Lewis v. City of Medina
| Decision Date | 15 April 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 43965,43965 |
| Citation | 548 P.2d 1093,87 Wn.2d 19 |
| Parties | G. Harlan LEWIS and Harry G. Lewis, Appellants, v. CITY OF MEDINA, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Philip P. Malone, Poulsbo, for appellants.
Benson, Chadwick, Stege & Wines, Stephen F. Chadwick, Jr., Kirk R. Wines, Seattle, for respondent.
This action involves the refusal of the City of Medina to issue a building permit. The Superior Court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the city to issue the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed and the property owners have appealed.
Due to the changing positions of the parties as to being appellants or respondents, we find it more clear and convenient to refer to G. Harlan Lewis and Harry G. Lewis as 'plaintiffs' and the City of Medina as 'defendant'.
Plaintiffs' parents owned all of tract G of DeVries Lake Washington Tracts in 1942. Some time thereafter they sold the northerly 75 feet of tract G, which was triangular in shape. The parents had built a home near the center of the tract. Later the father died and his widow, Melita G. Lewis, with the cooperation of her sons, plaintiffs herein, sold the home. In the sale there was conveyed, for a consideration of $45,000, not only the land on which the house was located, but also a triangular-shaped tract bounded on the east by 84th Avenue N.E. with a 75-foot frontage on said avenue. The conveyance of that tract left Mrs. Lewis owning an oddshaped tract, sometimes referred to as a trapezoid, with an area of approximately 5,150 square feet.
Mrs. Lewis desired a small house on the land which remained in her ownership. She employed an architect, Roland W. Wilson, who prepared plans for such a house. Through some misunderstanding, Mr. Wilson did not know of the conveyance of the triangular tract, but thought it was merely an easement. The plans which he prepared called for a substantial part of the house to be on the land which had been conveyed. The City of Medina had not been formed at that time and Mr. Wilson went to the King County, Engineer's Office to get a building permit.
The employee in the engineer's office relied upon the plans presented by Mr. Wilson, including the statement that the area which in fact had been conveyed was only an easement. In such reliance the building permit was issued in April 1952, although no construction was undertaken.
In 1955 the City of Medina was incorporated. Mrs. Lewis died, leaving the plaintiffs herein as the owners of the 5,150 square feet of property.
In February 1972, plaintiffs applied to the City of Medina for a building permit. The matter was referred to the Board of Adjustment. The board held two hearings, received reports from the planning commission and members of the board personally made an inspection. After that, the Board of Adjustment made extensive findings of fact and supplemental findings of fact and entered a detailed decision. The Board of Adjustment denied the application for a building permit.
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Medina, the King County requirement for a single family residence was 6,000 square feet (minimum lot size). After the city was incorporated, ordinances were adopted calling for sizes of lots for single family residences to be at least 16,000 square feet.
After incorporation, the City of Medina adopted certain ordinances relative to zoning. One of those ordinances contained what has been referred to as a 'grandfather clause.' It reads:
5--1.15 Separate Ownership Exception: Lot Size and Frontage.
Where a parcel of land was in separate ownership at the time of the adoption of the City's applicable residential land use density regulations and such parcel would have qualified as a building site under minimum lot size and frontage regulations applicable at the time of its acquisition by such owner, said parcel shall, without the necessity of a variance, when possessed of frontage equal to at least 85% Of that otherwise required, qualify as a single building site notwithstanding otherwise applicable lot size and frontage regulations, but shall in all other respects be subject to land use regulations of the district of its location.
City of Medina ordinance No. 148, § 1--1963.
Plaintiffs base their claim upon that ordinance, upon the 1952 building permit, and upon the constitutional prohibitions against the taking of property without due process of law. The constitutional argument rests upon the undisputed fact that without a building permit plaintiffs' land had little, if any, value.
First, we shall discuss the constitutional question. It is a well-settled law that zoning is a constitutionally permissible exercise of the police power. State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Wenatchee, 50 Wash.2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957). State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash.2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952). Although the plaintiffs herein might suffer considerable financial loss--a frequent situation in zoning matters--that would not render the zoning ordinances invalid. We said in Bitts, Inc. v. Seattle, 86 Wash.2d 395, at 400, 544 P.2d 1242 at 1245 (1976):
Economic hardship cannot usually be urged as a reason for the invalidity of an otherwise valid statute or ordinance enacted under the police power. Wiegardt v. Brennan, 192 Wash. 529, 73 P.2d 1330 (1937); State v. Dexter, 32 Wash.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, 13 A.L.R.2d 1081 (1949).
Second, we shall consider the scope of review of the decision of the Board of Adjustment. The rule is well established that a judicial review of the action of a Board of Adjustment is limited to an inquiry of whether the action of the board is 'arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.' Reiger v. Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 651, 359 P.2d 151 (1961); Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952); Durocher v. King County, 80 Wash.2d 139, 492 P.2d 547 (1972); Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955), Overruled on other grounds in Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
The rule is stated in L. M. Pike & Son, Inc. v. Waterford, 130 Vt. 432, 434, 296 A.2d 262, (197...
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