Liacopoulos v. Coumoulis

Decision Date25 November 1929
Docket Number55
PartiesLiacopoulos, Appellant, v. Coumoulis
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued October 9, 1929

Appeal, No. 55, March T., 1929, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., July T., 1926, No. 3620, on verdict for defendant, in case of Chrysanthos Liacopoulos v. B Coumoulis. Affirmed.

Trespass for libel. Before MACFARLANE, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

Errors assigned were various rulings and instructions, quoting record.

The judgment is affirmed.

H. P Eberharter, for appellant. -- The charge of the court was inadequate, said charge failing to define libel and failing to give the jurors a proper conception of the issue for them to decide: Holland v. Flick, 212 Pa. 201; Oles v. Pittsburgh Times, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 130; McIntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. 52; Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. 367; Price v. Conway, 134 Pa. 340; Drebin v. Jewish World, 262 Pa. 169; Wood v. Boyle, 177 Pa. 620; Binder v. Pottstown Daily News, 33 Pa.Super. 411; Wilde v. McKee, 111 Pa. 335; Egan v. Print. & Pub. Co., 64 Pa.Super. 115.

The procurance of the publication made the defendant responsible: Bruce v. Reed, 104 Pa. 408.

The writing of the letter to the newspaper showed deliberation and malice: Collins v. Dispatch Publishing Co., 152 Pa. 187; Wills v. Hardcastle, 19 Pa.Super. 525; Com. v. Wolfinger, 7 Kulp 537; Moore v. Publishing Co., 8 Pa.Super. 152.

The charge of the court below was prejudicial to the interests of plaintiff: Fisher v. Publishing Co., 239 Pa. 200; Collins v. Publishing Co., 152 Pa. 187; McDonald v. Lee, 246 Pa. 253.

The court below should have permitted plaintiff to introduce the translation and innuendo contained in the statement of claim, defendant having admitted the same by his plea of justification: Oles v. Pittsburgh Times, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 130; Binder v. Pottstown Daily News, 33 Pa.Super. 411; Livingston v. Reich, 54 Pa.Super. 346; Palmer v. Harris, 60 Pa. 156.

Plaintiff having pleaded special damages, should have been permitted to show decreased earnings as a result of the libel: Sacchetti v. Fehr, 217 Pa. 475; Com. v. Foley, 292 Pa. 277; Scott v. Sampson, 8 Q.B.D. 491; Burkhart v. North American Co., 214 Pa. 39; Livingston v. Reich, 54 Pa.Super. 346.

Charles P. Lang, for appellee. -- Whether the case was properly submitted to the jury, is ruled by Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. 367.

A translation of the article was laid as innuendo in the statement of claim and the court properly overruled the offer to put the innuendo in evidence before the jury as proof of the accuracy of the translation: Stoner v. Erisman, 206 Pa. 600.

If the jury believed the publication was true, or that defendant had just cause to believe it to be true, the verdict should be for defendant: Ferber v. Pub. Assn., 212 Pa. 367; Sacchetti v. Fehr, 217 Pa. 475.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SADLER:

The plaintiff, a Greek, resident of the City of Pittsburgh, had been employed there since 1918. In conjunction with another, he prepared a book of an historical nature. To increase its sale, he surrendered, in 1924, the position held by him with a local bank, and thereafter traveled from point to point, making efforts to dispose of the publication in which he was interested. Before leaving Pittsburgh, he had become indebted to certain of his friends. He had previously induced the defendant to endorse a note for $200, but failed to meet the obligation when due, and the endorser was compelled to pay the discounting bank the principal and interest, and a new note for $205 was executed by plaintiff, naming defendant as payee. The plaintiff failed to comply with several written requests for its satisfaction when overdue. Finally, the creditor notified him that a failure to pay within a fixed time would result in exposure. The demand for reimbursement was not complied with, whereupon defendant caused to be inserted in a newspaper, published in the Greek language, a statement reflecting upon the conduct of plaintiff, alleged by the latter to be libelous and causing injury to him, for which recompense was asked.

The article set forth that the plaintiff, before leaving Pittsburgh, "put in hand" from several members of his own nationality over $5,000, represented by different notes, which he refused to liquidate. The default in the payment of $205, advanced by the defendant, was referred to as part of the indebtedness. The newspaper was asked to publish these facts "because possibly [the plaintiff, naming him], a salesman of albums, traveling under the smile of deceit, may 'put more in hand.'" This writing was circulated, and, according to plaintiff, made difficult or impossible the further carrying on of the work in which he was engaged, as a result of which special damage was suffered, though none was shown at the trial by competent evidence. The defendant pled justification to the action instituted.

In the statement filed, it was averred, as an innuendo, that the charge that plaintiff "put in hand" money of others meant, when translated into English, that he "cheated, defrauded and swindled." In view of the plea of justification, plaintiff contended that this was an admission not only of the publication of the writing, but of the meaning ascribed to the words "put in hand," as charged, and, for this purpose, the statement, as interpreted in the claim filed, should be received in evidence. This offer was properly refused by the court. An innuendo cannot be accepted as true, when the words used enlarge the natural and ordinary sense of the language, or otherwise may place a false construction thereon: Snyder v. Tribune Co. (Ia.), 143 N.W. 519. "An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the meaning of the defamatory statement, or operate as an averment, imparting into the statement anything which is not a usual and natural presumption from the precedent words. . . . It is a question of fact for the jury as to whether the defamatory statement was used and understood in the sense charged": Cunningham v. Underwood, 53 C.C.A. 99, 116 F. 803; Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 596 (writ of error dismissed, 215 U.S. 589). See also notes 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 140; 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1043.

In the present case, the printed article was in the Greek language, and the meaning of the words complained of, as translated into English, was in dispute. The plaintiff testified that he was thereby designated as a cheat or fraud, but another witness, called on his behalf, ascribed the meaning to be the borrower of money without intending to repay it. This construction was borne out by the defendant, and the witnesses called by him. The true meaning was a question for the jury, and it was for that body to determine whether the plaintiff had been defamed as he alleged: Stoner v. Erisman, 206 Pa. 600; Abersold v. Marcus, 272 Pa. 199; Mengel v. Reading Eagle Company, 241 Pa. 367; McCormick v. Weinstein, 81 Pa.Super. 163; Egan v. Dubois Printing Co., 64 Pa.Super. 115. It was for the court to say whether the writing was libelous, if the jury found the language used bore the interpretation insisted upon by the plaintiff: Meas v. Johnson, 185 Pa. 12. The court did so instruct, as required, that if they found the words expressed the meaning contended for by plaintiff then they were libelous in themselves, but the jury determined that they could not be so construed, and rendered a verdict for the defendant.

The plaintiff further complains of a failure to answer various points presented defining the acts which would constitute a libel. The first three correctly set forth the proof necessary to establish a defamatory statement, but the general charge sufficiently covered the same subject-matter and made unnecessary a repetition of the words used in the instructions asked. The jury was expressly told that if the meaning of the phrase "put in...

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