Lewis v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-1355-JPG |
| Parties | LERON LEWIS, JR, Plaintiff, v. HIRSCHBACH MOTOR LINES, INC. and ERIC JEROME CAMPELL, SR., Defendants. BRANDON JAMAL MOFFETT, Plaintiff, v. HIRSCHBACH MOTOR LINES, INC. and ERIC JEROME CAMPBELL, SR., Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, v. BRANDON JAMAL MOFFETT, LERON LEWIS, JR., DATWAY LLC, MOTOR CARRIER CONSULTANTS, LLC., J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., MCGRIFF TIRE, CO., INC., NAVISTAR, INC., BENDIX, COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS LLC, and BIG TEX TRAILER MANUFACTURING, LLC, Third Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter comes before the Court on various pending motions. See Docs. 163, 164, 183, 184, and 197. These motions have been filed by certain Third-Party Defendants. Third- Party Plaintiffs Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc. (“Hirschbach”) and Eric Jerome Campbell (“Campbell,” collectively “Defendants” or “Third-Party Plaintiffs”) have filed responses to these motions.
This case involves a motor vehicle accident on interstate 57, southbound in Franklin County on December 13, 2020, around 6:30 a.m. Campbell was driving a tractor-trailer for his employer Hirschbach. The tractor-trailer collided with the vehicle and trailer that Plaintiffs Leron Lewis Jr. (“Lewis”) and Brandon Moffett (“Moffett,” collectively “Plaintiffs”) were operating for their employer Datway, LLC (“Datway”). Lewis filed this suit eight days after the accident (Doc. 1). Moffett filed suit 22 days after the accident. Their suits were then consolidated (Doc. 25).
On November 15, 2021, Campbell and Hirschbach have filed a Third-Party Complaint against various entities (Doc. 91):
In short, Campbell was driving the tractor-trailer for his employer Hirschbach and collided with a vehicle and trailer that Lewis and Moffett were operating for their employer Datway. Moffett and Lewis sued Campbell and Hirschbach for negligence. Moffett owned the vehicle he and Lewis were operating and Moffett leased it to Datway for the purpose of hauling freight. (Doc. 98 at ¶ 34). Datway hired MCCI to monitor the hours of service and regulation compliance.
Various entities named in the Third-Party Complaint now move this Court to dismiss their third-party claims. Datway moved to dismiss Counts 4 and 5 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Doc. 163). Third-Party Plaintiffs Campbell and Hirschbach responded and objected. (Doc. 178). Datway replied. (Doc. 182). Later, Datway filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the same Counts 4 and 5. (Doc. 183). No response has been filed in response of that motion.
Motor Carrier Consultants, LLC (“MCCI”) also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count 6 of the Third-Party Complaint. (Doc. 164). Third-Party Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion (Doc. 179). MCCI filed a reply. (Doc. 185).
J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (“J.B. Hunt”) also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings against Third-Party Plaintiffs (Doc. 184). Third-Party Plaintiffs filed its response. (Doc. 192). Additionally, J.B. Hunt filed a motion to strike Third-Party Plaintiffs' response at Doc. 192 because it attached immaterial documents to its opposition. (Doc. 197). Third-Party Plaintiffs opposed that motion. (Doc. 199). The Court takes each motion in turn.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The plaintiff “must do more in the complaint than simply recite the elements of a claim.” Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2011). Complaints that offer “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
We “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). This is a fine line, though, and it is appropriate to give plaintiffs a chance to amend a complaint to provide more factual detail, as the district court did here after its first dismissal. Olson v. Champaign Cty., Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2015).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim should survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if the complaint contains well-pled facts-that is, not just legal conclusions- that permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In deciding or reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we do not ask did these things happen; instead, “the proper question to ask is still ‘could these things have happened.' ” Carlson v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no disputed issues of material fact and it is clear that the moving party ... is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Unite Here Local 1 v. Hyatt Corp., 862 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2017). A district court is confined to matters in the pleadings and must consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Pleadings include “the complaint, the answer, and any accompanying written instruments attached as exhibits.” Rube v. PartnerRe Ireland Ins. DAC, 470 F.Supp.3d 829, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (citing N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998)). Just as the Court does so with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the non-moving party's pleading as true and draws all inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). In diversity cases, such as this one, federal courts apply state substantive law. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co., 796 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the parties agree that Illinois law applies.
As mentioned above, Count 3 of the Complaint asserts a claim of negligence against Datway under the theory of respondeat superior, alleging that Datway, by and through its employment of Lewis and Moffett, was negligent in the same respects as Lewis and Campbell. Count 4 asserts a claim of negligence hiring, retention, and supervision against Datway in respect to its employment of Lewis and Moffett. In Datway's motion, Datway answered Third-Party Plaintiff's complaint where it “admitted that it employed Mr. Lewis and Mr. Moffett at all relevant times and that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Moffett were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident in question.” (Doc. 163 at 5); (Doc. 135 at 7). Therefore, Datway admitted to vicarious liability for Lewis and Moffett's alleged negligence under respondeat superior and Count 4 of the complaint is duplicative and should be dismissed. Datway now moves under Rule 12(b)(6) or alternatively in Rule 12(c) for this Court to dismiss Count 4.
Third-Party Plaintiffs make multiple...
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