Li v. Vill. of Saddle Rock
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-2289 (DRH) (ST) |
| Parties | JIANJUN LI and CHIXIN FANG, Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF SADDLE ROCK, DAN LEVY, JAMES T. MURPHY and JOHN DOES 1-4, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES
MARGOLIN BESUNDER LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Islandia, NY 11749
By: Jeffrey D. Powell, Esq.
Linda U. Margolin, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
101 Greenwich Street, 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10006
By: Cristina A. Knorr, Esq.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jianjun Li and Chixin Fang ("Plaintiffs") bring this action against Defendants Village of Saddle Rock, Dan Levy, James T. Murphy, and John Does 1-4 (collectively "Defendants") alleging (1) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New York state law, (2) malicious abuse of process in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New York state law, (3) conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and (4) Monell liability of Defendant Village of Saddle Rock for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action arises out of the Defendants' prosecution of Plaintiffs for failing to repair a retaining wall, Plaintiffs' conviction thereof, and the New York Appellate Term of the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [DE 20]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
The following facts from the Complaint and materials properly considered on Defendants' motion, see infra Discussion Section I, are taken as true for the purposes of this Order.
Plaintiffs Dr. Jianjun Li and Dr. Chixin Fang are Chinese-American co-owners of a home in the Village of Saddle Rock in Long Island, New York (the "Village"). (Compl. ¶¶ 14-17). The named defendants are the Village, the Village Mayor Dan Levy, the Village Attorney James T. Murphy, and unidentified co-conspirators John Does 1-4. (Id. ¶¶ 18-21).
In October 2015, Plaintiffs purchased property in the Village that is supported by a retaining wall at the shared border with its two neighboring properties. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 27, 28). Around the time of Plaintiffs' purchase, their neighbors performed excavation work that destabilized the natural slope between the properties and impaired the lateral support of the retaining wall. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31). Plaintiffs complained to Levy, who indicated the problem "was minor and would all be fixed in the spring." (Id. ¶¶ 36-37).
In February 2016, a piece of retaining wall on a neighbor's property collapsed and caused Plaintiffs' to subside. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35). With the condition now worsened, Levy tried to convince Plaintiffs that they "were personally liable for repairing" the retaining wall and re-stabilizing the slope. (Id. ¶ 38). Levy recommended that Plaintiffs hire one of their neighbor's contracting company to replace the wall, which would have cost $160,000.00 plus survey and engineering expenses. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43). Levy is alleged to have "a long-standing business, social and/or personal relationship" with Plaintiffs' neighbors, belonging to the same "civil, municipal and/or religious committees or groups." (Id. ¶¶ 39-40). Around this time, Levy allegedly stated that the neighbors "have done enough for the Village" and proposed to "[l]et the Chinaman pay." (Id. ¶ 41). The Complaint does not identify to whom Levy made the comment. (See id.). Plaintiffs declined to repair the wall. (Id. ¶ 44).
Levy then directed the Village to hire Plaintiffs' neighbor's contracting company "to erect a temporary wooden retaining wall," which required helical piles to be driven into Plaintiffs' property and which was done without their consent. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47). When the temporary wall quickly failed, Levy demanded that Plaintiffs reimburse the Village of the cost: $35,000.00. (Id. ¶ 48). The Complaint does not set out the dates on which the temporary wall went up or collapsed. (See id. ¶¶ 46-48).
On February 15, 2016, an architect assessed the retaining wall and determined that it was not Plaintiffs' responsibility, advising Levy of the same. (Id. ¶¶ 49-52). The Complaint does not reveal who retained the architect. (See id.). Levy nevertheless directed Paul Lauria, a Village building inspector, to issue a "Notice ofUnsafe Condition" due to Plaintiffs' "violation of Section 48-13(B&C) of the Village of Saddle Rock Building Code." (Id. ¶¶ 53-56 (quoting the Notice)). The order, dated February 17, 2016, demanded Plaintiffs repair the retaining wall by February 23, 2016. (Id.). Plaintiffs hired an engineer to design a replacement wall, though they disclaimed any intention to pay for its construction. (See id. ¶¶ 59-61). Levy encouraged Plaintiffs' engineer to convince them to pay for the wall and offered future work in exchange for the engineer's efforts to that end. (Id. ¶ 61). During his conversation with the engineer, Levy allegedly "mocked [Plaintiffs'] Chinese accent." (Id.).
On February 25, 2016, Levy directed Lauria to send a letter to Plaintiffs which called their attention to a $500.00 per-day fine and thirty days imprisonment should the wall remain unremedied. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 64). Village Attorney Murphy later followed up with a letter Plaintiffs, noting the accruing amount of the fine. (Id. ¶ 63).
On June 17, 2016, Levy directed Murphy to write another letter, demanding Plaintiffs pay $35,000.00 to the Village in satisfaction of the outstanding violations. (Id. ¶¶ 70-71). In July, the Village brought criminal charges against Plaintiffs for violations of § 48-13(B) & (C) of the Village Code. (Id. ¶¶ 74-76, 79). The Village Justice denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the charges on December 22, 2016, held a four-day trial across the first half of 2017, ultimately convicted Plaintiffs on October 17, 2017, and imposed a fine in the amount of $202,000.00. (Id. ¶¶ 77-78, 83, 85-86).
The New York Supreme Court Appellate Term, Second Department reversed Plaintiffs' conviction on May 16, 2019. (Id. ¶ 91). The accusatory instrument's § 48-13(B) charge was "facially insufficient," and thus "jurisdictionally defective," and its § 48-13(C) charge was improper because that section "does not charge an offense." (Id. ¶¶ 90-91; Decision & Order of New York Supreme Court Appellate Term, Second Department ("2d Dep't Order"), Ex. C [DE 20-5] to Decl. of Cristina A. Knorr ("Knorr Decl.") [DE 20-1]).1 Accordingly, charges were dismissed. (2d Dep't Order; see Compl. ¶ 94).
Plaintiffs brought this action on May 21, 2020, and Defendants moved to dismiss on September 4, 2020. [DE 1, 20].
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court should "draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff['s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility standard is guided by two principles. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009).
First, the principle that a court must accept all allegations as true is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Thus, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556U.S. at 678. Although "legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. A plaintiff must provide facts sufficient to allow each named defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Second, only complaints that state a "plausible claim for relief" can survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57) (internal citations omitted); see In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007). Determining whether a complaint plausibly states a claim for relief is "a context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.
Though no party raises the issue, the Court first addresses the materials extraneous to the Complaint considered on Defendants' motion. In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court isgenerally limited to the complaint and documents attached thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Nakahata v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2013). A court "'may also consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken.'" Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. 823 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008)); see Bristol v. Nassau County, 2016 WL 2760339, at *4 ...
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