Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 97-1230-A.,Civ.A. 97-1230-A.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Harold LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Kmart Corporation, Defendants.

993 F.Supp. 382

Harold LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Kmart Corporation, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 97-1230-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

February 11, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Victor Michael Glasberg, Alexandria, VA, for Lewis.

Ronald S. Cooper, Washington, DC, John C. Fox, Phyllis E. Andes, Fenwick & West, Washington, DC, for Aetna.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRINKEMA, District Judge.

I.

Plaintiff Harold Lewis has suffered from severe depression since 1979. In 1984, Lewis obtained employment with defendant Kmart Corporation ("Kmart"). In 1987, by virtue of his employment, he was offered and accepted an employee disability benefit plan issued by defendant Aetna Life Insurance Company ("Aetna"). The plan provided that physical disabilities would be covered through age sixty-five, but terminated benefits for mental disabilities after twenty-four months of coverage.

In March of 1995, plaintiff's depression worsened, and he became unable to work. At first, he went on medical leave under Kmart's leave program. However, by September of 1995, he began receiving monthly long-term disability benefit payments under the Aetna plan. On October 2, 1995, Aetna sent plaintiff a letter confirming his entitlement to benefits. See Kmart's Ex. M. Although the letter referenced the different periods of coverage applied to physical and mental conditions, it did not specifically classify plaintiff's condition as "mental" in nature. However, by the Spring of 1996, plaintiff had learned that Aetna had classified his disability as mental. See Plaintiff's Dep. at 50-51, 53 (Aetna Ex. C). Plaintiff's benefits were terminated on September 18, 1997, two years after he first began receiving them.

On July 2, 1996, more than a year before the termination of his benefits, plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination against defendant Kmart with the EEOC. See (EEOC Charge Aetna Ex. D.). In the charge, plaintiff argued that he had been subjected to discrimination on the basis of a mental disability because he was given less disability insurance coverage than a person with a physical disability. Plaintiff identified June 17, 1996 as the latest date on which the alleged discrimination had occurred. A Right to Sue letter issued and plaintiff filed a complaint in this court on August 6, 1997, alleging that defendant Kmart violated his rights under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, to terms and conditions of employment free from discrimination based on his disability, and that defendant Aetna violated his right under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, to public accommodation free from discrimination based on his disability.

In the motions now before the Court, defendants each seek summary judgment in their favor, arguing that plaintiff's claims are barred both by the relevant statute of limitations and by administrative exhaustion requirements.

II. The Applicable Statute of Limitations

Because the ADA does not specify a statute of limitations for claims under either Title I or Title III, district courts must adopt the most analogous state statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 268, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The Fourth Circuit has not yet determined which state limitations period governs ADA claims brought in Virginia. However, the Fourth Circuit has held that the Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (the "Virginia Act"), Va.Code Ann. § 51.5-40 et seq., provides the most analogous statute of limitations for claims brought under the federal Rehabilitation Act, the predecessor to the ADA. See Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 223 (4th Cir. 1993). The ADA was closely modeled on the Rehabilitation Act and was intended to extend its protections into the private sector. See e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Sen. Comm. H'gs Before the Committee On Labor and Human Resources, Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 189 (May 9, 10, 16 and June 22, 1989); S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 156 (1989). Accordingly, by implication the Fourth Circuit has recognized that an essential similarity also exists between the Virginia Act and the ADA. See Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir.1994) (Virginia Act standards for liability follow those of the ADA). Like the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the Virginia Act is aimed at preventing disability discrimination both in the terms of employment and in public accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112, 12182(a); 29 U.S.C. § 794; Va.Code Ann. § 51.5-41, 51.5-44. Indeed, the Virginia Act conspicuously relies on both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for many of its enforcement provisions. See Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-40 (regulations created to implement Virginia Act "shall be consistent, whenever applicable, with regulations imposed under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990"). As such, this Court concludes that, as with Rehabilitation Act claims, the Virginia Act is the most analogous state statute for claims brought under the ADA. Plaintiff does not dispute this conclusion. Because the Virginia Act uses a one-year statute of limitations for disability discrimination claims, we conclude that a one-year limitation applies to Lewis' claims. See Va.Code Ann. § 51.5-46.

When the Statute Begins to Run

Having determined the appropriate statute of limitations, we next consider when the statute began to run as to plaintiff's claims. Defendants each argue that plaintiff's lawsuit was filed after the statute of limitations had run. Specifically, Kmart argues that the limitations period began to run on plaintiff's claims in 1987, when plaintiff first received notice of the details of his Aetna benefits package. Aetna argues that the limitations period began to run in the Spring of 1996 when plaintiff became aware that Aetna had classified him as suffering from a mental rather than physical disability. Plaintiff responds that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until his claims became ripe for adjudication; that is, not until he was faced with actual and imminent loss of benefits.

In order for a claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an "injury in fact," meaning the "invasion of a legally protected interest that is `(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are not ripe. Id. Here, plaintiff argues that his injury did not become "actual and imminent" until it became certain that he would require benefits beyond the two-year limit, and that he would be denied such benefits on the basis of his disability. Plaintiff argues, for example, that he might have recovered before the expiration of the two-year limit. Had Lewis recovered before the end of the two-year period, he would not have suffered any pecuniary loss as a result of Aetna's treatment of his disability as "mental" rather than "physical." Indeed, plaintiff supports his argument with evidence that, in the past, his condition tended to wax and wane, and that during the early months after he went on long-term disability, his doctor expected him to recover well before the expiration of the two-year limit on benefits. See Hryvniak 2d Decl. at ¶¶ 2-7; Cobb 2d Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 3. Moreover, plaintiff claims that Aetna's own actuarial data demonstrate that mental conditions tend not to last beyond two years. See Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts at $5. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that his claim did not become ripe until it was inevitable that he would lose benefits as a result of the plan's distinction between mental and physical conditions.

The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit appear to have rejected plaintiff's logic. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981); English v.. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.1988); Martin v. Southwestern Virginia Gas Company, 135 F.3d 307 (4th Cir.1998). In Ricks, a state college denied the plaintiff tenure but gave him a one-year grace period in which to find other employment. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252-55. The plaintiff did not sue immediately, but waited to bring his Title VII and § 1981 action until his employment ended. Finding that the limitations period began to run when the plaintiff received final and definite notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision, rather than when the effects of that decision were felt, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Ricks' action. Id. at 255, 258; see also English, 858 F.2d at 961-62.¹

Similarly, in English, a nuclear safety worker was notified that she would be laid off but was given a ninety-day grace period in which to find other employment. Plaintiff waited until the ninety-day period had expired before filing a claim of retaliation with the Department of Labor. English, 858 F.2d at 958-60. Attempting to distinguish Ricks, English argued that the decision to discharge her was not final until her employment actually ended, because the effects of that decision might never be felt. For example, the plaintiff argued, she might have found another job before the expiration of the ninety-day period, and never suffered the effects of unemployment. Id. at 961. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the plaintiff's ability to avoid the harsh effects of a discriminatory decision was irrelevant to determining whether discrimination had in fact occurred. The court reasoned that there was nothing tentative about the decision to discharge the plaintiff, and that her ability to avoid its effects ...