Lewis v. Germantown Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 04 December 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 398,398 |
Citation | 251 Md. 535,248 A.2d 468 |
Parties | Morris M. LEWIS v. GERMANTOWN INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
John K. Keane, Jr., Riverdale (Edward P. Camus, Riverdale, on the brief), for appellant.
William H. Clarke, Bethesda, for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.
We sometimes wonder if the bar ever reflects upon the reasons why we have adopted and promulgated rules of practice and procedure. We wonder also how many practitioners pay any attention to what we have said about these rules. We refer, at the moment, to Maryland Rules 18 c 1 and 535 2 and the decisions 3 in which they have been discussed. Thus, far, in enforcing the Rules, we have been reluctant to make use of our powers of remand and dismissal, more out of consideration for litigants than for members of the bar. Of late, it should be noted, we find ourselves becoming somewhat less considerate of the plight of litigants whose obligation to know and comply with the Rules, at least in theory, is no less than that of the attorneys they retain to represent them. However, as we shall see, Rules 18 c and 535 were not the only ones slighted by the parties.
In the case at bar the appellant (Lewis) sued appellee (Company) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In his declaration he alleged, in addition to the 'money paid' and 'money received' common counts, that on 1 September 1964 he received a letter from Carey Winston Company of Washington, D. C. (Winston), which held a mortgage on his Silver Spring residence, inviting him to participate in an arrangement whereby the Company 'would insure * * * (his) mortgage indebtedness in the event of his disability,' that to evidence his agreement thereto he completed and returned to Winston the 'QUALIFICATION CERTIFICATE' AND THAT ON 1 october 1964 he received a 'Certificate of Insurance.' 4 He paid the premiums, he further alleged, until 4 February 1966 when he became totally disabled 'as a result of heart failure.' The Company, he concluded, despite proper and timely demands on his part, refused to make the promised payments. The Company filed a motion to dismiss 'inasmuch as this (the Circuit Court for Montgomery County) is not the most convenient forum and because the Carey Winston Company is an indispensable party to the termination of the issues in this case and is not amenable to suit in Maryland.' Lewis responded with a motion ne recipiatur.
At this point we call attention to infringements of Rule 828. There is no record extract. There is no appendix to the Company's brief. Neither the declaration nor the motion to dismiss is printed in either brief. The same is true in respect of the certificate of insurance, except for a single paragraph thereof printed in Lewis' brief.
On 21 December 1967 there was a hearing on the motion ne recipiatur and the motion to dismiss. A 28 December 1967 docket entry indicates the entry of a 'judgment in favor of the defendant (the Company) for costs.' What transpired at the hearing, or thereafter, we have no way of knowing as the trial judge gave no reasons for his action.
Since the motion to dismiss was inappropriate, the motion ne recipiatur (which should have been a motion to strike) ought to have been granted. The Company's objections to the declaration should have been raised either by demurrer as provided by Rule 345 or by a motion raising preliminary objections as provided by Rule 323 a (2) and (8). We repeat our discussion of the function of Rule 535 as it appears in Smith v. State Roads Commission, 240 Md. 525, 539-540, 214 A.2d 792, 799 (1965):
The nub of the Company's case seems to be that because Winston is an indispensable party Lewis should have filed his suit in the District of Columbia which, it says, is a more convenient forum. While, for reasons not disclosed, the District of Columbia might be, for the Company, a more desirable jurisdiction, there can be no doubt Lewis had a perfect right to sue the Company in Maryland and if Winston really is an indispensable party there is no reason why it cannot be made a third party defendant (Maryland Rule 315) upon whom service of process can be obtained under the provisions of the 'long arm' statute. Code, Art. 75, §§ 94-100 (1965 Repl.Vol.). In these circumstances we are unable to discern how or why the District of Columbia would be a more convenient forum than Montgomery County, the courts of which jurisdictions are less than 20 miles apart. But we cannot see how Winston can be an indispensable party. The satisfaction of its mortgage on Lewis' property obviously is its only interest in the matter and under the terms of the policy the Company is obliged to make payment to Winston. If, by chance, a dispute should arise as to who is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance the payment of the money into court would protect the Company against the danger of having to pay twice.
Coates v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 58 Md. 172, 177-179 (1882), (cited by neither party) we think, settles the matter. Judge Ritchie, for the Court, said:
'The plaintiffs were the party with whom the company contracted; were the owners of the property insured, when the policy was issued, and at the time of the loss, and had paid the intermediate renewals by which the policy was kept in force.
'There was no consideration moving from the mortgagee to the company; and the company assumed no enhanced risk or burden in consenting to pay the insurance money to the mortgagee. This application or disposition of the money was an arrangement, in substance, as between the assured and the mortgagee, for the greater security or indemnity of the latter, and was not of the essence of the company's obligation. The right to the money really accrued to the assured, in case of loss, by virtue of their having been the contracting party; of their property being the subject of the insurance; and of their having paid the premiums which constituted the consideration. But because of their direction simply, incorporated at their instance in the policy, and not because of any independent liability incurred to the mortgagee by the company, the mortgagee was designated as the recipient of the payment, though in fact such payment enured to their own benefit.
'It is true, that by reason of this provision, the mortgagee acquired such an interest under it, that suit could have been brought by it, had it so elected. 'If * * * one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third, that third may maintain an action upon it.' * * * 'In policies of insurance, it is a common practice to bring your action, either in the name of the party by whom the contract was made, or of the party for whom the contract was made.' * * *.
'The designation of a party to whom the money shall be paid over, does not destroy the legal right of the party, through whose contract the right to have the money has accrued, to demand it himself when there has been a failure to so pay it over.
'Of course, the company, in a case like the present, if willing to pay, is interested in not having to pay the money twice.
'* * * Indeed, if apprehensive of suits by both parties, the payment of the money into Court would be a ready and adequate means of protection against separate demands. * * *.'
See also Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 158 Md. 169, 175-176, 148 A. 252 (1930); Farmers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Baker, 94 Md. 545, 51 A. 184 (1902).
The Company seems to say that the contract is actually between it and Winston and that Lewis, if insured, is only a beneficiary. It is not entirely clear what impact the Company intended this argument to have. It has long been established that a third party beneficiary may maintain an action. Hamilton & Spiegel, Inc. v. Board of Education, etc., 233 Md. 196, 195 A.2d 710 (1963); Marlboro Shirt Co., Inc. v. American District Telegraph Co., 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951); Seigman ex rel. Shaffer v. Hoffacker, 57 Md. 321, 325 (1881).
The Company did not move to dismiss Lewis' appeal and we have chosen not to do so nostra sponte. It must not be supposed, however, that the same degree of forbearance will be displayedIn the future, in respect of a similar disregard of the Maryland Rules.
The judgment entered by the learned judge below will be reversed and the case will be remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment...
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