Leyo v. State

• Decision Date: 12 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-18.,04-18.
• Citation: 116 P.3d 1113,2005 WY 92
• Parties: Christopher LEYO, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

116 P.3d 1113

2005 WY 92

Christopher LEYO, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 04-18.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

August 12, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and SANDERSON, D.J.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Christopher Leyo appeals his convictions on two counts of delivering a controlled substance (methamphetamine)¹ and one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine).² Leyo claims there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions and prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument. Finding no error, we affirm Leyo's convictions.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Leyo submits the following issues for this Court's review, with which the State generally agrees:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant for delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.

II. Whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor improperly appealed to community outrage in closing argument, and whether the trial court erred in failing to rectify this error with a proper curative instruction, denying appellant a fair trial.

FACTS

[¶ 3] In the spring of 2002 Amanda Inman began working as a confidential informant for the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). Inman was an intravenous methamphetamine user and a convicted felon. Inman began working for DCI as an informant because she and her boyfriend had been caught delivering methamphetamine. In return for her cooperation, the State offered to recommend probation on the delivery charges, drop other charges against her, and help her boyfriend. Pursuant to this deal, Inman provided information to DCI on several different criminal matters.

[¶ 4] On January 27, 2003, Inman learned she was staying in the same motel as an acquaintance, Michelle Mastin. She went to Mastin's room. Inman found four people in the room, including Mastin and Leyo. Leyo informed Inman that he had some methamphetamine he needed to sell. The next morning, Inman informed an agent with the DCI that she could purchase a quarter gram of methamphetamine from Leyo for $35.00. DCI proceeded to make arrangements for a controlled buy and executed the controlled buy the same day.

[¶ 5] DCI followed standard operating procedures for a controlled buy. They had Inman come to the DCI office. After her arrival, a DCI agent searched her vehicle. Inman was searched by a female employee of DCI and fitted with a wireless transmitter. Inman was then given pre-recorded buy money. Inman left the DCI office with, to the best knowledge of the law enforcement representatives present, nothing but the pre-recorded buy money. Inman drove straight to Mastin's motel, at all times followed by law enforcement officers. Inman drove normally and was not seen moving her hands around or reaching for anything.

[¶ 6] The controlled buy took place in Mastin's motel room. Inman went alone to the motel room. DCI maintained surveillance around the motel and monitored the transaction by way of the wireless transmitter. The proceedings as received from the wireless transmitter were recorded to audiotape. Inman returned to her car and drove back to the DCI office, under constant surveillance. Back at the office, Inman was searched again, the methamphetamine was recovered, and Inman was questioned about the buy (debriefed). Inman's car was also searched. Inman then left the office.

[¶ 7] The second buy took place on February 4, 2003. Prior to February 4, Mastin told Inman that, although her source was leaving town and she personally could not get more methamphetamine for Inman, Leyo could sell Inman some methamphetamine. Inman informed DCI of her negotiations with Mastin. DCI set up a controlled buy and the same procedures were followed. Inman came to the DCI office, she was searched and wired, and she was given pre-recorded buy funds.

[¶ 8] Inman's driver's license had been suspended so this time a law enforcement officer drove Inman to the buy location. Inman was kept under constant surveillance. Inman entered the motel room alone and returned to the officer waiting for her in the parking lot within six or seven minutes. The proceedings as received from the wireless transmitter were recorded. On this occasion, Inman purchased 1.75 grams of methamphetamine from Leyo for $130.00. Inman was driven back to the DCI office, the methamphetamine was recovered, Inman was searched and debriefed. The information Inman gave to DCI in the debriefing after both buys corresponded to what DCI agents were able to hear over the transmitter. The audiotapes that recorded the transactions over the transmitter were played to the jury and admitted as evidence.

[¶ 9] DCI hoped to make further purchases from Leyo (and hopefully gather evidence regarding Leyo's supplier(s)), but Inman was caught driving with a suspended license and sentenced to forty-five days in jail. Once DCI found out that Inman would be in jail and unavailable to conduct any more controlled buys for them, DCI looked for Leyo and Mastin, but they had vacated the area. Thus, DCI was unable to obtain a search warrant to find pre-recorded buy funds or other evidence of drug related activity.

[¶ 10] Leyo was eventually arrested on April 22, 2003, and charged with two counts of delivering methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine. The case was tried to a jury in September 2003. Mastin was not located in time for her to testify at Leyo's trial. Thus, although the State called several law enforcement officers to testify regarding their respective roles in the controlled buys, Inman was the only witness to provide direct testimony of the actual transactions. Specifically, Inman was the only witness to testify that Leyo was the person from whom she bought the methamphetamine. At the time of trial, Inman was in jail for violation of the terms of her probation. She also had been diagnosed with, and was on medication for, schizophrenia. Leyo moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case. The motion was denied. Leyo did not put on a defense. The jury convicted Leyo on all three charges.

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Standard of Review

[¶ 11] On appeal, Leyo first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. When the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, this Court must respect the role of the fact-finder, in this case the jury, to weigh the credibility of the respective witnesses. A jury is entitled to weigh and disregard any evidence intended to discredit the witnesses for the State. Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo.1985). This Court does not second-guess the credibility determinations of the jury. Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 703, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2003). To that end, this Court must presume that the jury resolved any conflict in the evidence in favor of the prosecution. McFarlane v. State, 2001 WY 10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, ¶ 4 (Wyo.2001). Ultimately, in order to preserve the role of the fact-finder, this Court does not review the record evidence to determine if it agrees with the verdict, but rather the critical inquiry of this Court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Ekholm v. State, 2004 WY 159, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d 201, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2004); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1242, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2002).

Discussion

[¶ 12] Initially, Leyo questions this Court's standard of review on claims that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. In a confusing argument, Leyo seemingly contends that this Court has strayed from the standard of review established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This Court finds Leyo's contention peculiar, particularly in light of the fact this Court has repeatedly directly quoted Jackson when explaining our standard of review:

When addressing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for a crime, we apply the following standard:

This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did.

Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001). This inquiry does not require a court to determine whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo.1985). Rather, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This standard gives the trier of fact the responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Id. "`Once a defendant has been...