Lewis v. Titlemax of Ariz., Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2021
• Docket Number: CV-21-00560-PHX-MTL
• Parties: Paul Lewis, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Titlemax of Arizona Incorporated, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Paul Lewis, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Titlemax of Arizona Incorporated, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-21-00560-PHX-MTL

United States District Court, D. Arizona

October 25, 2021

ORDER

MICHAEL T. LIBURDI UNITED SLATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendants Titlemax of Arizona, Inc. (“TitleMax”) and P.R.S. of AZ, L.L.C. (“PRS”), move to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docs. 16, 18.) The Motions will be denied.

I.

The Amended Complaint alleges that, in October 2019, Paul Lewis, Plaintiff Adam Lewis's father, purchased a preowned vehicle from a car dealer for his son. (Doc. 13 ¶ 36.) The vehicle had a clear title. (Id. ¶ 37.) According to the Amended Complaint, however, TitleMax had issued a loan to the previous owner, taking a security interest in the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) The previous owner defaulted on the loan. (Id. ¶ 33.) Although a lien was placed on the title, it did not appear at the time that Paul Lewis acquired the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 37.)

Paul Lewis transferred the vehicle's title to Adam in August 2020. (Id. ¶ 38.)

In early September 2020, TitleMax decided to repossess the vehicle due to the prior

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owner's default. (Id. ¶ 42.) Apparently TitleMax was unaware that the vehicle was resold. TitleMax hired an unidentified party who, in turn, engaged PRS to perform the repossession. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44.) Within a matter of days, PRS found the vehicle and repossessed it from Adam Lewis's mother's residence. (Id. ¶ 45.) Adam and his father learned what happened and demanded that PRS return the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.) The Lewis' allege that the vehicle was returned after four days of protest. (Id. ¶ 47.)

The Amended Complaint asserts claims against PRS and “Does I-X” for a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A); a claim against TitleMax under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”); and a claim for common law trespass to chattel against PRS and TitleMax. (Doc. 13 ¶¶ 51-73.) The Motions to Dismiss contest the Court's jurisdiction under the FDCPA. TitleMax also moves to dismiss the UCC claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “When the motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Renteria v. United States, 452 F.Supp.2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Fed'n. of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to demonstrate that jurisdiction exists. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain

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“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 545, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Dismissal under...