrus Lewis' death on June 15, 2014, the NCP, in conjunction with its medical provider, PrimeCare Medical, had in place a written suicide prevention program, first instituted on January 1, 2003.
Upon being committed to the NCP on June 9, 2014, it was documented that Lewis had made statements to the arresting officer that were interpreted by the arresting officer as expressing suicidal ideation. For this reason, Lewis was stripped by NCP staff and placed in a security smock (Doc. 55, ¶ ¶ 13-15; Doc. 72, ¶¶ 13-15; Doc. 60, ¶ 9). Plaintiff further avers that in addition to stating that he wanted to die to the arresting officer, Lewis attempted suicide by wrecking a vehicle on two occasions while heavily intoxicated in the days leading up to his arrest. (Doc. 70, at ¶ 9). Consistent with Northumberland County's policy and procedure related to suicide prevention Section 11.01, Lewis was administered an initial booking observation questionnaire which included a suicide prevention screening questionnaire. This suicide prevention screening questionnaire accurately reflected that Lewis was reported by the transporting officer as a potential suicide risk and also did reflect that Lewis had a psychiatric history and that he showed signs of depression. (Doc. 72, ¶ 13; Doc. 60, ¶ 10; Doc. 70, ¶ 10).
An intake medical screening of Lewis was conducted on June 10, 2014 by Defendant Henrie, a Licensed Practical Nurse with PrimeCare. During that screening, Lewis admitted to moderate alcohol use, heroin and opiate use, use of morphine, Oxycontin, and Fentanyl. Henrie noted Lewis's comments to the arresting officer, and that he arrived in a suicide smock. (Doc. 55, ¶ 16; Doc. 72, ¶ 16; Doc. 60, ¶ 17; Doc. 70, ¶ 17). A behavioral health assessment was completed on June 10, 2014, by Mikelanne Welliver. (Doc. 55, ¶¶ 24-26; Doc. 72, ¶¶ 24-26;Doc. 60, ¶ 19, 63). Although during that screening, Lewis indicated that he could "stay safe," that assessment also indicated that Lewis was previously treated for bipolar/depression, counseling, a psychiatric hospitalization in 2013, that he used alcohol and drugs and was experiencing withdrawal symptoms. (Doc. 70, ¶19, 61, 62). Lewis refused to consent to additional medication for detox and...
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