Lewis v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., CIV-2-75-41.
| Decision Date | 25 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV-2-75-41.,CIV-2-75-41. |
| Citation | 429 F. Supp. 73 |
| Parties | Grady H. LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY et al., etc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Leon W. Davis, Jr., Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiff.
Harry W. Lawrence, Johnson City, Tenn., for defendants.
This is a diversity civil action for damages arising out of a collision between the defendants' train and the plaintiff's automobile upon a railroad grade crossing across property owned by the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), (c). The defendants moved to dismiss the action for the failure of the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants claim that the plaintiff Mr. Lewis contracted away in advance, any future claim for damages in an agreement of March 31, 1967 between the plaintiff and his mother Mrs. Myrtle Lewis and the defendant Clinchfield Railroad Company.1 Since matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b), supra.
If the aforementioned agreement is valid, the plaintiff Mr. Lewis has no claim against the defendant Clinchfield, since he and Mrs. Lewis agreed, inter alia, that:
Initially, the plaintiff contends that the agreement is inoperative because there was no consideration to support it in the following respects: (1) no consideration of $1.00 was paid by any of the parties to the other; (2) the defendants failed its obligation to install a gate and to furnish the plaintiff a key thereto; (3) the plaintiff was not leasing the property to his mother Mrs. Myrtle Lewis as stated in the agreement; (4) the railroad had no interest in the private road and no authority to require the plaintiff to maintain it, since the railroad's only proprietary interest was at a point where its right-of-way crossed the private roadway; and (5) the plaintiff and his mother already had the right to cross the railroad tracks and could gain nothing from a license so to do as purported in the agreement.
Regardless of the validity of the foregoing contentions, a careful reading of the agreement discloses mutual benefits and obligations therein. Thereunder, the railroad obligated itself to install a gate and lock at the aforementioned crossing and to furnish a key thereto to each of the other parties to the contract. In return Mr. Lewis and his mother agreed to indemnify the railroad as aforesaid. Whether the railroad breached its contract and failed to install a gate and lock is unclear, but this does not alter the fact that it was obligated so to do under the agreement.2 Therefore, the Court concludes that there was sufficient consideration to support this contract.
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the agreement must be declared void as against public policy, in that a party may not by contract absolve himself from future liability for his own negligence. This contention, likewise, lacks merit. Although there are earlier cases which appear to so held, see e.g., Kaylor v. Magill, C.A. 6th (1950), 181 F.2d 179, 1826, and Cart v. Coal Creek Mining & Manufacturing Company, D.C.Tenn. (1957), 153 F.Supp....
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Crum v. COLMAN-COCKER TEXTILE MACH. CO.
...agreements in Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., C.A.6th (1974), 507 F.2d 100 and in Lewis v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., D.C.Tenn. (1975), 429 F.Supp. 73, affirmed C.A.6th (1976), 549 F.2d 801 (table). They simply did not do There is no merit to Colman-Cocker's further con......