Lewis v. State

Decision Date11 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. 49S02–1010–CR–00619.,49S02–1010–CR–00619.
Citation949 N.E.2d 1243
PartiesCedric LEWIS, Appellant (Defendant below),v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Ruth Johnson, Matthew D. Anglemeyer, Marion County Public Defender, Appellate Division, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby D. Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02–0908–CR–000736

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Cedric Lewis was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. He challenges the admission of the handgun found in his car and the appropriateness of his sentence. We affirm, concluding that the gun in question was not the product of a search and that the sentence is appropriate.

Facts and Procedural History

Officer Romeo Joson of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department stopped Cedric Lewis's vehicle in the 1700 block of North Sherman Drive after observing Lewis speeding and changing lanes without signaling. Lewis was accompanied by a passenger. Lewis did not have a driver's license, but was able to produce a State identification card.

Joson checked Lewis's status with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and discovered that his driver's license had been suspended. He ordered Lewis out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Believing that the vehicle would be towed, Joson told the passenger to exit the vehicle. As Joson put it, “I went into the vehicle because the driver's side door was still open. Stuck my head in there to also tell the passenger to get out of the vehicle, that Mr. Lewis was being [sic] under arrest for driving while suspended with the intent of possibly towing the vehicle.” (Tr. at 16.) When he stuck his head in the car, Joson immediately saw a handgun wedged between the driver's seat and the center console.

In advance of trial and during trial, Lewis moved to suppress the gun, arguing that Joson violated the Fourth Amendment by sticking his head into the car to search for weapons. The court later overruled Lewis's objection to the admission of the gun and found him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.1 Lewis qualified as a serious violent felon based on his 1997 conviction for attempted battery, as a class C felony, for shooting at a police officer. The court sentenced him to twelve years in prison.

The Court of Appeals reversed, in a decision that produced three opinions. Lewis v. State, 931 N.E.2d 875 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). We granted transfer, 940 N.E.2d 828 (Ind.2010) (table), thereby vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Standard of Review

We review the constitutionality of a search or seizure de novo. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. We defer to the trial court's factual determinations and overturn them only if clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590 (Ind.2008).

I. The Officer's Actions Were Not a Search

Lewis argues that Joson's discovery of the gun was a search impermissible under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although both provisions use the same language, they are subject to different analysis. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind.2005). Both provisions are triggered only when the government engages in a search. We conclude that Joson's discovery of the gun did not constitute a search.

“A ‘search’ involves an exploratory investigation, prying into hidden places, or a looking for or seeking out.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 572 (Ind.2006). Nothing like that occurred here. We stated long ago that [i]t is not a search in any legal or colloquial sense for an officer to look into an automobile standing on the roadside.” Koscielski v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 549–50, 158 N.E. 902, 904 (1927). Since then we have held multiple times that there is no search when police look into cars during traffic stops. E.g., Alcorn v. State, 255 Ind. 491, 265 N.E.2d 413 (Ind.1970).

In Avant v. State, 528 N.E.2d 74 (Ind.1988), for example, the police pulled a car over and an officer shined his flashlight in the window and observed stolen property on the backseat. Discovering items in plain view is not a search, and the officer did not pick up, open, or pull back anything to see the stolen items. Id. at 76. We held that [o]nce an officer properly stops a vehicle, merely looking through the vehicle to see that which is inside is not a search.” Id.

The trial court found that the driver's door was open when Joson approached the car. (Tr. at 45.) Joson lowered his head to talk to the passenger, but the court was not sure whether his head actually entered the car. (Tr. at 45.) The court found that Joson's intention was to talk to the passenger and not to search. (Tr. at 45–46.) It concluded that Joson was not searching when he saw the gun in plain view.

We agree with the trial court. Joson needed to speak with the passenger and lowered his head down to her level. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to do when speaking with someone in a car. In the process, he saw a gun that was plainly visible between the driver's seat and center console. As in Avant, Joson did not open any compartments, move any objects, or pull back anything to see the gun. It was just there.

The Sentence was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • State v. Mandel
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • June 6, 2018
    ...with a passenger. See e.g., id. at 15–16 ; United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1309–10 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Lewis v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 (Ind. 2011) ; People v. Vasquez, 106 A.D.2d 327, 483 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245–46 (1984), aff'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 968, 498 N.Y.S.2d 7......
  • Mullen v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • May 25, 2016
    ...the evidence. Id. However, the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we review de novo. Lewis v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind.2011).2 [12] The Fourth Amendment states,The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, agains......
  • State v. Jenkins
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • April 7, 2022
    ...... speak with occupants, that action may not constitute an. unreasonable search. Id. at 116-17 (citing. United States v. Ryles , 988 F.2d 13, 15-16 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pierre , 958 F.2d 1304,. 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Lewis v. State ,. 949 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 (Ind. 2011); People v. Vasquez , 483 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245-46 (N.Y.App.Div. 1984),. aff'd on other grounds , 498 N.Y.S.2d 788 (N.Y. 1985)). . .          Just. like in Mandel , there was no evidence that Officer. ......
  • McNeal v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • November 14, 2016
    ...1045 (Ind.2011). However, the constitutionality of a search and seizure is a question of law that we review de novo. Lewis v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind.2011).Section 1—Police did not violate McNeal's Fourth Amendment rights.[8] We begin by addressing McNeal's contention that the coc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT