Lewis v. Louisiana
| Decision Date | 15 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-3088 |
| Parties | NATHAN LEWIS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and § 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and (2). The Court has determined that this matter can be resolved without an evidentiary hearing.
Lewis is an inmate presently incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. He filed the captioned pro se and in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article's 1, 2, 3, 19 and 22 of the Louisiana State Constitution, against Louisiana State, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Thomas J. Kliebert, Judge Edward A. Dufresne, Jr., Judge James L. Cannella and Judge Marion F. Edwards. Lewis claims that he was denied his constitutional rights by the failureof the judges of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal to follow the applicable provisions of state law when considering pro se post-conviction writ applications.
Lewis claims that the judges of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit failed to assign pro se writ applications to a random three judge panel and instead allotted the applications to one judge who signed the applications. Two other Judge's names were typed onto the applications to give the impression that a three judge panel was actually ruling on the pro se application. Instead, Judge Defresne was the only judge who handled most of the pro se applications.
Lewis claims he filed a pro se writ application in 2003 seeking review of the denial of his Post-Conviction application. However, he contends that regarding his pro se application, the judges acted outside of their judicial capacity and authority such that he was denied his right to due process.
Lewis contends that the decision by the judges was outside of the authority granted them by law such that they are not entitled to judicial immunity. As relief, he seeks declaratory judgment against the defendants, compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000 against each defendant for the abuse of their authority in violation of the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection and the violation of his Right of Access to the Courts. Lewis further seeks punitive damages in the amount of $250,000 against each defendant, injunctive relief ordering full disclosure of, and an investigation of, the defendants, and a review of his claim by a three judge panel. He further seeks a trial by jury on all issues.
In his Amended Complaint Lewis seeks the award of attorneys fees if an attorney decides to handle the cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. He alleges that Chief Judge Thomas Kliebert, through setting up the administrative procedure, created the opportunity for the denial of his Post-Conviction application in violation of his constitutional rights.
This lawsuit is one of many lawsuits filed in this Court as the result of allegations which came to light after the suicide death of Jerrold Peterson, the former Central Staff Director of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.1 The Court takes notice that, at the time of his suicide, Peterson left a letter in which he summarized the pro se post-conviction writ procedure addressed in Lewis' Complaint. When his representations were made public, numerous state prisoners sought relief in the state and federal courts contending that the Louisiana Fifth Circuit's procedure violated the state and federal constitutions. In response, after considering the en banc recommendations of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit on how to rectify the concerns, the Louisiana Supreme Court eventually directed that certain pro se writ applications be recommitted to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit for review by three-judge panels comprised of judges who were not involved in the decision to adopt the process utilized by Peterson. See State v. Cordero, 993 So. 2d 203, 205-06 (La. 2008).
The Court's research reveals that Lewis filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court which was denied on November 19, 2004 pursuant to La.C.Cr. P. Art. 930.8. State ex rel. Nathan Lewis v. State of Louisiana, 888 So.2d 187, 2003-2990 (La. 11/19/04). Lewis filed an application for reconsideration with the Court which again was denied on January 28, 2005. State ex rel. Nathan Lewis v. State of Louisiana, 893 So. 2d 59, 2003-2990 (La. 1/28/05). Lewis filed an additional writ application which was transferred by the Louisiana Supreme Court to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal for consideration pursuant to the procedures outlined in that court's en banc resolution of September 9, 2008, State v. Cordero, 08-1717 (La. 10-3-08), 993 So. 2d. 203.He does not indicate whether he has sought additional relief after the issuance of Cordero. While the facts alleged in his complaint are troubling, Lewis's claims are legally frivolous under various legal principles as detailed below.
Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(c) require the Court to sua sponte dismiss cases filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis upon a determination that they are frivolous. The Court has broad discretion in determining the frivolous nature of the complaint. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not sua sponte dismiss an action merely because of questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in the complaint.
Under this statute, a claim is frivolous only when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). It lacks an arguable factual basis only if the facts alleged are "clearly baseless," a category encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff's claims are based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual allegations. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994); see Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992).
Lewis names the State of Louisiana as a defendant in this matter. Suit against the State implicates the Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine. Muhammad v. Louisiana, Nos. 99-3742 & 99-2694, 2000 WL 1568210 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2000); Citrano v. Allen Corr. Ctr., 891 F.Supp. 312, 320 (W.D. La. 1995)("A suit against any state correctional center would be suit against the state and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.")(citing Anderson v. Phelps, 655 F.Supp. 560, 560 (M.D. La. 1985); Bldg. Eng'g Servs. Co. v. Louisiana, 459 F.Supp. 180 (E.D. La. 1978)).
The Eleventh Amendment forbids federal courts from entertaining a suit for money damages brought by a citizen against his own State. Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1986). It also prohibits suit for declaratory and injunctive relief brought against th State. See Saltz v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992)(declaratory and prospective injunctive relief can not be pursued directly against the State in federal court.) A state may expressly waive this Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)( that a state's consent to suit against it in federal court must be expressed "unequivocally"); Welch v. Dep't of Highways, 780 F.2d 1268, 1271-73 (5th Cir. 1986). However, the State of Louisiana has not done so.
To the contrary, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:5106(a) provides that "no suit against the state . . . shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court." Accordingly, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's claims against the State of Louisiana. See Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, Lewis's claims against the State arefrivolous, fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and otherwise for seeking relief from an immune defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Lewis's claims against the State must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. See Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).
The claims against the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal are also subject to dismissal as frivolous. Section 1983 imposes liability on any "person" who violates another's constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state which the district court is held." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b).
According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b), Louisiana law governs whether the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal is a suable entity. Under Louisiana law, to possess such a capacity, an entity must qualify as a "juridical person," which is defined by the Louisiana Civil Code as "an entity to which...
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