Lewis v. Suthers
Decision Date | 10 June 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 10 C 6522,10 C 6522 |
Parties | SHERRON L. LEWIS, JR., Plaintiff, v. JOHN W. SUTHERS, individually and in his representative capacity, ANDREW P. MCCALLIN, individually and in his representative capacity, and ERIC R. NEUSCH, individually and in his representative capacity, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Amy J. St. Eve
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Sherron L. Lewis, Jr. ("Plaintiff or "Lewis"), brings this action against Defendants John W. Suthers, individually and in his representative capacity as Attorney General of Colorado, Andrew P. McCallin, individually and in his representative capacity as First Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, and Erik R. Neusch, individually and in his representative capacity as Assistant Attorney General of Colorado. (R. 1.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in response to a complaint that Defendants filed against him on July 26, 2010, in the District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado, under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. (Id. at 7-16.) In bringing the Colorado lawsuit, Defendants alleged that Lewis had improperly offered mortgage-foreclosure-legal assistance to Colorado citizens and had engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. (Id. at 7-8.)
In his Complaint, Lewis vigorously disputes the accuracy of the allegations that Defendants brought against him in the state-court action in Colorado. (R. 1 at passim) He brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 1951, 11 U.S.C. § 362, for civil conspiracy, and for extreme and outrageous conduct, seeking injunctive relief and damages. (Id. at 16-27.) This is the second complaint that Lewis has filed against Defendants based on the same alleged facts. On September 28, 2010, this Court dismissed Lewis's lawsuit on the ground that Defendants have absolute immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and because the Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against a state for damages. Lewis v. Suthers, No. 10-CV-6101, 2010 WL 3842701, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2010). The Court also observed that the case appeared "to be an attempt to bring the Colorado enforcement action in federal district court" and so the Court dismissed the lawsuit "in its entirety[.]" Id. at 2.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the instant lawsuit, on a number of grounds that include the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Younger doctrine, prosecutorial immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, improper venue, the doctrine of res judicata, and for failure to state a claim. (R. 20.) The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss, with prejudice.
The Court previously dismissed Lewis's lawsuit against Defendants under the Eleventh Amendment. Lewis, 2010 WL 3842701, at *1-2. The Court noted that, "[u]nder the Eleventh Amendment[,] . . . individuals cannot bring lawsuits seeking damages against a State based on sovereign immunity." Id. at 1. Observing that "the individual Defendants represented the Stateof Colorado," the Court found that Lewis's claims were not actionable. Id. The Court will not revisit that determination, and so it dismisses Lewis's claims against Defendants in their official capacities.
As the Seventh Circuit recently observed, "[r]es judicata prohibits parties 'from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised' in a previous action in which there was final judgment on the merits." Johnson v. Cypress Hill, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 2138085, at *5 (7th Cir. June 1, 2011) (quoting Highway J Citizens Grp. v. U.S. Dep't Transp., 456 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir. 2006)). Res judicata applies if there is "(1) an identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the cause of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in the earlier action." Id. (quoting Prochotsky v. Baker & McKenzie, 966 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1992)). Lewis's present lawsuit against Defendants in their official capacities satisfies all of these conditions.
Lewis's earlier lawsuit involved precisely the same parties. Cf. R. 1 with Lewis, 2010 WL 3842701, at *1-2. Although the Complaint in this case differs in some modest respects from the earlier-filed complaint in this Court, they are materially identical, involving a common nucleus of operative fact. Specifically, both complaints allege facts emanating from Defendants' state-court action against Lewis under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, there is an identity of the cause of action. Johnson, 2011 WL 2138085, at *5 () (quoting Tartt v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp., 453 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2006)).
The final question is whether this Court's dismissal of Lewis's previously filed lawsuit against Defendants constituted a final judgment on the merits. There is some authority that suggests that a court's dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds may constitute a final judgment on the merits. See Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) () ; Lommen v. City of E. Grand Forks, 97 F.3d 272, 275 (8th Cir. 1996) ( ); Otis v. Ryan, No. 02-CV-6397, 2003 WL 21267106, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2003) () ; see also Daye v. Brannon, No. 00-CV-592, 2001 WL 34664089, at *4 ; Stewart v. Hunt, 598 F. Supp. 1342, 1350 n.11 (D.C.N.C. 1984) (); Warwick Corp. v. Maryland Dep't of Transp., 573 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (D.C. Md. 1983) ().
Despite this case law, it is not clear that a federal court's dismissal of a lawsuit on Eleventh Amendment grounds constitutes a final judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Adams v. Andrews, No. 99-CV-3316, 1999 WL 544727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1999) () (quotation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 provides that a dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction" does not operate as an adjudication on the merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (b). If a dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional, therefore, it does not constitute such an adjudication.
A number of courts have characterized a dismissal based on the Eleventh Amendment as jurisdictional—specifically, they regard it as a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 76 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) ( ); Republic of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Seaborn v. Fla., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) ( ); Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996) (); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989) ().The Seventh Circuit has made a similar characterization. See Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 656 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998) (), vacated on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. Doe, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999); Johnson v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 176 Fed. App'x 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming district-court holding that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over an Illinois agency under the Eleventh Amendment, but modifying dismissal "to be without prejudice to Johnson's refiling her claim in state court").
More recently, however, the Seventh Circuit has observed that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment is unusual in that it does not strictly involve subject matter jurisdiction." Ind. Protection & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Social Servs., 603 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Elwood v. Drescher, 456 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2...
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