Lewis v. City of Santa Fe

• Decision Date: 27 January 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23,849.
• Citation: 2005 NMCA 32,108 P.3d 558
• Parties: DARRYL LEWIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF SANTA FE, and WAL-MART STORES, INC., Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

2005 NMCA 32

108 P.3d 558

DARRYL LEWIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF SANTA FE, and WAL-MART STORES, INC., Respondents-Appellees.

Docket No. 23,849.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: January 27, 2005.

Barry Green, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Bruce Thompson, City Attorney, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Frank T. Herdman, Brenden J. Murphy, Rubin Katz Law Firm, P.C., Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} Petitioner Darryl Lewis filed an appeal with the district court seeking review of an administrative action of the City of Santa Fe (the City), by which Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., (Wal-Mart) was authorized to develop a gasoline filling station on one of its existing properties. The district court dismissed the appeal on grounds that it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a preexisting judgment. We granted Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

{2} Wal-Mart operates a Sam's Club store in Santa Fe. In February 2001, Wal-Mart sought permission from the City to increase the intensity of use at that location by erecting an unmanned gasoline filling station in the parking lot to serve its members. After gathering information from a variety of sources, the City's Planning Commission denied the application. Wal-Mart then appealed to the City Council. The City Council reviewed the recommendations of the Planning Commission, conducted a public hearing, and denied Wal-Mart's appeal in October 2001.

{3} Dissatisfied with the City's decision, Wal-Mart appealed to the district court. Shortly thereafter, the City and Wal-Mart reached a settlement of the suit in which the City agreed to approve the gasoline filling station, subject to certain conditions. In an executive session without a public hearing and without public comment, the City Council then voted to approve the settlement agreement and the proposed development on February 27, 2002. Petitioner filed a timely appeal with the district court alleging in part that while the development was first disapproved after a public hearing at which he spoke against it, "[t]here was no public meeting" and "[n]o public comment was allowed" when the City subsequently approved the development on February 27, 2002, although "there was no significant change in the application." Petitioner therefore alleged in his appeal that the City's approval of the development was arbitrary, capricious, not in accordance with law, and not supported by substantial evidence. See NMSA 1978, § 3-21-9 (1999) (providing for an appeal by a person aggrieved by a decision of the zoning authority); NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1 (2004) (setting forth the procedure for such an appeal).

{4} After Petitioner filed the foregoing appeal, the district court entered a stipulated order of dismissal in Wal-Mart's appeal on March 18, 2002. It recites that the City and Wal-Mart have resolved and settled Wal-Mart's appeal pursuant to a settlement agreement and then orders, "that this matter be, and hereby is, dismissed pursuant and subject to the terms and provisions of the [Settlement] Agreement."

{5} Shortly after the stipulated dismissal was entered, Wal-Mart intervened in Petitioner's administrative appeal to the district court. Wal-Mart then filed a motion to strike Petitioner's appeal, and the City filed a similar motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the district court granted the motions and dismissed Petitioner's appeal on the specific, limited ground that Petitioner's appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the order of March 18, 2002. Petitioner timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review of the district court's ruling.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{6} This Court reviews district court decisions in administrative appeals under an administrative standard of review. Rio Grande Chapter of the Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm'n, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 16-17, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806. Generally speaking, we "conduct the same review of an administrative order as the district court sitting in its appellate capacity, while at the same time determining whether the district court erred in the first appeal." Id. ¶ 16. In this case, we apply the latter portion of this standard, insofar as we are called upon to review the district court's dismissal of the appeal. "A decision to grant summary judgment on preclusion principles is reviewed under a de novo standard." Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 76, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d 215.

DISCUSSION

Preclusive Effect of the Stipulated Dismissal and Settlement Agreement

{7} The order of dismissal that we review here is premised on the district court's determination that Petitioner's administrative appeal should be characterized as an impermissible collateral attack on the March 18, 2002, order. This is the exclusive subject of our review. See Vill. of Angel Fire v. Wheeler, 2003-NMCA-041, ¶ 9, 133 N.M. 421, 63 P.3d 524 (observing that in the context of administrative appeals, it is generally inappropriate for this Court to rule on issues that the district court has not passed upon).

{8} Petitioner's pleadings, including the notice of administrative appeal and the statement of appellate issues, make clear that Petitioner seeks to challenge the City's official decision on February 27, 2002, to approve the development of a filling station at the Sam's Club location. This constitutes a statutorily authorized, direct attack on a land use decision by the City under Section 31-2-9. See also § 3-19-8; § 3-21-9; § 39-3-1.1 (providing for an appeal to the district court by any person in interest dissatisfied with an order or determination of a planning commission after review of the order or determination by the governing body of the municipality). Although the City, Wal-Mart, and the dissent assert that Petitioner was required to intervene in the litigation between them in order to protect his right to challenge the development, they cite no New Mexico authority to support this position, and we decline any invitation to create such authority here. We fail to see how Petitioner's statutory right to seek review of the City's land use decision should be defeated by the subsequent execution of a private settlement agreement and the entry of a stipulated order of dismissal.

The Dismissal Based Upon the Settlement Agreement is Not an Order Entitled to Preclusive Effect

{9} The City and Wal-Mart contend that Petitioner's appeal should be regarded as an impermissible collateral attack on the order of the district court by which Wal-Mart's lawsuit against the City was dismissed because the order specifically references the settlement, and because the settlement contains the terms of the very development agreement that Petitioner seeks to overturn. We are unpersuaded for several reasons.

{10} First, we do not regard Petitioner's administrative appeal as a collateral attack. A collateral attack is "an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade [a judgment], or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking" the judgment. Lucus v. Ruckman, 59 N.M. 504, 509, 287 P.2d 68, 72 (1955) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N.M. 502, 504, 505 P.2d 845, 847 (1973). In this case, all that is at issue is a stipulated order of dismissal. Petitioner's appeal from the development decision of the City Council does not in any way seek to "avoid, defeat, or evade" the stipulated order of dismissal. Instead, it seeks review of the substantive acts undertaken by the City making a zoning decision to secure the dismissal.

{11} The City and Wal-Mart urge that Petitioner's appeal represents a collateral attack on the settlement between them, insofar as Petitioner seeks a reversal of the development agreement contained therein. The jurisprudence pertaining to collateral attacks pertains to judgments and other adjudications. See, e.g., Hanratty v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 82 N.M. 275, 276, 480 P.2d 165, 166 (1970) (holding that a party could not collaterally attack a default judgment obtained against him in a foreclosure action); City of Socorro v. Cook, 24 N.M. 202, 212, 173 P. 682, 685 (1918) (holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack); Dugan v. Montoya, 24 N.M. 102, 115, 173 P. 118, 122 (1918) (observing that judgments evidenced by patents are immune from collateral attack); VanderVossen v. City of Espanola, 2001-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 17-21, 130 N.M. 287, 24 P.3d 319 (applying the bar against collateral attacks in regard to a municipal authority's final zoning decision); Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 122 N.M. 468, 469, 927 P.2d 23, 24 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an attempt to set aside a divorce decree constituted an impermissible collateral attack); Royal Int'l Optical Co. v. Tex. State Optical Co., 92 N.M. 237, 241, 586 P.2d 318, 322 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a judgment establishing a party's exclusive right to use a trade name was not subject to collateral attack). It has no application to contractual relationships. It is well established in this state that settlements and judgments entered by the consent of the litigants essentially represent contractual agreements. See Owen v. Burn Const. Co., 90 N.M. 297, 299, 563 P.2d 91, 93 (1977) (observing that "a stipulated judgment is not considered to be a judicial determination; rather it is a contract between the parties") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pope v. The Gap, Inc., 1998-NMCA-103, ¶ 18, 125 N.M. 376, 961 P.2d 1283 (holding that a consent judgment is essentially a contract).

{12} Had the stipulated dismissal meaningfully incorporated the settlement, Petitioner's appeal might have constituted an indirect attack on the district court's order. See, e.g., Sanders, 122 N.M. at 469, 927 P.2d...