Lewis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.

Decision Date09 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-2688.,07-2688.
Citation542 F.3d 403
PartiesRichard J. LEWIS; Patricia A. Lewis, Appellants, v. ATLAS VAN LINES, INC.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

James J. West, [Argued], Harrisburg, PA, for Appellants.

James A. Wescoe, [Argued], Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.

Before: FISHER, JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and YOHN*, District Judge.

OPINION

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves a claim by Richard and Patricia Lewis against Atlas Van Lines, Inc. ("Atlas") for damages incurred as a result of Atlas's failure to live up to its promise to move the Lewises' household belongings by a date certain. The District Court dismissed the Lewises' claim, concluding that they had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 14706, also known as the "Carmack Amendment," or, for purposes of this opinion, the "Amendment." While we agree with the District Court as to one aspect of its ruling, as more fully explained herein, we disagree that the Lewises' claim for damages in the amount of additional mortgage payments they had to make and the lost profit on the sale of their home was insufficient to comply with the Carmack Amendment and applicable regulations. We will therefore vacate the District Court's order dismissing the case and remand for further proceedings.

I. Standard of Review & Jurisdiction

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The standard of review for a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is de novo. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008). In conducting our review, we must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Id. at 233.

II. Background

Consistent with our standard of review, we recite the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the Lewises. The Lewises owned and lived in a house in Glen Rock, Pennsylvania. On July 19, 2004, as part of a planned move to New York, they entered into a contract to sell that residence. The sales agreement provided that the Lewises would deliver "a vacant building" to the buyer at the time of the closing, which was scheduled for August 27, 2004. (Appellee App. at A24 ¶¶ 6-8.) Well aware of the need to move their belongings quickly to comply with the terms of the sales agreement, the Lewises solicited a bid from Atlas's local agent, Warners Moving and Storage ("Warners"), explicitly informing Warners that their house had to be empty before August 27. The Lewises also informed Warners that they had purchased a new home in New York and that they intended to use the proceeds from the sale of their Pennsylvania home to pay for it.

Warners assured the Lewises that, if hired, it would have their Pennsylvania residence emptied by August 26, the day before the closing was scheduled to occur. On July 27, 2004, a Warners sales representative executed an agreement with the Lewises providing that "Warners Moving and Storage will arrive at your home on 8/23 & 8/24 to box the household belongings with loading the household effects on 8/25 & 8/26. Delivery is scheduled for 8/31 or 9/1." (Appellee App. at A42.)

However, notwithstanding its explicit promise, made with full awareness of the Lewises' obligation to present an empty home at closing on August 27 and their need to pay for their new home in New York, Warners dramatically failed to fulfill its commitment. On August 23 and 24, Warners did pack the Lewises' belongings as required, and on August 25, Warners did provide a moving van at the Lewises' residence, and began loading the belongings into the van. Despite its obligation to complete the loading by the following day, though, and knowing full well the possible consequences to the Lewises, Warners advised the Lewises that the moving van was leaving that evening because the tractor and crew were needed to handle a move to North Carolina for another customer the next day.

The Lewises were still left believing that another crew would appear with a tractor trailer to finish their move as scheduled. But, on August 26, the day it had agreed to complete the loading, Warners failed to show up at the Lewises' home. Obviously concerned, the Lewises attempted to contact Warners. No one from Warners appeared at the Lewises' home that day, and no one from Warners offered any explanation for the delay. Nor did Warners appear on August 27, the day of the closing. Aware that the real estate transaction was in serious jeopardy, the Lewises again tried to contact Warners and eventually spoke to Jeff Warner at around noon on August 27.1 Mr. Warner advised the Lewises that there were no licensed drivers available to deliver a moving van to their residence.

Later that day, the Lewises attended the scheduled closing. Not surprisingly, given Warners' failure to perform as promised, the Lewises were unable to deliver a vacant home to the purchasers. The purchasers refused to go through with the sale. Warners did not complete the loading of the Lewises' belongings until August 29, and did not deliver them to New York until September 3, 2004.

When the Lewises' belongings arrived at their new home in New York, Richard Lewis acknowledged their receipt by signing a Household Goods Bill of Lading and Freight Bill. That document provided that "as a condition precedent to recovery, a claim for any damage ... or delay, must be filed within nine months after delivery .... When a claim is not filed ... in accordance with the foregoing provisions, carrier shall not be liable and such a claim shall not be paid." (Appellee App. at A139.)

The following month, on October 26, 2004, the Lewises' attorney sent a letter to Warners requesting compensation for losses incurred because of Warners' failure to timely perform as promised under the parties' agreement. The letter requested damages equal to the "loss of profit on the sale of their residence, additional mortgage payments that Mr. and Mrs. Lewis have had to pay on two mortgages on their Pennsylvania residence which otherwise would have been paid off at closing, and various other miscellaneous expenses they would not have otherwise incurred." (Appellee App. at A150.) The letter went on to explain that the Lewises could not provide an exact dollar amount for their losses "until they are able to sell their Pennsylvania residence." (Appellee App. at A151.) Shortly thereafter, on November 4, 2004, Warners' counsel sent a letter to the Lewises' attorney acknowledging receipt of the October 26, 2004 letter, and requesting additional information and documentation.

On March 14, 2005, the Lewises entered into a new contract to sell their Pennsylvania property. The sale closed on June 3, 2005, at a price approximately $35,000 lower than the amount the Lewises would have received under the prior sales agreement, had that transaction been completed. During the nine-month period between the delivery of their belongings to New York and the sale of their Pennsylvania residence, the Lewises paid approximately $9,000 in mortgage payments on the Pennsylvania residence, approximately $1,600 in additional utility bills, and over $28,000 in additional taxes.2

On November 9, 2005, the Lewises sent a letter to Warners fully explaining their damages and providing a detailed spreadsheet showing the expenses incurred because of Warners' failure to keep its promises. Warners refused to pay, and the Lewises were compelled to file suit.

In their complaint filed on August 23, 2006 against Atlas in its capacity as Warners' principal, the Lewises asserted claims for breach of contract and negligence and sought approximately $72,000 in damages. Atlas, relying on the Carmack Amendment, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Atlas then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It argued that the Lewises' state law claims were preempted by the Amendment and that the Lewises could not obtain relief under that statute because they had not complied with an associated regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 370.3, which requires a shipper to file a claim "for a specified or determinable amount of money" with the carrier within the time limits specified in the bill of lading.

On January 30, 2007, the District Court denied Atlas's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Carmack Amendment did not preempt the Lewises' state law claims. However, on May 30, 2007, the District Court granted Atlas's motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. In doing so, the District Court agreed with Atlas that the Lewises' state law claims were preempted and that the Lewises had not complied with the cited regulation. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Subsection (a)(1) of the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), provides in relevant part that:

A carrier providing transportation or service ... shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation .... That carrier ... [is] liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property....

At oral argument, counsel for the Lewises correctly conceded that the Amendment preempts the Lewises' state law claims against Atlas.3 See, e.g., Ga., Fla & Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948 (1916) (explaining that the Carmack Amendment covers "all losses resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier's duty as to any part of the agreed transportation"); Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 306 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that the Carmack Amendment preempted state law claims by a consumer shipper against a...

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