Li11y v. Boyd

• Citation: 72 Ga. 83
• Parties: Li11y . vs. Boyd.
• Decision Date: 30 September 1883
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

72 Ga. 83

Li11y . vs. Boyd.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1883.

Attorney and Client. Actions. Statute of Limitations. Damages. Before Judge Estes. Lumpkin Superior Court. April Term, 1883.

Reported in the decision.

W. P. Findley; G. N. Lester, for plaintiff in error.

J. M. Bishop; H. Thompson; C. D. Phillips; M. L. Smith, for defendant.

Blandford, Justice.

C. A. Lilly brought his action on the case against Wier Boyd, in which he alleged that on the 25th March, 1866, he paid defendant for his opinion as an attorney at law; that defendant had previously thereto been employedas such attorney to investigate the titles to certain lots of land, and upon the advice and opinion of said attorney that plaintiff purchased said lands; that on the 12th day of April, 1880, he and his assigns were duly evicted from four-fifths of the lands mentioned. The declaration was demurred to, on the ground that the plaintiffs cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, as appeared by the declaration. The court sustained the demurrer, and dismissed plaintiff\'s case, and the plaintiff excepted, and error thereon is assigned.

The gist of this action is the misconduct of the defendant. When a person who wishes to purchase lands, retains an attorney to examine the titles, and such attorney reports to his client that the titles of the person from whom he wishes to purchase are good, and it would be safe to make the purchase, and the attorney makes a false report to his client, he is guilty of a breach of duty, and a right of action immediately accrues to the client; if no special damage or injury has resulted to the client, then he may, nevertheless, recover nominal damages; if special damage result from the misconduct of the attorney, it is not of itself a cause of action, but the breach of duty imposed by the contract is the cause of action, and not the consequential damage resulting from it. The breach of promise or of duty took place as soon as the defendant reported that he had examined the titles to the lands, and that the same were good and sufficient. And the plaintiff's declaration avers that this breach of duty occurred on the 25th March, 1866, and this action was not commenced until the 26th September, 1881; it follows, therefore, that the statute of limitations is a bar to this action. See Howell vs. Young, 5 Barnwell & Cresswell, 263, in which this question is ably discussed by Bayley and Holroyd, Justices In Rhines vs. Evans, 66...