Lewis v. The State
Decision Date | 05 April 1894 |
Docket Number | 17,142 |
Parties | Lewis v. The State |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Fayette Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to grant a new trial.
G. C Florea and L. L. Broaddus, for appellant.
A. G Smith, Attorney-General, F. W. Cady and D. L. Cady, for State.
At the March term, 1893, of the Fayette Circuit Court, the appellant, John Lewis, was indicted jointly with William Calvin, Morton Dixon and Peter Crawley, for shooting, in the night time, one Walter S. Jewiss, with intent to kill and murder him. The appellant had a separate trial by jury, was convicted and sentenced to be confined in the State prison for a period of two years and to pay a fine of one cent. He appeals to this court, and assigns but one error--the overruling of his motion for a new trial. The appellee, by her prosecuting attorney, joins in error.
Five reasons are assigned by appellant for a new trial. The first three are as follows:
"1st. Because the verdict of the jury is contrary to law.
2d. Because the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
3d. Because the verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence."
As to these specifications appellant admits that he is confronted by the rule that this court will not reverse a cause on the mere weight of the evidence, if there is evidence tending to support the verdict of the jury as to all the material facts. He does not question the record showing that the injured party testified that the appellant was present aiding and abetting one Haumesser in the felonious assault, and this alone puts in the record some evidence to sustain the verdict and brings him within the rule. But counsel complain that this is a harsh judicial rule. This is but a court of error, has nothing of the case before it except the record, in which the words of one witness mean just the same as the words of another witness.
The court and jury, in the court below, saw the witnesses, heard their voices, observed their manner of testifying, noted the degree of intelligence they possessed, and their fairness or bias for or against the accused, and many signs of truth or falsehood which can never appear in the record, and the decision comes to us with so many presumptions in its favor that it must clearly appear that substantial justice has not been done, or the ruling should be affirmed.
The bill of exceptions, which is in the record, contains the evidence in the cause, and, besides the testimony of the injured party tending to establish all the material facts necessary to a conviction, there is evidence going to show previous threats on that night, by appellant against the prosecuting witness; that appellant was in search of him shortly before the commission of the act complained of, and was pursuing Jewiss while the latter was on his way home, when the shots were fired. There is evidence from which it could be fairly inferred that he and his associates on that occasion were engaged in the felonious assault, agreeably to a common design and for a common purpose, viz., to take the life of the person assailed.
To use the language of this court in Siebert v. State, 95 Ind. 471 (479): "There is no clear defect, no link gone or too weak in the chain of facts which tend to establish the appellant's guilt of the felony, wherewith he was charged."
In Cox v. State, 49 Ind. 568 (572), the court said: "The jury found the verdict upon the evidence, and the court has sanctioned it by its judgment; and, though the evidence does not completely satisfy us, we can find no error in the law, and know of no judicial rule by which we can reverse the judgment pronounced below."
This doctrine is recognized in Siebert v. State, supra; Kelly v. State, 64 Ind. 326; Christy v. Holmes, 57 Ind. 314, and in many other cases.
The fourth reason for a new trial is as follows: "Because one of the jurors in said cause, viz., Joel Foster was guilty of misconduct in this, to wit: The said juror on his voir dire examination, in answer to questions touching his competency to sit as a juror in said cause, propounded by the defendant, answered, 'that he had formed or expressed no opinion on the merits of said cause,' which statement is now fully shown by the statement of Kate Johnston, the stenographer in said cause, filed herewith, made a part hereof and marked Exhibit A; that in fact said juror had formed and expressed an opinion on the merits of said cause, and was prejudiced and biased against the defendant, as shown by the affidavit of Anna Eisenhut, filed herewith, made a part hereof, and marked 'Exhibit B'; that defendant did not know that said juror had so formed and expressed such opinion until after the close of the trial, and could not have discovered the same by reasonable diligence; that he and his counsel made all effort in their power to ascertain whether the jurors in said court were biased or prejudiced against him, and that he was misled and surprised by the answers of said juror, Joel Foster, and would not have accepted him as a juror in said cause had he known that he had formed and expressed an opinion, as shown by the affidavit of Anna Eisenhut."
In support of the above charge of misconduct, is the following affidavit:
To this affidavit the proper jurat was attached.
In reply to the above, the State filed the following counter affidavit of said Foster:
This affidavit is signed by the juror, Foster, and the jurat of the officer administering the oath is attached thereto.
Kate Johnston, the official reporter, in substance, states that she was not present during the entire examination of the jury; that she took no notes of the testimony touching the qualifications of Joel Foster; that she does not know him, and has no recollection of his having been upon the jury; that it has been her practice as a stenographer, upon the examination of jurors, not to take notes touching their qualifications unless the juror states that he has formed and expressed an opinion, when, if present, she makes a note of the fact.
It is conceded by counsel for the appellant that the retention of such juror was discretionary with the court, under ...
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