Lewis v. Aetna Ins. Co.

• Citation: 505 P.2d 914,264 Or. 314
• Parties: Charles S. LEWIS and John C. Lewis, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
• Decision Date: 25 January 1973
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon

Page 914

505 P.2d 914

264 Or. 314

Charles S. LEWIS and John C. Lewis, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 11, 1972.

Decided Jan. 25, 1973.

Robert E. Nelson, Portland, argued the cause for appellants and cross-respondents. With him on the briefs were McCarty & Swindells, Portland.

Edwin J. Peterson, Portland, argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant. With him on the brief were Tooze, Kerr & Peterson and Farrand M. Livingston, Portland.

DENECKE, Justice.

Plaintiffs are the owners of a 46-foot Chris-Craft, the Manatee. The defendant carried hull insurance on the Manatee which was evidenced by a 'yacht policy.' The boat was found sunk in its boathouse on the Columbia River. It was raised and repairs were commenced. Plaintiffs brought this action for the cost of repairs. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, but the trial court set it aside and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs contend the damage was covered under the clause insuring against damage caused by the 'Bursting of boilers, breakage of shafts or any latent defect in the machinery or hull * * *.' This clause has been in hull policies for over 80 years and is referred to as the 'Inchmaree Clause' after the vessel whose uninsured loss brought about the inclusion of such coverage in the hull policy. The plaintiffs contend a latent defect caused the loss.

The evidence is that the Manatee sunk because of leaks in the hull; however, the cause of the leaks is unknown. The issue is whether from this evidence the jury can infer that the leaks were caused by a 'latent defect' within the meaning of the Inchmaree Clause.

A witness testified that leaks were in the seams on the sides of the keel; however, he could not determine why the leaks occurred. He could not find any rotten wood in this area. He put in some caulking, but not along the entire seam where it was leaking. The witness was of the opinion that the caulking was not deficient. The boat was put back in the water and each day less water came in until eventually she became tight without any repairs to the seam. The only possible explanation for her recovery was that the space between the seams filled with silt from the river or 'gunk' from the bilge.

The Manatee was 21 years old but was an expensive boat, of good construction and in good condition. The expert called by plaintiffs testified: '* * * (W) ith a boat of this age, it would probably be not too common that something like this would happen.' The Manatee's last cruise before she sank was on December twenty-seventh. About January first one of the plaintiffs showed the Manatee to friends and she appeared in good condition. The vessel was found sunk on January fourteenth.

In determining whether there was sufficient evidence we start with the premise that the insured has the burden of proving that the loss was caused by a peril insured against. Shaver Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 172 Or. 91, 114, 139 P.2d 769 (1943). In the instant case there is no direct evidence that a latent defect caused the loss. The problem, reduced to its fundamentals, is whether the circumstantial evidence raises a strong enough inference of loss because of latent defect that the issue should be submitted to the jury.

The problem is the same whether the insured is contending that the loss was caused solely by a latent defect or by some other peril insured against in a hull policy such as the perils of the sea or of the rivers. In most of the cases the insured is claiming that the loss was caused by several perils, alternatively or cumulatively.

Massey S.S. Co. v. Importers' & Exporters' Ins. Co., 153 Minn. 88, 189 N.W. 415, 31 A.L.R. 1372 (1922), is a leading older case holding that if there is evidence that the ship is seaworthy, and there are no other apparent causes for the loss, the jury may infer that the loss was caused either by the perils of the sea or a latent defect. The vessel was a lake freighter with a wooden hull and was built in 1891. In 1918 it was thoroughly repaired, inspected by the American Bureau of Shipping in March 1919, and approved. On her second voyage thereafter she encountered a gale, but rode well. On the third, she sprang a leak which the pumps could not handle and she sank. There was a possibility she hit an underwater object when unloading at the end of her second trip; however, the plank that was possibly stove in did not admit water until the rougher water of Lake Superior was encountered. This later theory, however, the court stated, 'rests on no substantial foundation of fact.' 153 Minn. at 92, 189 N.W. at 417. The court held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the loss was covered.

This same reasoning was followed 35 years later by Judge John R. Brown, writing for the court in Tropical Marine Prod. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 247 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1957). The Sea Pak was a wooden vessel, probably built during World War II. It was completely overhauled in the summer of 1953. She was fishing in calm waters in the Bahamas. She sprang a leak which became progressively worse. The place where she leaked was inaccessible. The master tried to bring her back to harbor through water that were not unusual; however, she sank.

No evidence of the specific cause of the leak was introduced. The court reversed the trial court and held that the loss must have been caused either by the perils of the sea or a latent defect.

Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Long, 195 Va. 117, 77 S.E.2d 457 (1953), is to the same effect. The insured bought a new 19-foot Higgins runabout in July 1948. The boat was moored in the James River the balance of the summer and stored in a garage in the winter. The next May the hull was examined, the rough spots sanded and a coat of lead paint applied. No defects were found. It was carefully returned to the water and again moored in the river. A week later the owner ran the boat about two miles to a fishing spot. When he stopped, the bow settled down after planing. Water commenced coming in at the bow. The boat sank. There was no direct evidence of the cause of the leaks. The court sustained a verdict for the insured, commenting:

'This boat was shown to have been new, and the testimony tended strongly to establish seaworthiness before and at the time of the trip of June 2, 1949. Within an hour it had filled with water and sunk. This affirmative evidence was uncontradicted in any particular. There was nothing whatever to indicate unseaworthiness unless it be the sudden and unexplained entry of water. The presumption that arose from the affirmative proof was not overcome solely by that fact; and defendant offered no evidence to rebut it. The proof sustains a finding that the boat foundered because of a peril of the sea or from a latent defect, both of which risks were assumed by the insurer. 77 S.E.2d at 460--461.

The cases cited in the Annotation, 'Necessity under marine insurance policy of showing specific cause of sinking of vessel,' 31 A.L.R. 1378 (1924), and supplemental decisions are largely in accord in holding that a failure to prove the specific cause of loss is not necessarily fatal to recovery by the insured.

At least one decision is contrary to the above cases. The trial court in Watson v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 106 F.Supp. 244 (D.C.E.D.N.C.1952), acknowledged there was logic in the theory followed by the cases we have cited above but believed the weight of authority was to the contrary and held the insured could not recover.

The judge in the Watson case was of the opinion that McKern v. The Corporation, etc., 85 Or. 652, 167 P. 795 (1917), supported his holding. We do not so construe our decision. The plaintiff in that case owned a 'motor boat,' and had purchased hull insurance from the defendant. The boat sank and plaintiff sued defendant who alleged in its answer that the boat was lost because it was unseaworthy and plaintiff was negligent. The procedure was peculiar and neither party offered any evidence. The trial court held for plaintiff. This court reversed, holding that the plaintiff could not recover without producing some evidence of seaworthiness before the loss. Some proof that the vessel was seaworthy is always necessary before the trier of fact can draw the inference that it was a latent defect and not some other unseaworthy condition that caused the loss. Pacific Dredging Company v. Hurley, 65 Wash.2d 394, 397 P.2d 819, 827 (1964).

City M.T. Co. v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 116 Or. 102, 239 P. 812 (1925), likewise does not support the proposition that the plaintiff cannot recover. There, the insurer-defendant alleged and introduced evidence that the barge was unseaworthy before the loss and the trier of fact held the owner-insured could not recover. We held there was evidence to support the finding of the trial court that the barge was unseaworthy. In the present case the jury must have found the Manatee was seaworthy prior to the loss, other than the latent defect.

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