Lewis v. Leon County

• Decision Date: 23 January 1926
• Citation: 107 So. 146,91 Fla. 118
• Parties: LEWIS et al. v. LEON COUNTY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

107 So. 146

91 Fla. 118

LEWIS et al. v. LEON COUNTY.

Florida Supreme Court

January 23, 1926

En Banc.

Proceeding by Leon county, as petitioner, under Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 3296-3301, to validate certain bonds, opposed by the State in which George Lewis and others, taxpayers and citizens of Leon county, intervened. From a final decree overruling interveners' demurrer to the petition, and granting the petitioner's motion to strike the answer of the interveners, and decreeing the validity of the bonds in question, the interveners appeal.

Affirmed.

Whitfield and Ellis, JJ., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

County may authorize issuance of bonds to raise money to aid in construction of hard-surfaced highways, although one or more has been designated by Legislature as state roads, and will become property of state. Under the provisions of sections 1531 et seq. of the Revised General Statutes of 1920, and chapter 8553 of the Laws of Florida of 1921, a county may, by following the procedure provided by the statutes, authorize the issuance of bonds, the proceeds of which are to be used for the purpose of constructing or aiding in the construction of payed, macadamized, or other hard-surfaced highways located within the county, although one or more of such highways so to be constructed, or the construction of which is to be aided, have been designated by the Legislature as state roads, and will, when constructed, become the property of the state, though still used as county roads.

Public highway may be state road, but as to that portion passing through particular county it may be county road. A public highway may be a state road, both in name and ownership, but as to that portion which passes through a particular county it may be also, to all practical intents and purposes, and in its beneficent effect, a county road as well.

Whether county or state constructs, owns, or maintains within county any given portion of through highway use is same, and benefits are same. Whether the county or the state constructs or owns or maintains within the county any given portion of a through highway, connecting neighborhoods, villages, and towns within the county, as well as counties and cities beyond its boundaries, and facilitating travel, transport and intercommunication between them, the use is the same, and the benefits are the same.

Legislature held to have power to give county right to contribute to, or aid in, construction of public highway located in county though it is to be owned and maintained by state. As the Legislature has the power to confer, as it long has done, on the respective counties the power to build and maintain at county expense public highways for the use of the general public, plenary power over which was retained by the Legislature, it has the power to give a county the right (as it has done by chapter 8553 of the Laws of Florida, construed in connection with section 1531 et seq. of the Revised General Statutes of 1920) to contribute to, or aid in, the construction of a public highway located in and benefiting such county, though the same, when constructed, is to be owned and maintained by the state; thus legislatively construing such purpose to be a county purpose.

Making title of act mention matters germane to and properly connected with its general title held not to vitiate title or make it express more than one subject; title to statute authorizing department of state, county, or special road or bridge district to aid in construction or maintenance of state or state aid road held not defective. The amplification of the title to an act so as to make it expressly mention matters germane to and properly connected with its general subject does not vitiate such title or subject it to the criticism of expressing more than one subject. The title to chapter 8553 of the Laws of Florida of 1921 comes within this rule, and is not violative of section 16 of article 3 of our Constitution.

Leon county, acting through board of county commissioners, subject to ratification and election, held to have power to authorize issuance of bonds to improve public roads, although some of roads have been designated as state roads by legislative enactment. Upon the record in the instant case, the county of Leon, acting through its board of county commissioners subject to ratification thereof by subsequent election to be called and held in accordance with the statute, had the power to adopt the resolution of March 16, 1925, and to take the other steps required by sections 1531-1536 of the Revised General Statutes of 1920, to authorize the issuance of bonds for the purpose expressed in the resolution, although some of the roads in said county therein designated to be constructed, or the construction of which was to be aided, were and had been designated as state roads by legislative enactment; such purpose being a county purpose within the meaning of section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution.

Statutes relating to issuance of county bonds for aiding construction of highways held not to require exact location of roads to be set out in resolution, nor that it shall appear that right of way has been secured in advance. Section 1531 of the Revised General Statutes of 1920, construed in connection with said chapter 8553, does not require the exact location of the roads to be constructed or aided to be set out in the resolution, nor that it shall appear that the right of way has been secured in advance.

Change of route of highway to defeat validity of bonds to construct and aid in road construction should be of sufficiently substantial character to defeat purpose expressed in resolution and ratified by election. If it should develop that, after the election, there had been any radical or substantial departure from the route of any road designated in the resolution of the board of county commissioners, this might present a question going to the expenditure of the funds raised by the sale of the bonds rather than to the validity of the bonds, for relief against which appropriate remedies are provided by law; and, in order for any change of route to be invoked to defeat validation, it should be sufficiently substantial in its character as to defeat the purpose expressed in the resolution and ratified by the election.

Submitting question of issuance of county bonds to construct and aid in construction of hard-surfaced highways as single question held proper. Where the question submitted by the resolution of the board of county commissioners to the electors was a single one, in substance being whether a bond issue of $1,500,000 should be authorized for the purpose of constructing and aiding in the construction of hard-surfaced highways in the county, the net proceeds from the sale of the bonds to be apportioned and expended on the several hard-surfaced roads to be constructed, or the construction of which was to be aided by the issue and sale of such bonds, the resolution enumerating and designating such several roads, and the sum intended approximately to be allocated to each, it was permissible to submit such question to the electors of the county as a single question, and the fact that the proposition was not divided so as to allow the electors to vote on each road separately shows no violation of the statute, or abuse of power by the county commissioners, and affords no reason why the bonds thus authorized and ratified by the electors should not be validated.

Authorization of specific bond issue to construct and aid in construction of roads by county commissioners held not abuse of discretion. While the discretion vested in the county commissioners as to the amount of bonds which may be authorized, in view of the assessed valuation of property in the county, the existing indebtedness of the county, amount of taxes paid, etc., is subject to control by the courts in case of abuse, under the principles announced in Getzen v. Sumter County (Fla.) 103 So. 104, as applied to the facts set up by the interveners in the instant case, no abuse of such discretion is here shown.

Including in decree statutory clause that it should be forever conclusive on validity of bonds against county not error. No error was committed by the lower court of which the interveners can complain by embracing in its decree a clause to the effect that 'this decree shall be forever conclusive upon the validity of the bonds against the said county, and the validity thereof shall never be called in question in any court in this state,' as this was a mere statement of the effect of the validation as fixed by the statute, and in the language of the statute.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Leon County; E. C. Love, Judge.

COUNSEL

W. J. Oven, of Tallahassee, for appellants.

Myers & Myers, of Tallahassee, for appellee.

OPINION

BROWN C.J.

This is an appeal from a decree validating an issue of bonds by the county of Leon in a proceeding brought by said county under sections 3296 to 3301 of the Revised General Statutes of 1920. The county filed its petition, and, as required by the statute, the state was made the party defendant thereto, and the state attorney of the Second judicial circuit, who is directed by the statute to represent the state in such proceedings, filed an answer to the effect that he had carefully examined the petition and that, from the same, he did not see any legal reason why the said bonds should not be validated. An intervention was filed in said cause by George Lewis and others, citizens and taxpayers of said county, objecting to the validation of said bonds upon grounds hereinafter referred to, and embracing in their answer a demurrer to said petition. The petitioner filed a motion to strike each paragraph of the answer...