Lewis v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 05 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04CV2468DMS(NLS).,04CV2468DMS(NLS).
• Citation: 416 F.Supp.2d 935
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Brian Deverick LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. John MITCHELL, et al., Defendants.

Page 935

416 F.Supp.2d 935

Brian Deverick LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. John MITCHELL, et al., Defendants.

No. 04CV2468DMS(NLS).

United States District Court, S.D. California.

October 5, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brian Deverick Lewis, Lancaster, CA, Pro se.

Attorney General, State of California Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER: (1) ADOPTING IN PART R & R. AND REJECTING IN PART MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT JONES' MOTION TO DISMISS; (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.

[Doc. Nos. 6, 11]

SABRAW, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before this Court are a motion Defendant Jones to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and another motion by the remaining state Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint based on various legal grounds. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to both motions. State Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's opposition. The motion was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civ. L.R. 72.3, for a Report and Recommendation ("R & R"). The Magistrate Judge found the issues appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1).

On July 11, 2005, the Magistrate Judge issued her R & R. The State Defendants filed objections to the R & R on August 5, 2005; Plaintiff filed objections to the R & R on August 9, 2005; and Defendant Jones filed a reply to Plaintiff's objections on August 19, 2005. Plaintiff filed a reply to Jones objections on August 26, 2005.

Based on this Court's de novo review of the R & R, Defendants' objections and Plaintiff's replies, the Court adopts in part and rejects in part the Magistrate Judge's R. & R.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Plaintiff is an inmate committed to the custody of the California Department of Corrections ("CDC"), and the events giving rise to the causes of action herein occurred when Plaintiff was housed at Calipatria State Prison ("Calipatria"). Plaintiff is a follower of Islam, and in accordance with the tenets of his faith, he does not eat pork. He alleges that in May 2002, he began to suspect that the prison was serving foods containing pork without labbeling them with a "P" on the menu as required by prison regulations. He was referred to a prison psychologist, who diagnosed him with depression. He was transferred to a mental health facility, and was placed on suicide watch, but was eventually transferred back to Calipatria.

In October 2003, the Calipatria prison cafeteria began serving "turkey ham" for breakfast. It was not labeled with a "P" on the menu, but Plaintiff was nonetheless suspicious that it contained pork. Plaintiff alleges that his own investigation revealed that the turkey ham did in fact contain pork, despite the affirmative verbal assurances to the contrary by Defendant Vorise.

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal complaining that his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion had been infringed by the prison's failure to alert him to the presence of pork in the cafeteria food. Plaintiff filed two additional appeals complaining that the prison refused to let him be seen by medical staff for the mental health problems he was experiencing as a result.

In December 2004, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.0 § 2000bb-2000bb-4. He names as Defendants the Director of the CDC, Jeanne Woodford; the Calipatria warden, Stuart Ryan; the Calipatria food service manager, John Mitchell; two Calipatria cooks, Hector Lopez and M. Vorise; and Sysco's Regional Sales Manager, Stan Jones. Plaintiff claims that he was led to consume pork by the actions and omissions of these Defendants, in violation of his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant M. Levin, the chief medical officer of Calipatria, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by ignoring his repeated requests for mental health treatment.

III. DISCUSSION

On April 7, 2005, Defendant Stan Jones filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he is not a state actor and therefore cannot be sued for the alleged First Amendment violations. On May 16, 2005, State Defendants Levin, Lopez, Mitchell, Ryan, Vorise and Woodford also filed a motion to dismiss on various legal grounds. Plaintiff opposes both motions.

A. RFRA Claims

As an initial matter, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and dismisses Plaintiff's RFRA claims in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing in light of Boerne that state and local government actors cannot be sued for violations of RFRA). Although none of the Defendants moved for dismissal of this claim, the Court dismisses this claim sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 proper when claim is based on "indisputably meritless legal theory"). Because amendment of Plaintiff's RFRA claim would be futile in light of Boerne, the Court dismisses the claim with prejudice.

B. State Defendants' Motion

State Defendants move to dismiss based on several legal theories. Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). Defendants also move to dismiss the First Amendment claims against them on grounds that negligence cannot be the basis of an alleged Constitutional violation. Defendants Ryan and Woodford move to dismiss on grounds that they were not alleged to have been personally involved in the violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional rights. Defendant Levin also moves to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against him because his actions do not amount to "deliberate indifference" to Plaintiff's serious medical needs.

1. Exhaustion

State Defendants assert the Plaintiff failed in several respects to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, and that Plaintiff's entire complaint should be dismissed without prejudice because it contains unexhausted claims.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff bringing § 1983 claims is not required to exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing suit. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). However, the PLRA imposes an exhaustion requirement on prisoners bringing such claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Defendants maintain that strict adherence to this exhaustion requirement mandates an inmate plaintiff exhaust all the claims he seeks to litigate before commencing the action. According to Defendants, the Court must dismiss a "mixed" complaint in its entirety.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue, this Court has held that the PLRA requires total exhaustion before filing suit. Therefore, this Court has held that a "mixed" complaint containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must be dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. Mubarak v. Calif. Dep't of Corr., 315 F.Supp.2d 1057-1060 (S.D.Ca1.2004). In so holding, this Court joined the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in requiring total exhaustion. See Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (10th Cir.2004) (presence of unexhausted claims in the complaint required district court to dismiss action in entirety without prejudice); Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884 (8th Cir.2000) (plain language of PLRA requires all available prison grievance remedies be exhausted as to all of the claims). Accordingly, if the State Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs complaint is "mixed," the entire complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.

The administrative appeals process for California inmates is set forth in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, which provides, "Any inmate. . . may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a). The process consists of four steps. The first is to attempt to informally resolve his or her problem with the staff member involved. Id. at § 3084.5(a). If unsuccessful, the inmate may submit an appeal on the CDC 602 inmate appeal form. Id. at § 3084.5(b). If denied at that level, the inmate may appeal to the second formal review conducted by the head of the institution or his/her designee. Id. at § 3084.5(c). The third and final level of formal review is conducted by the Director of the CDC or his/her designee. Id. at § 3084.5(e)(2); see also Nichols v. Logan, 355 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1161 (S.D.Cal.2004).

Defendants argue that with respect to Plaintiffs First Amendment claim, Plaintiff failed to name any Defendants in his administrative grievance other than Mitchell and Vorise, therefore he failed to exhaust his claim as to the other Defendants. Since the claim is therefore "mixed," Defendants argue that it should be dismissed in its entirety. State Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Levin by failing to name him in his grievances about the prison's alleged failure to provide mental health treatment.

While Plaintiff did not list all of the State Defendants by name, the Magistrate Judge nonetheless concluded in her R & R that a plaintiff need not identify or name each defendant in an administrative grievance form to properly exhaust his claim. See Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir.2005). The form used in Butler to initiate a grievance under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (CDC Form 1824) did not require identification of any specific person. Id. The form used to initiate...