Lewis v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 14 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 07-0429 (RMU). |
| Citation | 653 F.Supp.2d 64 |
| Parties | Tanya D. LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
John F. Mercer, Mercer Law Associates, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Dwayne C. Jefferson, D.C. Attorney General's Office, Patricia Ann Jones, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
This employment discrimination case is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff, an African-American woman, alleges that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and has asserted claims for disparate treatment, retaliation, hostile work environment and constructive discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the defendant discriminated and retaliated against her by refusing to promote her on multiple occasions and fostered a hostile work environment that resulted in her resignation.
The court concludes that the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie of discrimination in connection with her non-selection claims and, as a result, denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to these claims. Moreover, because the defendant has failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the plaintiff's non-selections, the court grants the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on these claims. The court concludes, however, that the plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her retaliation, hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to the defendant on those claims.
Beginning in February 2002, the plaintiff worked as an electrical inspector for the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs ("DCRA"). Pl.'s Am. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mot.") at 4. Prior to joining the DCRA, the plaintiff had worked for twenty years as an electrician in Virginia and the District of Columbia. Id. In May 2004, the DCRA selected the plaintiff to serve as Acting Electrical Supervisor. Id. In that position, the plaintiff's job responsibilities included supervising a largely male staff, overseeing inspection of electrical standards and implementing safety procedures for the handling of hazardous materials. Id.
In April 2005, the DCRA began soliciting applications for the position of Permanent Electrical Supervisor. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") at 2. The plaintiff submitted her application for the position, and was deemed qualified, see Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 6, but the DCRA closed the application cycle on June 9, 2005 without selecting a candidate ("the first non-selection"). Def.'s Mot. at 2. At the time she applied, no woman had previously occupied the position of Permanent Electrical Supervisor. Pl.'s Mot. at 6-7.
In August 2005, the DCRA advertised the position for a second time. Def.'s Mot. at 2. The plaintiff submitted another application, as did several male candidates, some of whom worked under the plaintiff's supervision at the time. Pl.'s Mot. at 7. The DCRA closed the application cycle on September 28, 2005, again without selecting a candidate for the position ("the second non-selection"). Def.'s Mot. at 2.
Shortly after the second non-selection, and without explanation, the DCRA removed the plaintiff from the position of Acting Electrical Supervisor and returned her to her former position as electrical inspector. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. The plaintiff contends that she was not compensated for the services she rendered as Acting Electrical Supervisor, despite the fact that she served in that capacity for over a year. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
On October 3, 2005, the DCRA again solicited applications for the Permanent Electrical Supervisor position. Def.'s Mot. at 2-3. The plaintiff applied, but once again, the DCRA closed the application cycle at the end of October without selecting a candidate ("the third non-selection"). Id. at 3. The DCRA advertised the position two more times in 2006, and the plaintiff applied on both of those occasions ("the fourth and fifth non-selections"). Id. At the close of the fifth application cycle, the DCRA selected William Davidson, an African-American male, to serve as Permanent Electrical Supervisor. Id. at 3.
Davidson resigned from the position in December 2007, allegedly on the grounds that he was not qualified to serve as Permanent Electrical Supervisor and was not licensed as a Master Electrician in the District of Columbia. Id. at 8 & Ex. 3 (Aff. of Mohammed Ali) ("Ali Aff.") ¶¶ 18-19.1 The plaintiff notes that at the time she applied, she had been serving as Acting Electrical Supervisor for over a year, was licensed as a Master Electrician in the District of Columbia and Virginia, had taught a course at a community college, had received a masters degree in business administration and was the only candidate who qualified for the District of Columbia's residency preference.2 Id. at 4, 8-9.
After participating in five application cycles within thirteen months, all resulting in her non-selections, and after allegedly being subjected to "wrongful, psychological torment and interference with her ability to work" through "open recalcitrance, discourtesy and insubordination by her subordinates" and "lack of support from her Superiors," the plaintiff resigned from the DCRA on July 7, 2006. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 33-34.
The plaintiff first filed a complaint with the DCRA on January 3, 2006, alleging discrimination in connection with her third non-selection. Id. ¶ 16. On March 16, 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming "disparate treatment in the denial of a promotion and a hostile work environment on the basis of . . . race, gender, and matriculation." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1. The plaintiff did not include allegations of retaliation or constructive discharge in her EEOC complaint. Id. On December 4, 2006, after more than 180 days had passed since the plaintiff filed her complaint, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter stating that it had terminated its processing of the complaint. Am. Compl., Ex. 1.
The plaintiff filed a complaint in this court on March 5, 2007, see generally Compl., and shortly thereafter, filed an amended complaint setting forth six counts of gender discrimination, one count of discrimination in violation of the District of Columbia Personnel Rules, one count of retaliation, one count of hostile work environment and one count of constructive discharge, see generally Am. Compl. On January 24, 2008, 535 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008), the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. See 535 F.Supp.2d at 3. Specifically, the court dismissed the claims predicated on the fourth and fifth non-selections on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to include those claims in her administrative complaint. Id. at 6-8. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim based on a violation of the D.C. Personnel Rules. Id. at 11. The court, however, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's remaining claims.3 See generally id.
On February 17, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. See generally Def.'s Mot. The plaintiff filed her own motion for summary judgment on February 17, 2009 and filed an amended summary judgment motion one week later on February 23, 2009. See generally Pl.' Mot. Both parties assert that there is no issue of material fact with respect to any of the plaintiff's remaining claims. See generally Def.'s Mot.; Pl.'s Mot. The court now addresses the arguments set forth in the parties' submissions.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.
The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations made in a sworn...
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