Lewis v. Gov't of D.C., Civil Action No. 15-521 (JEB)

• Decision Date: 07 December 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-521 (JEB)
• Parties: Patricia D. Lewis, Plaintiff, v. Government of the District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

161 F.Supp.3d 15

Patricia D. Lewis, Plaintiff,

v.Government of the District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-521 (JEB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed December 7, 2015

Adam C. Bonner, Charles A. Bonner, Bonner & Bonner, Sausalito, CA, Joseph A. Scrofano, Scrofano Law PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Fernando Amarillas, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Charles Theodore Tucker, Jr., Tucker Law Group LLP, Brandywine, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge

Happily ensconced in the District of Columbia's new Consolidated Forensic Sciences Laboratory, the city's Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) decided that all employees stationed there had to take a drug test as a condition of continued employment. Plaintiff Patricia Lewis, formerly employed as a human-resources adviser with OCME, balked. Objecting on privacy grounds, she refused to take the test and was fired nine months later. She then brought this suit against the District, former Mayor Vincent Gray, and a number of its officials. Although the crux of her grievance lies with the drug testing, her Complaint is muddied by a skein of claims under the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, state statutes, and state common law. A subset of Defendants—the District, former Mayor Gray, and OCME's Chief of Staff, Beverly Fields—now moves to dismiss. The Court will grant in part and deny in part their Motion.

I. Background

Before her termination in 2013, Lewis held the job of “[Human Resources] Advisor, Management Liaison Specialist” in the city's Office of Chief Medical Examiner. See Am. Compl., ¶ 20. OCME's duties include autopsies as well as other forensic and medicolegal investigations. See generally D.C. Code Ann. § 5-1401 et seq. When she was hired, OCME was located in an office building on Massachusetts Avenue in Southeast Washington. See id. , ¶ 24. Sometime in or before July 2012, the city informed OCME's workforce that it would be moved to a new facility: the city's Consolidated Forensic Sciences Laboratory. See id. , ¶ 21. The new laboratory, which opened in October 2012, was designed to house under one roof a number of city departments, including OCME, the Department of Forensic Sciences, and several divisions of the Metropolitan Police Department, such as the Firearms and Fingerprint Examination Division, the DNA laboratory, and the Forensic Sciences Services Division. See D.C. Council Resolution No. 19–726 § 2(b) (Dec. 4, 2012).

During a staff meeting on July 18, 2012, an attorney for the city, Charles Tucker, informed OCME employees that, as a condition of their ability to relocate to the new laboratory, and thus to maintain their jobs, they would be required to consent to a set of background checks detailed in a 2012 Mayor's Order. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 21, 22, 28 (citing Mayor's Order 2012–84); Def. Mot., Exh. A (Mayor's Order 2012–84). The Order indicated that the city's Department of Human Resources possessed the authority to require employees with “a duty station” at the new laboratory to submit to some combination of “background checks, investigations, mandatory criminal background checks, and tests for controlled substance use.” Mayor's Order 2012–84 at 2. Tucker stated that employees had until 4:00 p.m. that day to sign a “Notification of [ ] Drug and Alcohol Testing Form,” which also required disclosure of “any current medications,” or risk being fired. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 21, 22.

Lewis “immediately protested” both the requirements themselves and the short timeframe that employees were given to respond. See id. , ¶ 23. She alleges that she made her objections known “verbally” to an unspecified audience on July 18, 2012, and “in writing” in a letter to Tucker two days later. See id. , ¶¶ 23, 24. In the letter, Lewis stated that she was “hired into a non-sensitive position that has not been reclassified, nor designated as high risk,” suggesting that certain inquiries into her background, like the drug test, were unwarranted. See id. , ¶ 23. Plaintiff received a written response from Tucker on August 30, 2012, which stated definitively that, “due to the relocations of your position to the new facility, you will be subject to mandatory criminal background checks and testing for controlled substance use in accordance with [M.O. 2012-84].” Id. , ¶ 27. According to Lewis, she refused to “submit[ ] to the background check,” including a drug test. See id. , ¶ 24.

Plaintiff claims that, as a consequence of her refusal to comply with those requirements, she suffered repeated mistreatment at the hands of the city and its agents. The first set of wrongs related to her working conditions. Beginning on October 23, 2012, she was forced to “remain at the abandoned [OCME] Office” building—i.e. , her former duty station prior to the relocation—while the rest of the OCME workforce departed for the new facility. See id. , ¶ 24. She remained working there, alone, until January 3, 2013, when she received a proposed letter of termination from her employer. See id. , ¶¶ 24, 57. More on that later. During that time, the facility lacked “adequate heat” and afforded her inadequate access to her office and the bathroom, given what she claims was her “known disability—difficulty of traversing stairs.” Id. , ¶ 24. The problem, according to Plaintiff, was that the “elevators were largely inoperable[,] which meant that [she] had to climb the stairs to get to her office on the second floor.” Id. , ¶ 55. Furthermore, because the “bathroom facilities on the second floor were disabled because the ceiling in the bathroom had fallen,” Plaintiff was forced “to make the difficult climb up and down two flights of stairs just to use the bathroom.” Id. , ¶ 56.

She also alleges that certain city employees retaliated against her, at times in rather odd ways. One grievance is that OCME's Chief of Staff, Beverly Fields, directed her executive assistant to “stealthily and surreptitiously enter the suite occupied by Ms. Lewis without identifying herself,” ostensibly to either scare or intimidate Plaintiff. Id. , ¶¶ 58, 59. These spectral visitations apparently happened “on several occasions.” Id. In one instance, Lewis “heard noises and shouted out for the individual to identify himself or herself.” Id. The assistant, who was apparently “hiding in the supply room next to [Plaintiff's] office space, came out and said to [Plaintiff], ‘While you're calling out for someone to identify themselves you could already be dead.’ ” Id. The assistant then left. Id.

She also complains of harm to her reputation. Specifically, she asserts that an OCME employee posted Plaintiff's picture at a guard station at the new laboratory with a caption indicating that she had “fail[ed] the background check,” even though she had simply refused to submit to one. Id. , ¶¶ 24, 60.

Finally—and perhaps most importantly—Lewis claims that the city fired her because of her refusal to undergo the background checks and her decision to “speak[ ] up and protest[ ]” the background-check requirement. Id. , ¶¶ 5, 25, 98. The District issued its proposed letter of termination on January 3, 2013, see id. , ¶ 57, and terminated her on April 9. See id. , ¶ 5. (The Complaint leaves unexplained what Plaintiff was doing or where she was working between January 3, 2013, and her eventual termination, but she appears to concede that she no longer went to work in the abandoned office building after receiving the proposed-termination letter. See id. , ¶ 24).

She then brought this 10-count suit against the District, certain officials, and various city employees, alleging violations of: (1) the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution (Counts IX, II, and V); (2) various federal and state civil-rights statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the D.C. Human Rights Act (Counts III, VII, VIII, and IV); and (3) state law prohibiting wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation (Counts I, VI, and X). Certain Defendants—comprising the District, former Mayor Gray, and Beverly Fields—now move to dismiss. (Other Defendants subsequently filed separate motions, which the Court does not address here.)

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true ... and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ ” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979) ) (citation omitted); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA , 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C.Cir.2005). The notice-pleading rules are “not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo , 544 U.S. 336, 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005), and she must thus be given every favorable inference that may be drawn from the allegations of fact. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 584, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Plaintiff must put forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court need not accept as true “a legal ...