Lewis v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 17 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-3527 |
| Parties | SHERMAN THEODORE LEWIS, TDCJ-CID NO. 1591241, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Sherman Theodore Lewis has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody ("Habeas Petition") (Docket Entry No. 1). Pending before the court is Respondent Stephens's Motion for Summary Judgment With Brief in Support ("Motion for Summary Judgment") (Docket Entry No. 14), to which Lewis has not filed a response. For the reasons explained below, the court will grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and will deny Lewis's Habeas Petition.
Lewis was convicted of injury to an elderly individual after a jury trial in the 176th District Court of Harris County, Texas.1Lewis elected to have the trial judge assess punishment and received thirty-five years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.2
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals affirmed Lewis's conviction.3 Lewis did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.4 Lewis filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court.5 The state trial court recommended to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that Lewis's state habeas application be denied.6 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Lewis's application without written order.7
Lewis filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Texas.8 On November 26, 2013, Lewis'spetition was transferred to this court.9 On February 27, 2014, the Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.10 Lewis has not responded to the motion.
Lewis argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Lewis also claims that there is no evidence to support his conviction. The court understands Lewis's Habeas Petition to advance four grounds of relief:
The Respondent argues that Lewis has failed to exhaust claims (2) and (4) and that those claims are now procedurally barred and that claim (3) is procedurally defaulted because such a claim is notcognizable on state writ.11 Alternatively, Respondent argues that all claims lack merit.12
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Disputes about material facts are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986) . The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if "the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
A party moving for summary judgment "must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553). "If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Id. If, however, the moving party meetsthis burden, "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings" and produce evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54). The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
"The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011). When considering a summary judgment motion the court usually resolves any doubts and draws any inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). However, the AEDPA amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 change the way in which courts consider summary judgment in habeas cases.
In a habeas proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) mandates that findings of fact made by a state court are "presumed to be correct." This statute overrides the ordinary summary judgment rule. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004). Therefore, the court will accept any findings made bythe state court as correct unless the habeas petitioner can rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ().
The provisions of § 2254(d) establish a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings." Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2066 n.7 (1997). A federal court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court proceeding:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-20, 1523 (2000). A decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 1523.
In reviewing a state court's determination regarding the merit of a petitioner's habeas claim, a federal court cannot grant relief if "'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2143 (2004)).
Respondent argues that Lewis has failed to exhaust claims (2) and (4) which allege ineffective assistance of counsel.13 Respondent also argues that Lewis has failed to exhaust claim (3) "because sufficiency of the evidence is not cognizable in a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus."14
The AEDPA requires state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), (c). "The exhaustion doctrine seeks to afford the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary." Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 620 (1986). A Texas prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement when the substance of the federal claims have been fairly presented to the state's highest court by filing either (1) a direct appeal followed, if necessary, by a petitionfor discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; or (2) a state petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1998) ; Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 430-32 (5th Cir. 1985). Habeas petitioners are not required to pursue both avenues of relief to meet the exhaustion requirement. Myers v. Collins, 919 F.2d 1074, 1076 (5th Cir. 1990). A federal claim satisfies the "fairly presented" requirement when it is the "substantial equivalent" of the claim presented to the state courts. Whitehead, 157 F.3d at 387. This requirement is not satisfied if the petitioner presents new legal theories as new factual claims in his federal petition. Id.
If a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust his claims in state court, the federal petition for habeas relief must be dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1199, 1205 (1982); Dispensa v. Lynaugh, 847 F.2d 211, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1988). If a petition for habeas relief contains exhausted and unexhausted claims, it must be dismissed as a "mixed petition" for failure to exhaust. Rose, 102 S. Ct. at 1199, 1205; Murphy v. Johnson. 110 F.3d 10, 11-12 (5th Cir. 1997).
"In habeas, the sanction for failing to exhaust properly (preclusion of review in federal court) is given the name of procedural default . . . ." Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). "A procedural default . . . occurs when a prisoner failsto exhaust available state remedies and 'the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to...
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