Lewis v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Citation: 56 Cal.App.3d 729,128 Cal.Rptr. 795
• Parties: Debbe LEWIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 36823.
• Decision Date: 30 March 1976
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 795

128 Cal.Rptr. 795

56 Cal.App.3d 729

Debbe LEWIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 36823.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

March 30, 1976.

A. Keith Lesar, Community Advocates, Legal Aid Society of Santa Cruz County, Inc., Watsonville, Richard M. Pearl, California Rural Legal Assistance/California Legal Services Center, San Francisco, for petitioner and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Eleanor Nisperos, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

RATTIGAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

Appellant Debbe Lewis commenced this proceeding in administrative mandamus by petitioning the superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (We hereinafter refer to her as 'petitioner.') In her petition, she sought a writ of mandate which would have required the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (respondent below and here, to which we refer as 'respondent Board,' or the 'Board') to set aside its decision denying her application for unemployment compensation benefits and to declare her eligible therefor. The trial court made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law adverse to petitioner, and entered a judgment denying her the relief sought. She appeals from the judgment.

Prior to July, 1973, petitioner was regularly employed in Santa Cruz by Charmwick, Inc, a candle manufacturer. She took a 'leave of absence' in that month and found herself unemployed when she returned from the 'leave' two months later: the circumstances are hereinafter described as expressly found by the trial court.

Petitioner thereupon applied to the Department of Human Resources Development ¹ for the benefits in question. The director determined that she was ineligible upon he ground that she had 'left . . . (her) . . . most recent work voluntarily without good cause,' as provided in section 1256 of the Unemployment Insurance Code. ²

Petitioner appealed to a Board referee pursuant to section 1328. After a hearing, the referee filed a written decision denying her application upon the same ground. Upon her further appeal to respondent Board as permitted by section 1336, the Board entered a decision in which it adopted the referee's statement of facts, and his reasons, and affirmed his decision.

Having thus exhausted her administrative remedy, petitioner commenced the present proceeding. The issue therein were framed upon her petition and the Board's answer and return. The return included the department's 'Administrative Record' of the aforementioned administrative proceedings. This record was the sole evidentiary basis of the trial court's findings and conclusions.

The facts appear in the findings, all of which are supported by the evidence. Petitioner expressly accepts the findings without dispute; as will appear, she challenges some of the trial court's conclusions of law. We therefore quote the findings and conclusions, in the context of the prefatory language employed by the trial court, as follows (all italics added):

'The matter was submitted to the court for decision, and the court being fully advised in the premises and having exercised its independent judgment on the evidence now makes the following ( ) FINDINGS OF FACT(:)

'I. Petitioner was employed as a candle decorator in special designs by Real Party In Interest, Charmwick, Inc., for approximately four and one half months prior to July 20, 1973.

'II. Prior to July 20, 1973, petitioner requested a leave of absence, beginning after she finished work on July 20 and lasting until mid-September. Petitioner requested the leave for her own personal pleasure, namely to sail a boat from Hawaii to the continental United States.

'III. Petitioner was granted a leave of absence by her supervisor who also advised her that the company might be undergoing changes due to fluctuations in the candle market, which would mean the laying off of personnel, and could, therefore, give her no assurance that she would be reemployed upon her return.

'IV. Petitioner took her leave of absence and returned prior to the expiration of her leave. On September 7, 1973, her employer advised Petitioner that she could not return to work because her position had been eliminated on August 16, 1973.

'V. Petitioner's position with her employer was abolished along with that of a number of other employees as part of a general cutback by her employer. On August 16, 1973 petitioner lacked sufficient seniority to have avoided the layoff.

'VI. Petitioner's employer did not give the Employment Development Department notice that petitioner had voluntarily left her work without good cause within five (5) days after the termination of her service as provided for in Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256.

'VII. When petitioner subsequently applied for unemployment insurance benefits, her application was denied on the ground that she had quit her work without good cause.

'From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes the following ( ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW(:)

'I. In exercising its independent judgment upon the evidence presented in the administrative record, the Court is not bound by the findings and determination of the Referee or the Appeals Board.

'II. An employee is presumed not to have voluntarily left his work without good cause unless his employer has given written notice to the contrary to the Employment Development Department within five (5) days after the termination of the employee's service and has set forth in the notice facts sufficient to overcome the presumption. This presumption is a rebuttable presumption which imposes on the employer or the Department the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant quit work voluntarily without good cause.

'III. An employee who obtains a leave of absence without securing an unconditional guarantee that he may return to his employment at the expiration of the leave of absence voluntarily quits his employment within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256.

'IV. Pursuit of personal enjoyment does not constitute good cause for terminating employment within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256.

'V. The preponderance of the evidence shows that when petitioner obtained her leave of absence, she did not secure an unconditional guarantee that she could return to work at the expiration of her leave and further shows that she took her leave for reasons of personal pleasure. Accordingly, petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment and consequently left her work without good cause and under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 is disqualified from receiving Unemployment Compensation Benefits in connection with this claim.

'VI. Respondent Appeals Board therefore did not act in excess of or without jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's application for Unemployment Insurance Benefits.

'VII. Accordingly, judgment should be entered denying the Petition for Writ of Mandate and awarding respondent costs of suit incurred herein.'

It will be observed that the trial court deemed petitioner 'disqualified' for benefits pursuant to section 1256, After the which the court found to have occurred in August and September (findings IV and V), upon the theory that she had 'left . . . (her) . . . work voluntarily without good cause' when she commenced her 'leave of absence' for personal pleasure in July (finding no. II), without having secured at that time (i.e., in July) 'an unconditional guarantee that she could return to work at the expiration of her leave . . ..' (Conclusion of law no. V.) Petitioner challenges this theory, both in principle and as applied by the trial court.

The theory is applied in conclusion of law no. V as expressed in no. III: 'An employee who obtains a leave of absence without securing an unconditional guarantee that he may return to his employment at the expiration of the leave of absence voluntarily quits his employment within the meaning of . . . section 1256.' We have concluded that the theory, thus inflexibly stated, is invalid because it fails to comprehend the material distinction between suspension of work and termination of employment; that it was invalidly applied to the facts As found by the trial court in the present case; and that those facts require reversal of the judgment with directions that petitioner be granted the relief sought.

The parties have not cited, nor have we found, any judicial decision in this state which specifically supports or negates the trial court's theory as stated in its conclusion of law no. III. In a single decision which generally interrelates a 'leave of absence' with section 1256 (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. California Unemp. Ins. Appeals Board (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 636, 4 Cal.Rptr. 723), the affected employee had taken a 'leave of absence' from her work because she was pregnant. (Id., at pp., 638--639, 4 Cal.Rptr. 723.) Such leave, in a case of pregnancy, was required under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement which controlled her job. (Ibid.)

The Douglas court held in effect that the compulsory nature of the leave made it Involuntary on the employee's part, so that it did not constitute her having 'left . . . (her) . . . work voluntarily without good cause' within the meaning of section 1256. (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. California Unemp. Ins. Appeals Board, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 636 at p. 642 et seq, 4 Cal.Rptr. 723.) The decision therefore does not define the effect of section 1256 upon a strictly Voluntary leave of absence such as was taken here (see the trial court's findings II and III, quoted Supra), and we are aware of no judicial decision in California which does.

Thus lacking judicial authority for conclusion of law no. III, respondent Board cites in support thereof an administrative decision reached by itself in an earlier proceeding (...