Lewis v. DMH Invs.
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-3207 |
| Parties | RACQUEL LEWIS v. DMH INVESTMENTS LLC AND CITY OF PHILADELPHIA OFFICE OF HOMELESS SERVICES |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
The Complaint in this action asserts claims against the City of Philadelphia Office of Homeless Services (“OHS”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Racquel Lewis's civil rights while she was a resident of a homeless shelter associated with the OHS. The Complaint also asserts state law claims against OHS and DMH Investments LLC (“DMH”). The claims against DMH relate to the actions of its employees during the time in which Lewis rented an apartment it managed. The City of Philadelphia[1] (the “City”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims against it. Plaintiff has failed to file a response to the Motion.[2] For the reasons stated below, we grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's claims against the City with prejudice and remand her claims against DMH to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
The Complaint alleges that Racquel Lewis and her minor child were residents of a homeless shelter associated with OHS from January 2020 until March 2021. (Compl. (Docket No. 1-1) at 16 of 26.) Early in her stay at the homeless shelter, Lewis had a multidisciplinary meeting where she was asked about triggers by three staff members (none of whom is identified by name in the Complaint). (Id.) A behavioral specialist, who was one of the three staff members in attendance, confirmed to Lewis that her experiences were “designed to make her ‘insane.'” (Id.) Following this meeting, Lewis was “singled out - called names, weekend passes were prohibited, transportation passes were not received, furniture assistance was withheld, [and] staff spoke of content regarding [Lewis's] personal conversations that should not have been known to them . . . .” (Id.) In addition, her minor child was “subjected to repeated verbal threats by an adult resident” of the facility. (Id.) On one occasion, staff called law enforcement when Lewis engaged in protected activity, and the law enforcement officer disciplined her and dismissed the actions of another resident. (Id.) No other residents were treated in this manner. (Id.)
The Complaint asserts claims against the City pursuant to § 1983 for violations of the Constitution. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the City violated Lewis's right to equal protection and procedural due process under the 14th Amendment; her First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, and press; her Fourth Amendment rights against searches and seizures; her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and her Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 15, 19 of 26.) The Complaint also asserts claims against the City for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Federal Communications Act. (Id. at 18-19 of 26.) It is not clear whether the Complaint purports to assert claims against the City under local and state laws, but the Complaint mentions the City's Fair Practices Ordinance, Philadelphia Code § 9-1101 et seq., 68 Pa. Stat. § 397.11, and negligence in connection with OHS. (Id. at 18-19 of 26.) Lewis seeks damages of $1,000,000 from the City. (Id. 18 of 26.)
The Complaint alleges that Lewis was accepted into the OHS's rapid rehousing program for assistance in obtaining housing in November 2020. (Id. at 17 of 26.) Under the program, she was required look for vacant apartments, after which an apartment was chosen for her. (Id.) Lewis first viewed the apartment into which she eventually moved in January 2021 and moved into the apartment in March 2021. (Id.) The apartment was managed by DMH. (Id. at 6 of 26.) DMH violated its lease agreement with Lewis and treated her improperly.
The Complaint appears to assert claims against DMH for negligence in trying to enter Lewis's apartment while her minor child was home alone and for violation of Lewis's privacy by installing a Bluetooth listening device in her apartment. (Id. at 18 of 26.) The Complaint also appears to assert a breach of contract claim against DMH for violating Lewis's lease agreement. (Id. at 7 of 26.) Lewis moved out of the apartment on January 1, 2022 and seeks damages totaling $8,923.72 from DMH Investments. (Id.)
Lewis filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The City subsequently removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. Lewis has not filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss. DMH has not been served in this action.
The City has moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we “‘consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.'” Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)). We take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F. 4th 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)). However, we “‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
A plaintiff's pleading obligation is to set forth “‘a short and plain statement of the claim,'” which “‘give[s] the defendant ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) () (first quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); and then quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must allege “‘sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,' thus enabling ‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.'” Warren Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In the end, we will grant a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint are not sufficient “‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Geness v. Admin. Off, of Pa. Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The instant Complaint has been filed pro se. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)).
Lewis asserts her federal Constitutional law claims against the City pursuant to § 1983. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (footnote and citation omitted). Thus, in order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, “a plaintiff must demonstrate [that] the defendant, acting under color of law, deprived . . . her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Id. (citations omitted). A municipality “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her constitutional deprivations were caused by an official policy or custom of the municipal entity or by a failure by the municipal entity to train its employees. Id.; Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989). A municipal policy is a “‘statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a local governing] body's officers.'” Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1059 (3d Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). A custom, on the other hand, “is an act ‘that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,' but that is ‘so widespread as to have the force of law.'” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 404). “In either case, the policymaker, as defined under state law, must be ‘responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.'” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 761 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480-81 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The City argues that we should dismiss the Complaint as against it because the Complaint fails to include any nonconclusory allegations that it violated any of Lewis's federal rights and because the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to plausibly allege claims for violations of the Constitutional Am...
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