Lewis v. L. A. Cnty. Metro. Transit Auth.

• Docket Number: B318081
• Decision Date: 20 July 2023
• Parties: FERGUS LEWIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

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FERGUS LEWIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant and Respondent.

B318081

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Third Division

July 20, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No 21STCV03968, Elaine Lu, Judge. Affirmed.

Andrew E. Smyth for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kessel & Megrabyan, Elizabeth M. Kessel, and Armineh Megrabyan for Defendant and Respondent Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

ADAMS J.

This is plaintiff Fergus Lewis's third suit against defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) for damages allegedly arising out of Lewis's 2014 termination by the MTA. The first action, for wrongful termination and whistleblower retaliation, was dismissed because Lewis failed to timely file a government claim with the County of Los Angeles. The second action, filed in federal district court, was dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction because it was a de facto appeal of the state court judgment and did not adequately allege extrinsic fraud. The third action, for extrinsic fraud alleges that the MTA prevented Lewis from pursuing his wrongful termination/whistleblower retaliation case by making false statements to the court in connection with a demurrer.

The present appeal is from an order granting a special motion to strike the complaint in the third action pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).^[1] Lewis concedes that his complaint is based on conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, but he urges that the trial court erred by granting the motion because he established a probability of prevailing. We conclude that Lewis's extrinsic fraud claim is identical to that already adjudicated by the district court, and thus it is barred by issue preclusion. We therefore affirm the order granting the special motion to strike.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Wrongful Termination/Whistleblower Retaliation Action (Lewis I)

Lewis began working as a bus driver for the MTA in August 1990. On March 12, 2014, Lewis was directed to drive a bus that did not contain an equipment bag. Lewis refused and told a supervisor an order to do so was illegal. An argument ensued and security and police were called. Lewis was placed on administrative leave the same day and was terminated in May 2014.

Lewis filed a worker's compensation claim in June 2014 for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of the March 2014 incident. Nine months later, in March 2015, Lewis filed a claim with the County of Los Angeles under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) asserting retaliation and wrongful termination. The county rejected his claim as untimely because it was filed more than six months after his termination.

Lewis filed a wrongful termination and whistleblower retaliation action in superior court in May 2015 (Lewis I). The MTA demurred, asserting the action was barred because Lewis had not filed a government claim within six months of his termination and had failed to exhaust all internal administrative remedies. The superior court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Lewis then filed an amended complaint alleging that the filing of the workers' compensation action equitably tolled the time to file the government claim. The MTA again demurred, contending the workers' compensation claim made no mention of Lewis's termination, whistleblowing, or retaliation, and thus it did not put the MTA on notice of Lewis's retaliation/wrongful termination claim. The superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the workers' compensation action did not equitably toll the time to file the government claim because it concerned only physical injuries arising out of the March 12, 2014 incident, which were unrelated to Lewis's alleged wrongful termination.

Lewis appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Lewis v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Apr. 2, 2018, B280604) [nonpub. opn.].) The appellate court explained that the equitable tolling doctrine requires, among other things, timely notice and lack of prejudice to the defendant. An earlier claim can provide notice of a later claim if" 'the facts of the two claims [are] identical or at least so similar that the defendant's investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly defend the second.'" The critical question, therefore, is" 'whether notice of the first claim affords the defendant an opportunity to identify the sources of evidence which might be needed to defend against the second claim.'" In the present case, Lewis's workers' compensation claim "arose from entirely different facts than those alleged in his lawsuit, and is based on an entirely different theory of recovery than his retaliation claim. Plaintiff's whistleblower retaliation claim arose from plaintiff's termination on May 23, 2014, in retaliation for his reporting the 'illegality' of operating a bus without his necessary supplies to various MTA personnel. The viability of a retaliation claim turns on evidence of the employer's motive to terminate the plaintiff. [Citation.] Defendant's investigation of plaintiff's personal injuries sustained March 12, 2014, in the context of a workers' compensation case, would not put it on notice of plaintiff's whistleblower retaliation claim arising from his termination on May 23, 2014." Lewis's workers' compensation action, therefore, did not equitably toll the time to file his retaliation claim.

II. Federal Court Action (Lewis II)

Lewis filed a second action in federal court in February 2019, asserting that he lost his state court action because the MTA engaged in extrinsic fraud which deprived him of the opportunity to argue the merits of his retaliation/wrongful termination claims. Specifically, Lewis alleged that the MTA "failed to disclose internal documents and made intentional misstatements, which led the state court to dismiss his case."^[2]

The MTA moved to dismiss the action, contending, among other things, that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars cases "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005) 544 U.S. 280, 284.) The doctrine does not apply, however, where a plaintiff alleges that an adverse party in a state court proceeding committed extrinsic fraud that caused the state court to rule for that party. (E.g., Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. (9th Cir. 2004) 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 ["Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that court. It is, rather, a wrongful act committed by the party or parties who engaged in the fraud. Rooker-Feldman therefore does not bar subject matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff alleges a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to set aside a state court judgment obtained by that fraud"].)

The district court concluded the extrinsic fraud exception did not apply and granted the motion to dismiss. It explained that extrinsic fraud is conduct that" 'prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.'" Intrinsic fraud, in contrast, is fraud that "weakens an opponent's case, such as through perjury or concealment of evidence, rather than fraud that prevents a party 'from getting into court at all.'" In the case before the court, Lewis alleged at most intrinsic fraud because he did not contend that the MTA prevented him from presenting his claim in state court. Instead, Lewis "fully participated in the state court case and presented his arguments there that [the MTA] concealed evidence and intentionally misled him." Accordingly, the court said, Lewis "has not alleged extrinsic fraud."^[3]

III. The Present Case

Lewis filed the present action in February 2021 against the MTA and 20 individuals. Although the complaint's caption identifies 34 causes of action, the body of the complaint asserts only a single cause of action for extrinsic fraud. The complaint alleges that Lewis was unlawfully terminated in May 2014 after he refused to drive a bus without having his equipment bag with him. Lewis filed the Lewis I action, to which the MTA demurred on the ground that Lewis's delay in filing a government claim prejudiced its ability to defend the suit. According to Lewis's complaint, the demurrer "strongly implied, . . . without directly stating, that the 4 month delay in filing the administrative claim prejudiced [the MTA's] ability to defend." This implied assertion "is and was a false claim and was known [to the MTA] to be false . . . when made" because the MTA "had in fact thoroughly interviewed all the witnesses to the incident (who were supervisory employees) shortly after the incident" about "all aspects of what happened." Further, the complaint asserts the MTA "actively misled the Plaintiff and the Court by arguing that such an allegation, ie serious misconduct, would not trigger a complete investigation-while, at the same time knowing that policy of the MTA, in fact, required such an investigation; and that such an investigation had been done." These actions by the MTA "prevented Plaintiff from exercising his Constitutional rights to redress economic injuries in a Court of law and are a deprivation of Federally protected rights."

The MTA and 15 individual defendants (sometimes referred to collectively as MTA) filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to section 425.16. The MTA asserted that the alleged wrongful acts-making...