Lewis v. Parker
| Decision Date | 10 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14–163 BAH |
| Citation | 67 F.Supp.3d 189 |
| Parties | Lashawn D. Lewis, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Darryl S. Parker, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jaime T. Zeas, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Darryl S. Parker, Washington, DC, pro se.
Claronell Hope Brown, Law Offices of C. Hope Brown, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
The instant suit is the latest iteration of a “long arduous and unnecessary journey of 10 years” of litigation over the estate of James Jarvis (the “James Jarvis Estate”), who died in 2003. Compl. ¶ 106, ECF No. 1; see id. ¶¶ 4–8, 15. The plaintiffs, who include LaCreasha Kennedy–Jarvis, the decedent's spouse, and Lashawn Lewis and Derek Jarvis, who are two out of at least four of the decedent's children, are dissatisfied with the administration of the James Jarvis Estate by the defendants, Daryl S. Parker and C. Hope Brown (collectively, the “defendants”), who served, successively, as the personal representatives of the estate. See generally Compl., ECF No 1.1 The plaintiffs bring this action for breach of fiduciary duty against both defendants, see Compl. ¶¶ 116–22, 129–35, and for civil conversion against Defendant Parker, see id. ¶¶ 123–128.2 Pending before the Court are three motions: Defendant Parker's Motion to Dismiss, Def. Parker's Mot. Dismiss (“Def. Parker Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 11; Defendant Brown's Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, Def. Brown's Mot. Dismiss Alt. Mot. Summ. J. (“Def. Brown Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 12; and the plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ( ), ECF No. 16.3 For the reasons below, the defendants' motions are granted.4
Both defendants assert that the plaintiffs' claims are barred on res judicata grounds including claim and issue preclusion, see Def. Parker's Mot. ¶¶ 3–4; Def. Brown's Mot. at 1. Thus, a review of the history of proceedings involving the James Jarvis Estate before the District of Columbia Probate Court and Court of Appeals is necessary, before turning to the litigation in this United States District Court.5
Defendant Parker was appointed personal representative to the James Jarvis Estate in 2004, following the preclusion of one of Jarvis' daughters, Greer Burriss (“Burriss”), from appointment as a Special Administrator. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–22. In his role as Personal Representative, Defendant Parker secured a settlement, following court-ordered mediation, with Burriss regarding “a 2003 Cadillac automobile allegedly titled in the name of the decedent.” See Compl. Ex. L (District of Columbia Probate Court Consent Order, February 23, 2005, filed in In re James P. Jarvis, 2003 ADM 1036) (the “Consent Order”)at 1, ECF No. 4–1. As part of the settlement, the James Jarvis Estate agreed to “forgo any further claims the Estate might raise against Greer M. Burriss,” and Burriss “agree[d] to waive, relinquish and surrender her share as an heir in the net Estate of James P. Jarvis.” Id.
Following entry of the Consent Order, the plaintiffs filed suit, on July 8, 2005, in District of Columbia Probate Court alleging that Defendant Parker “breached his fiduciary duty in administering the Estate.” Compl. Ex. N (District of Columbia Probate Court Order, March 10, 2009, filed in Jarvis v. Parker , 2003 ADM 1036) (the “Removal Order”)at 1, ECF No. 4–1. The majority of the breaches the plaintiffs accuse Defendant Parker of committing stem from the terms of the Consent Order, which the plaintiffs contend was improperly entered because “Burriss had undervalued the Estate and had stolen items from the decedent's abode shortly after his death.” Compl. ¶¶ 19; see id. ¶ 27.
Before trial in Probate Court, the plaintiffs sought clarification of a ruling that limited the plaintiffs' possible relief to the removal of Defendant Parker as a personal representative. See Pls.' Opp'n Def. Brown's Mot. Dismiss Ex. A (District of Columbia Probate Court Order, July 25, 2007, filed in In re Estate of James P. Jarvis, 2003 ADM 1036) (the “Clarification Order”)at 1, ECF No. 17–4.6 Instead, the plaintiffs sought the ability to seek both “relief in equity and/or at law for damages owed the Jarvis Estate by Defendant Parker....” See id. at 1. Prompted by the plaintiffs' request, the Probate Court issued the Clarification Order, which summarized the prior history, through 2007, of the probate litigation. See generally id.
Of particular relevance to the instant matter are two issues addressed in the Clarification Order. First, critically, the Probate Court rejected all of the plaintiffs' requests for damages based on certain purported assets not being included in the inventories and accountings of the James Jarvis Estate that Defendant Parker filed with the Probate Court. See Clarification Order at 6, 9–10. The court pointed out that the plaintiffs failed timely to object to Defendant Parker's inventories and accountings, thus waiving their right to later challenge the accuracy of those filings. See id. at 6. Consequently, the allegedly missing assets, for which the plaintiffs sought damages in their Complaint, were merely “assets that [the plaintiffs] believe the Estate might have had .” Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). The court explained that the plaintiffs could not recover damages based on assets not listed on the inventories of the James Jarvis Estate to which the plaintiffs had ample opportunity, but declined or failed to challenge within the time provided for by the relevant statute. See id. Rather, the plaintiffs would only be able to secure damages, if at all, against Defendant Parker if they could prove that certain assets were lost from the James Jarvis Estate that were properly inventoried as part of the Estate and were no longer available due to Defendant Parker's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. See id. at 9–10.
Second, the Probate Court rejected the plaintiffs' attack on the legitimacy of the Consent Order and their allegations that Defendant Parker breached his fiduciary duty by filing the Consent Order. See id. at 6–8. The court opined that “the Court, when deciding whether to grant the petition to settle, must have determined that the settlement was in the best interest of the estate.”See id. at 6. Consequently, “Mr. Parker's decision to settle with Ms. Burriss would appear able to withstand Plaintiffs' challenge of any breach,” especially considering that the plaintiffs had the opportunity, pursuant to D.C. Code § 20–521, to seek an order restraining Defendant Parker from joining the Consent Decree and the plaintiffs failed to do so. See id. at 7.
The court also considered, in the context of the Clarification Order, a motion filed by the plaintiffs seeking to set aside the Consent Order, under D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60, based on “newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 8. The court denied this motion because the plaintiffs, as non-parties to the Consent Order, had no standing to pursue such a motion and only the successor personal representative, if Defendant Parker were removed, would be able to file such a motion “if appropriate.” Id.7
The Probate Court then held a trial on eight allegations, posited by the plaintiffs as warranting Defendant Parker's removal as personal representative. The allegations were that Defendant Parker: (1) failed “to marshal for the estate a 1995 Cadillac El Dorado that the decedent owned when he died,” Removal Order at 1; (2) failed “to seek to become Successor Personal Representative of the estate of Charles Jarvis, James Jarvis' father, for which James Jarvis had been Personal Representative before his death,” id. at 2; (3) failed “to attempt to recoup for the estate moneys debited from the decedent's bank account in the form of automatic debits made after his death,” id. ; (4) failed “to attempt to secure funds from a stale payroll check of the decedent,” id. ; (5) failed “to marshal estate real property in the states of New Jersey and South Carolina owned by the decedent,” id. at 1; (6) failed “to marshal for the estate certain personal property that the decedent owned at the time of his death,” id. at 1–2; (7) failed “to communicate with the heirs about the administration of the estate,” id. at 2; and (8) failed “to pay creditors in a timely fashion,” id.
After hearing evidence at the trial, the Probate Court found that the plaintiffs had proven the first four allegations but not the last four, and removed Defendant Parker as Personal Representative. Removal Order at 24–25. Specifically, the Probate Court concluded that (1) Defendant Parker “mismanaged property, specifically the funds represented by [a] $618.00 [payroll] check made payable to James Jarvis by a District of Columbia Agency;” (2) that Defendant Parker “failed, without reasonable excuse, to fulfill the duties of his office” by (a)“failing to conduct the basic investigation/verification required to make informed decisions about” declining to marshal the 1995 Cadillac to the James Jarvis Estate, (b) foregoing “any claims by the James Jarvis [E]state to any funds from the Charles Jarvis estate,” and (c) not seeking “the return from the bank or any other individual of moneys withdrawn from James Jarvis' bank account after his death.” Id. The Probate Court concluded the plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendant Parker was derelict in his duty to marshal to the estate personal property owned by the decedent, real property allegedly owned by the decedent in New Jersey and South Carolina, id. at 17–18, or that Defendant Parker failed materially to communicate with the heirs or pay creditors in a timely fashion, id. at 12–13.8
Following the removal of Defendant Parker as the Estate's Personal Representative, he filed a “Petition for Award of Compensation for Personal Representative,” which the Probate Court granted in part and denied in part. See Def. Brown's Mem. Supp. Def. Brown's Mot....
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