Lewis v. Pella Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-00549-DCN,No. 2:14-mn-00001-DCN,2:14-mn-00001-DCN,2:14-cv-00549-DCN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | RANDY LEWIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PELLA CORPORATION, Defendant. |
By this order, the court reconsiders its December 17, 2014 order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1472 (4th Cir. 1991) (). Specifically, the court reconsiders its ruling on a motion to dismiss brought by defendant Pella Corporation ("Pella"). This order amends and replaces the court's earlier order. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part Pella's motion and dismisses all of plaintiff's causes of action except for his breach of express warranty and MMWA claims to the extent he relies on Pella's failure to repair or replace windows under the limited warranty.
Plaintiff Randy Lewis ("Lewis") purchased Pella Designer Series windows in the summer of 2006 to install in his home in Festus, Missouri. Compl. ¶ 22. The following winter, Lewis "began experiencing fog and moisture on the interior of the window, including freezing, as well as water infiltration, swelling, bowing, and warping." Id. Hecontacted Pella "repeatedly" over the next several years because of these problems, but claims that the alleged "defects were repeatedly denied and concealed." Id. In May 2010, Pella replaced the glass in eleven windows and the backdoor. Id. In May 2012, Pella replaced the front door because the front exterior separated from the main door frame. Id. At some point in 2013, Lewis alleges that he "again experienced freezing and ice on the interior of the window, as well as water infiltration, air leakage, swelling, bowing, warping, and sagging," and contacted Pella regarding these issues. Id.
Lewis alleges that the windows suffer from a defect in the "design of the sill extrusion and sill nailing fin attachment as well as a defect in the design of allowing a gap between the jamb gasket and the sill gasket." Id. ¶ 36. Lewis alleges that due to these design defects, water leaks through the windows and can become trapped between the cladding and the operable wood frame, causing damage to the windows and "other property within the home." Id. Lewis further alleges that Pella knew of the defect when it shipped the windows. Id. ¶ 52.
On January 17, 2014, Lewis filed a class action complaint against Pella in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, asserting jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The complaint brings the following eight causes of action: (1) violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA"); (2) negligence; (3) breach of express warranty; (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) fraudulent concealment; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.; and (8) declaratory relief.
Pella filed the instant motion to dismiss on March 18, 2014. Lewis opposed the motion on May 9, 2014, and Pella replied on May 23, 2014. On February 27, 2014, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred Lewis's case to this court as part of the consolidated multidistrict litigation. Pella's motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court's review.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 679. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Facts pled that are 'merely consistent with' liability are not sufficient." A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
This case is predicated on diversity jurisdiction and was filed in federal court, so it is governed by state substantive law and federal procedural law. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)). "In multidistrict litigation, the law of the transferee circuit governs questions of federal law." In re KBR, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957 (D. Md. 2010) modified on reh'g sub nom. In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 925 F. Supp. 2d 752 (D. Md. 2013) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 744 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2014); see also In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2004); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (). Therefore, this court must apply Missouri substantive law and Fourth Circuit procedural law.
Pella Corp. asserts that all of Lewis's claims should be dismissed. The court first determines whether the applicable statutes of limitations are tolled by equitable tolling or class action tolling. The court will then consider Pella's arguments about each claim individually.
Pella argues that all of Lewis's claims are barred by their respective statutes of limitations. While the specific statute of limitations for each claim will be discussed below, the parties argue about the application of two tolling doctrines to all of the statutes of limitations: equitable estoppel and class action tolling. In considering these doctrines,the court notes at the outset that it is well-settled under Missouri law that statutes of limitations are favored and can be avoided only by strictly complying with specific legislative exceptions, which courts cannot extend. Owen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 533 F.3d 913, 919 n.5 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
Lewis first argues that Pella is estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense because it fraudulently concealed that its windows were defective. Compl. ¶ 61; Pl.'s Resp. 6.
Missouri law provides that "[i]f any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.280; see also Tilley v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 957 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) . "To constitute concealment of a cause of action within the general rule tolling the statute of limitations on that ground the concealment must be fraudulent or intentional and, . . . there must be something of an affirmative nature designed to prevent, and which does prevent, discovery of the cause of action." Owen, 533 F.3d at 919-20 (quoting Hasenyager v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). To avoid the running of the statute of limitations, the fraudulent concealment "must be something more than mere silence on defendant's part . . . ; usually the employment of some means or device to prevent discovery shouldbe shown." Id. at 920 (quoting Gilliam v. Gohn, 303 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Mo. 1957)). "Silence becomes misrepresentation only when there is a duty to speak, such as 'when one of the parties has superior knowledge or information not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party.'" Id. (quoting Bohac v. Walsh, 223 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)).
In determining whether there was fraudulent concealment which tolls the statute of limitations, "a pivotal issue is when plaintiffs realized they had a cause of action." M & D Enterprises, Inc. v. Wolff, 923 S.W.2d 389, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Tayborn v. Burstein, 748 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)). Fraudulent concealment is "inapplicable if a plaintiff knows or should have known he had a cause of action." Id. (citing Miller v. Guze, 820 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)). In other words, statutes of limitation will be tolled due to fraudulent concealment only until a plaintiff "discover[s] the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2011).
Pella argues that by failing to allege when and how he discovered Pella's alleged fraud, Lewis has failed to meet his burden of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saves his otherwise time-barred claims. See Summerhill, 637 F.3d at 881 (...
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