Lewis v. Long (In re Long)

• Decision Date: 29 January 2014
• Docket Number: Adversary No. 13–06030.,Bankruptcy No. 13–60044.
• Court: United States Bankruptcy Courts. Third Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: In re Clyde A. LONG, Jr. and Latoya L. Long, Debtors. Crystal D. Lewis, Plaintiff, v. Clyde A. Long, Jr., Defendant.

504 B.R. 424

In re Clyde A. LONG, Jr. and Latoya L. Long, Debtors.

Crystal D. Lewis, Plaintiff,

v.Clyde A. Long, Jr., Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 13–60044.

Adversary No. 13–06030.

United States Bankruptcy Court,

W.D. Virginia,

Lynchburg Division.

Jan. 29, 2014.

J. Michael Sharman, Commonwealth Law Office, PC, Culpeper, VA, for Plaintiff.

Marshall Moore Slayton, Esq., Charlottesville, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION FOR DETERMINATION OF A DEBT AS NON–DISCHARGEABLE

REBECCA B. CONNELLY, Bankruptcy Judge.

Crystal Lewis filed this Adversary Proceeding complaint against Clyde Long to determine, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the dischargeability of his debt to her. This opinion follows a trial on the merits. Mr. Long is a debtor in this Court, and Ms. Lewis has voluntarily brought this section 523(a)(6) action asking the Court to adjudicate the merits of her complaint to except her debt from the discharge in Mr. Long's bankruptcy case. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and authority to hear this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7056, and the Western District of Virginia District Court General Order of Reference.¹ This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt.² After consideration of the record, arguments of the parties, and evidence and motions presented at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law ³ as to Ms. Lewis's case-in-chief.

Background

This case originates from rather disturbing and troubling facts. Mr. Long and Ms. Lewis were involved sexually at various times in 1999 and 2000. During the course of their sexual relationship, Mr. Long was twenty-two or twenty-three years of age, while Ms. Lewis was twelve or thirteen years of age. Trial Transcript at 4:21–25, Lewis v. Long (In re Long), No. 13–06030 (Bankr.W.D.Va. Apr. 1, 2013) ECF No. 17, hereinafter “Trial Tr.”. The parties conceived a child, who was born in November of 2000. Id.

In connection with the sexual relationship, Mr. Long plead guilty to two counts of carnal knowledge under section 18.2–63 of the Code of Virginia. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Lewis v. Long (In re Long), No. 13–06030 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2013) ECF No. 16. Mr. Long's criminal action is not before this Court. Following Mr. Long's criminal conviction, Ms. Lewis filed a civil suit in the Circuit Court of Culpeper County alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual assault and battery, and carnal knowledge of a minor. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, Lewis v. Long (In re Long), No. 13–06030 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2013) ECF No. 16. Mr. Long did not make any appearance in that case until he appeared pro se at the default judgment hearing. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Lewis v. Long (In re Long), No. 13–06030 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2013) ECF No. 16. The Circuit Court entered a default judgment on liability and set the matter for a jury trial to determine damages. Id.

Prior to initiating the jury trial proceeding, Mr. Long, pro se and Ms. Lewis, through counsel, executed a promissory installment note with a confession of judgment. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Lewis v. Long (In re Long), No. 13–06030 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2013) ECF No. 16. Judgment on the promissory note is the underlying debt in this matter.

Procedural History

Mr. Long filed for Chapter 7 relief with this Court on January 10, 2013. Ms. Lewis filed her complaint against Mr. Long in this Adversary Proceeding on April 1, 2013, seeking a determination that the debt owed her by Mr. Long is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Court held a pre-trial conference with the parties on May 20, 2013. Following the pre-trial conference, neither party submitted briefs or memoranda of law prior to trial on October 21, 2013. During the trial and at the close of Plaintiff's evidence, Mr. Long moved to strike. Trial Tr. 25:3–4 ⁴. After hearing arguments on the motion to strike, the Court took the motion under advisement and allowed Mr. Long to put on evidence in his defense. At the close of the trial, the Court took the matter under advisement.

Defendant's Rule 52(c) Motion

At the close of Plaintiff's evidence, Mr. Long moved to strike. Trial Tr. 25:3–4. Mr. Long argued that Ms. Lewis had failed to present sufficient evidence for the Court to find in her favor. In particular, Mr. Long argued that Ms. Lewis had failed to present any evidence of intent as required to succeed under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Although a motion to strike does not exist within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 52(c) is applicable and is consistent with Mr. Long's Motion to Strike. SeeFed. R. Bankr.P. 7052 (incorporating Fed.R.Civ.P. 52). Under Rule 52(c), “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable ruling on that issue.” Id. The Court interprets Mr. Long's Motion to Strike as a Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings under Rule 52(c), incorporated by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.

A Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings is applicable to non-jury trials, such as the case before this Court. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 52 advisory committee's note. Rule 52(c) authorizes a court to enter judgment at any time the court can make a dispositive finding appropriately on the evidence. Id. Congress enacted subsection (c) to replace part of Rule 41(b), which previously permitted a court to dismiss a case at the close of plaintiff's evidence if the plaintiff had failed to carry her burden. Id. Mr. Long moved the Court at the close of Ms. Lewis's evidence, which was appropriate timing considering that Ms. Lewis was given the opportunity to present any and all evidence for the Court to consider in ruling on her complaint.

A court may grant Judgment on Partial Findings if a party has been fully heard on an issue, the Court finds against the party on the issue, and a favorable ruling on the issue is necessary for a judgment in the party's favor. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 52(c). The Court must assess and weigh the evidence presented and render judgment if the evidence is insufficient to support the claim or defense. See Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir.1994); Cherrey v. Thompson Steel Co., 805 F.Supp. 1257, 1261 (D.Md.1992); Rawat v. Hamil (In re Hamil), 453 B.R. 812, 814 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2011); In re Modanlo, 413 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr.D.Md.2009). The Court is not to make any special inferences in considering the evidence; rather, the Court “is to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where the preponderance lies.” Cherrey, 805 F.Supp. at 1261 (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2371 (1971)). The Court's determination must be supported by specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re Modanlo, 413 B.R. at 266.

In this case, Mr. Long's request to strike is a request for Judgment on Partial Findings under Rule 52(c). The Court did not empanel a jury and gave Ms. Lewis the opportunity to present her case. The timing is appropriate for the Court to make dispositive findings on her evidence. In determining whether Mr. Long is entitled to judgment, the Court must assess Ms. Lewis's evidence and determine if it is sufficient to support a finding that the debt owed her is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). If it is not, Mr. Long is entitled to judgment under Rule 52(c). Based on the evidence presented by Ms. Lewis at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

In addition to the facts outlined above, the Court finds the following facts to be relevant and proven by the evidence presented by Ms. Lewis at trial.

Mr. Long admitted that he is the father and Ms. Lewis is the mother of Diamond Lewis. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 at ¶¶ 3–5, Lewis v. Long (In re Long), No. 13–06030 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2013) ECF No. 16. Mr. Long further admitted pleading guilty to two counts of carnal knowledge under section 18.2–63 of the Code of Virginia. Id. at ¶ 10.

Mr. Long admitted that he appeared in court on the day the court entered the default judgment in the state court proceeding with Ms. Lewis. Trial Tr. 20:16–18. Mr. Long further admitted that the judge in the state court proceeding asked him some questions prior to entering the default. Id. at 20:19–24. The contents of those questions and Mr. Long's answers were never presented. Mr. Long, however, testified that after answering the judge's questions, the judge entered default because Mr. Long lacked any statutory basis to prevent entry of default. Trial Tr. 20:24–21:2. The remainder of Ms. Lewis's evidence pertained primarily to establishing the facts and timeline associated with the parties' relationship. See Trial Tr. 12:5–19:2. Ms. Lewis's contention is that the state court proceeding should be given preclusive effect under Virginia's doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. at 22:23–23:8. The Court will address this contention.

Conclusions of Law

Collateral Estoppel

A state court judgment can collaterally estop the litigation of issues in non-dischargeability proceedings. Chun Song v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 448 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir.2006). To determine whether such a judgment is given preclusive effect, the Court must apply the relevant state law of collateral estoppel for the state that rendered the judgment. Id. See also, Reed v. Owens (In re Owens), 449 B.R. 239, 250 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2011) (citing cases). In this case, Ms. Lewis received a default judgment by the Circuit Court of Culpeper County. The Court shall apply Virginia's law of collateral estoppel.

The seminal case in Virginia is TransDulles...