Lewis v. Lewis
Decision Date | 25 April 2023 |
Docket Number | 2022-CA-00016-COA |
Parties | ROBERT G. LEWIS APPELLANT v. LISA M. LEWIS APPELLEE |
Court | Court of Appeals of Mississippi |
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ.
¶1. The DeSoto County Chancery Court granted Lisa Lewis and Robert Lewis an irreconcilable differences divorce, divided the marital estate, and awarded Lisa periodic alimony of $2,000 per month. On appeal, Robert argues that the chancellor abused her discretion in selecting the "line of demarcation" for purposes of dividing the marital estate and in awarding alimony. We find no error and affirm.
¶2. Robert and Lisa were married in 1999 and later had two children together. After twenty years of marriage, Robert moved out of the marital home in December 2019 and filed for divorce in January 2020. Lisa later filed an answer denying that Robert was entitled to a divorce and a counterclaim for separate maintenance. Lisa alleges that Robert had already begun an affair with another woman by the time he left the marital home. At trial, Robert admitted that he had committed adultery and that the affair was still ongoing, but he testified that the affair began shortly after he moved out.
¶3. In December 2020, the chancellor entered a temporary order requiring Robert to pay $1,903 per month in child support and certain other expenses of the parties' children, pay $1,100 per month in temporary alimony, and maintain health insurance for Lisa and the children. The temporary order stated in part, "Out of the money received by [Lisa] she shall have the responsibility for payment of the ongoing house mortgage note, [her] vehicle note, [her] vehicle insurance, all house utilities, and the other expenses and items listed on [her] Rule 8.05 Financial Disclosure."
¶4. Nine days after the temporary order was entered, Robert filed a motion to modify the order because he had lost his job. In February 2021, the chancellor modified the temporary order, reducing Robert's child support payments to $900, reducing his temporary alimony payments to $100 per month, and suspending Robert's obligation to maintain health insurance for Lisa and the children.
¶5. In April 2021, Lisa filed a motion to modify the temporary order because Robert had found a new job. In May 2021, the chancellor modified the temporary order, increasing Robert's child support payments to $1,105 per month, increasing his temporary alimony payments to $600 per month, and requiring him to provide health insurance for the children as soon as it became available through his new job. 2
¶6. In November 2021, the parties consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce. They agreed that the chancellor would divide the marital estate and rule on Lisa's request for alimony. Following a trial, the chancellor divided the marital estate and awarded Lisa the marital home and $2,000 per month in periodic alimony.[1] Robert appealed. On appeal, he argues that the chancellor abused her discretion in selecting the line of demarcation for the division of the marital estate and in awarding alimony.
¶7. "The law in Mississippi is that the date on which assets cease to be marital and become separate assets-what we refer to . . . as the point of demarcation-can be either the date of separation (at the earliest) or the date of divorce (at the latest)." Collins v. Collins, 112 So.3d 428, 431-32 (¶9) (Miss. 2013). In addition, the chancellor may use a temporary order as the line of demarcation. Id. at 432 (¶11). "Ultimately, . . . the chancellor has the discretion to draw the line of demarcation." Randolph v. Randolph, 199 So.3d 1282, 1285 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Collins, 112 So.3d at 432 (¶10)).
¶8. Here, the chancellor used the date of the original temporary order (December 2, 2020) as the line of demarcation. Robert argues that the use of that date was unfair to him because the value of the marital home increased between the temporary order and the trial held one year later. An appraiser testified that the value of the home increased from $335,000 on December 2, 2020, to $383,000 at the time of trial (November 30, 2021). Robert contends that the use of the date of the temporary order negatively impacted him in the division of the marital estate. In the final judgment, the chancellor awarded the marital home and mortgage to Lisa and found that the home had a net value of $105,000-$335,000 with a mortgage balance of $230,000. In total, the chancellor awarded Robert assets and debts with a net value of $164,960 and awarded Lisa assets and debts with a net value of $155,350. The chancellor then ordered Robert to pay Lisa $4,805 to "equalize" the property division. Robert reasons that if the chancellor had valued the marital home as of the date of trial, then Lisa would have been required to make an equalization payment to him. Robert argues that the use of the temporary order as the line of demarcation resulted in a "$48,000 windfall" to Lisa. He argues that this was unfair to him because his temporary alimony payments were used to pay the house note. However, Robert fails to show that the chancellor abused her discretion in setting the line of demarcation.
¶9. To begin with, Robert paid a total of only about $6,200 in temporary alimony during the entire period covered by the temporary orders.[2] Those temporary alimony payments were not just for the house note but were intended to assist Lisa with her "responsibility for payment of the ongoing house mortgage note, [her] vehicle note, [her] vehicle insurance, all house utilities, and the other expenses and items listed on [her] Rule 8.05 Financial Disclosure." In short, the temporary alimony payments were to assist Lisa with all of the expenses she became responsible for when Robert abandoned the marital home. Lisa's expenses totaled $5,273 per month-or $63,276 for the entire year covered by the temporary orders.[3] Thus, Robert's temporary alimony payments covered less than one-tenth of Lisa's household expenses during the year covered by the temporary orders. Taking into account all the expenses Lisa inherited following Robert's departure from the marital home, the record simply does not support Robert's claim that the chancellor treated him unfairly.
¶10. Moreover, as noted above, the line of demarcation "can be . . . the date of separation (at the earliest) or the date of divorce (at the latest)." Collins, 112 So.3d at 431-32 (¶9). Within that range, the chancellor has considerable discretion, and it is well settled that the chancellor may use a temporary order as the line of demarcation. Id. at 432 (¶11). In the present case, by the time the original temporary order was entered, the parties had been separated for a year. Moreover, even taking into account Robert's temporary alimony payments, Lisa was by that time responsible for the vast majority of her own expenses, including the mortgage. On these facts, we cannot say that the chancellor abused her discretion by selecting the date of the temporary order as the line of demarcation.
¶11. "Alimony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor" and will not be reversed unless the chancellor's findings are clearly erroneous or the chancellor abused her discretion or "applied an erroneous legal standard." Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). "Periodic alimony is awarded on the basis of need, generally in monthly installments." Stroh v. Stroh, 221 So.3d 399, 412 (¶44) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). Permanent periodic "[a]limony should be considered only if, after the parties' assets are equitably divided, there are not sufficient assets to provide for both parties and one party is left with a deficit." Id. at (¶43) (quotation marks omitted). By this, we mean that the spouse requesting alimony "is left with a deficit with respect to having sufficient resources and assets to meet his or her needs and living expenses." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Harris v. Harris, 241 So.3d 622, 625 (¶8) (Miss. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "[T]o the extent of his ability to pay," the financially independent spouse "is required to support [the financially dependent spouse] in a manner to which she has become accustomed" during the marriage.[4]
¶12. In ruling on a request for alimony, the chancellor should consider and make findings regarding certain factors, known as the "Armstrong factors." Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1280. Those factors are:
¶13. In this appeal, Robert argues that we should reverse the...
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