Lewis v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-1355-JPG |
| Parties | LERON LEWIS, JR, Plaintiff, v. HIRSCHBACH MOTOR LINES, INC. and ERIC JEROME CAMPELL, SR., Defendants. BRANDON JAMAL MOFFETT, Plaintiff, v. HIRSCHBACH MOTOR LINES, INC. and ERIC JEROME CAMPELL, SR., Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, v. BRANDON JAMAL MOFFETT, LERON LEWIS, JR., DATWAY LLC, MOTOR CARRIER CONSULTANTS, LLC., J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., MCGRIFF TIRE, CO., INC., NAVISTAR, INC., BENDIX, COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS LLC, and BIG TEX TRAILER MANUFACTURING, LLC, Third Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Hirschbach”) and Eric Campbell (“Defendant” or “Campbell”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss against Plaintiff Leron Lewis, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “Lewis”) and Plaintiff Brandon Moffett's Complaint (“Plaintiff” or “Moffett”), (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Defendants have filed two separate motions - a Motion to Dismiss Count III of Lewis' Complaint (Doc. 52), and Motion to Dismiss Count III and VI of Plaintiff Moffett's Complaint (Doc. 53)[1]. Moffett and Lewis submitted their joint responses at Doc. 71 and 72, respectively.
Plaintiffs allege they were injured in an accident with a semi-truck driven by Defendant Campbell on December 13, 2020, in Franklin County, Illinois on Interstate 57. Plaintiffs allege that they were injured when a tractor-trailer, operated by Defendant Campbell, driving within the scope of his employment with Hirschbach, collided with their stopped vehicle on Interstate 57. Lewis alleges he sustained severe injuries to the right side of his body, along with other bodily injuries and suffers pain as a result of this accident. Moffett alleges bodily injury, mental suffering, disfigurement and other damages. Lewis filed this suit eight days after the accident (Doc. 1). Plaintiff Moffett filed suit 22 days after the accident. Their suits were then consolidated (Doc. 25).
In Count I, Lewis asserts a claim against Campbell, alleging he was negligent in operating his semi-truck at a speed too great for conditions, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to avoid a collision with the vehicle operated by Lewis, striking Lewis' vehicle, failing to slow or stop, failing to adhere to 49 CFR 300, and failing to maintain his semi-truck. Lewis Compl at ¶ 4. Count II of Lewis' Complaint asserts a negligence claim against Hirschbach under a theory of respondeat superior. Count III asserts a claim of direct negligence under a theory of negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, and/or entrustment that Hirschbach allowed Campbell to operate the semi-truck in violation of federal regulations, failed to properly train Campbell, failed to ensure he was properly trained to operate the semi-truck, failed to discipline or re-train Campbell when it should have known Campbell failed to comply with rules and regulations, failed to remove Campbell from his duties after it knew Campbell was unfit for the job, failed to supervise Campbell, and failed to train Campbell regarding driving rules, regulations and industry customs. Lewis Compl ¶¶ 7-8. In Count III, Hirschbach admitted Campbell was acting within the scope of his employment and admitted respondeat superior is applicable.
In Count I of Moffett's Complaint, Moffett alleges the same negligence against Campbell, negligence against Hirschbach in Count II under a theory of respondeat superior, and a claim of direct negligence against Hirschbach for negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, and/or entrustment. Moffett Compl at ¶¶ 22-26. Count IV alleges that Defendant's conduct amounts to gross negligence. Moffett Compl at ¶¶ 24-26.
Defendants move to dismiss Count III of Lewis' Complaint and Count III and Count IV of Moffett's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The plaintiff “must do more in the complaint than simply recite the elements of a claim.” Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2011). Complaints that offer “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
Defendants move to dismiss Count III of Lewis and Moffett's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, Defendants state that Count III should be dismissed on the grounds it is “duplicative and improper under Illinois law given that Hirschbach has admitted respondeat superior for Mr. Campbell's relevant acts or omissions.” (Doc. 52, p. 5); (Doc. 53, p. 6). Plaintiffs respond with two arguments. First, they state that Defendants' motions are not properly brought before the Court under 12(b)(6), because Defendants' motion relies on material outside of the complaint, namely Defendant's answer. Additionally, Plaintiffs state that the Court should not dismiss Count III for direct negligence against Hirshbach because Plaintiffs Lewis and Moffett meet the exception of “willful and wanton misconduct.” (Doc. 71, p. 11); (Doc. 72, p. 11).
In Illinois, a plaintiff who is injured in a motor vehicle accident cannot maintain a claim for negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent entrustment against an employer where the employer admits responsibility for the conduct of the employee under respondeat superior. Gant v. L.U. Transport, Inc., 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 928, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 770 N.E.2d 1155 (2002). The reasoning behind this principle is that additional liability should not be imposed on the employer where the employer's liability “is predicated initially on, and therefore is entirely derivative of, the negligence of the employee” and so “cannot exceed the liability of the employee.” Id.
But an exception exists where a principal's culpability may be greater than that of the agent. Lockett v. Bi-State Transit Auth., 445 N.E.2d 310, 314, 94 Ill.2d 66, 67 Ill.Dec. 830 (1983). “Unlike the situation in negligent-entrustment cases, where the misconduct of the defendant-principal is of the same level of culpability as that of the tortfeasor-agent, defendants-principals may be found guilty of willful and wanton misconduct even though the tortfeasors-agents to whom the instrumentality causing the injury was entrusted may have been only negligent.” Id. As a result, “the necessity of proof of the defendant-principal's misconduct in connection with willful-and-wanton entrustment actions is not eliminated simply because that party acknowledges an agency relationship with the tortfeasor.” Id; see also Neuhengen v. Glob. Experience Specialists, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 160322, ¶ 90, 109 N.E.3d 832, 852 (“there is no sound reason for such a rule where a plaintiff has pled a viable claim for punitive damages based on allegations of willful and wanton conduct against an employer for its independent actions in hiring and retaining an employee or entrusting a vehicle to an unfit employee”).
In order to recover damages based on “willful and wanton conduct, ” a plaintiff must plead and prove the basic elements of a negligence claim, i.e., that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and must additionally allege either a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the plaintiff's welfare. Neuhengen, 2018 IL App (1st) 160322, 109 N.E.3d 832.
Illinois courts have attempted to define “willful and wanton conduct” throughout the years. Papadakis v Fitness 19 IL 116, LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 170388, ¶ 23, 148 N.E.3d 648, 653 (). Such conduct can mean “only degrees more than ordinary negligence, ” while under other facts, willful and wanton acts may be only “degrees less than intentional wrongdoing.” Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill.2d 267, 275-76, 204 Ill.Dec. 178, 641 N.E.2d 402 (1994). In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court describes such acts as “a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious...
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