Liang v. Guang Hui Liang

• Decision Date: 16 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 341010,341010
• Citation: 936 N.W.2d 710,328 Mich.App. 302
• Parties: McCarty JI LIANG, BY Next Friend Mei SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUANG HUI LIANG and G. Liang, Inc., doing business as Chan’s Chinese Restaurant, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

328 Mich.App. 302

936 N.W.2d 710

McCarty JI LIANG, BY Next Friend Mei SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.GUANG HUI LIANG and G. Liang, Inc., doing business as Chan’s Chinese Restaurant, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 341010

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 10, 2019, at Detroit.

Decided May 16, 2019, 9:15 a.m.

Ross Law Office, PLLC (by Sherrie C. Ross ) for plaintiff.

Harvey Kruse, PC (by James E. Sukkar and Gregory P. LaVoy ) for defendants.

Before: Murray, C.J., and Sawyer and Redford, JJ.

Murray, C.J.

We granted the application for leave to appeal filed by defendants, Guang Hui Liang (Liang) and G. Liang, Inc., doing business as Chan’s Chinese Restaurant, Inc. (Chan’s),¹ to consider whether Liang is entitled to parental immunity from the claims brought against him by his son, plaintiff McCarty Ji Liang, for an injury plaintiff suffered at Liang’s business. For the reasons that follow, we hold that parental immunity bars the negligence-based claims against Liang but that the immunity doctrine has no bearing on the premises-liability claim against the corporate entity. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the injuries suffered by plaintiff at Chan’s, his father Liang’s restaurant.² Plaintiff, who was five years old at the time, arrived at Chan’s between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. with his mother, Guo Ying Cao, to surprise Liang for Father’s Day. Although Chan’s operated only as a take-out restaurant, it had a full dining room in the front where plaintiff and Cao waited while Liang prepared for closing by cleaning and prepping food for the next day. When Cao walked away to inform a customer at the take-out window that Chan’s had closed for the night, plaintiff wandered out of the dining area and into a room that housed the restaurant’s industrial meat grinder. The room, separated from the kitchen, was near the bathroom, and the meat grinder was plugged in on the floor. Plaintiff attempted to operate the meat grinder, but caught and injured his hand in the machine, ultimately requiring amputation of his hand.

In his suit against defendants, plaintiff alleged common-law negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and premises liability. In lieu of an answer, defendants moved for summary disposition of the complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), asserting entitlement to parental immunity from plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff responded by arguing that parental immunity could not shield Chan’s, a corporate entity, from liability and that his complaint did not allege negligent supervision as Liang was acting in a business capacity at the time of the injuries. Further, plaintiff asserted that parental immunity did not apply to his premises-liability claim because property owners owe a heightened duty of care to licensees. Ultimately, the trial court denied defendants' motion, holding that parental immunity could not shield defendants from liability because Liang was acting as a business owner when plaintiff’s injuries occurred and had a duty to plaintiff as an invitee on the property.

II. ANALYSIS

We first address defendants' argument that the trial court erred when it concluded that parental immunity did not bar plaintiff’s claims against Liang. We agree and hold that, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff’s injuries occurred at Chan’s, Liang’s business, Liang was entitled to parental immunity.

"This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for summary disposition."

Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm. , 477 Mich. 197, 202, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007). "Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is barred by immunity granted by law." Fane v. Detroit Library Comm. , 465 Mich. 68, 74, 631 N.W.2d 678 (2001). When deciding the motion, "a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Fields v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Regional Transp. , 311 Mich. App. 231, 234, 874 N.W.2d 715 (2015). "If there is no factual dispute, whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred under a principle set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law for the court to decide." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. PARENTAL IMMUNITY

Michigan courts had for many decades recognized the doctrine of parental immunity, which prohibited a minor from suing her parent in tort. See Elias v. Collins , 237 Mich. 175, 177, 211 N.W. 88 (1926), overruled by Plumley v. Klein , 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). The Elias Court stated that the doctrine was created at common law to serve "the interest of the peace of the family and of society, and is supported by sound public policy." Elias , 237 Mich. at 177, 211 N.W. 88. In 1972, however, the doctrine was redefined and limited; it was expressed as permitting "[a] child [to] maintain a lawsuit against his parent for injuries suffered as a result of the alleged ordinary negligence of the parent," except "(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." Plumley , 388 Mich. at 8, 199 N.W.2d 169.

In Goodwin v. Northwest Mich. Fair Ass'n , 325 Mich. App. 129, 143-144, 923 N.W.2d 894 (2018), our Court recently set out the current standards governing the application of the parental-immunity doctrine:

Although parents undoubtedly have a duty to supervise their children, the law generally does not allow children to recover damages from their parents for a breach of this duty. In particular, "[a]t common law, a minor could not sue his or her parents in tort." The Michigan Supreme Court generally abolished intra-family tort immunity in Plumley , holding that a child could maintain a lawsuit against his or her parents for an injury resulting from a parent’s negligence. However, the Plumley Court retained two exceptions to this rule, concluding that parental immunity remained:

(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.

A claim for negligent parental supervision of a child falls within the first Plumley exception, meaning that a parent is granted immunity and a child may not sue a parent for negligent supervision. [Citations omitted.]

See also Vandonkelaar v. Kid’s Kourt, LLC , 290 Mich. App. 187, 211, 800 N.W.2d 760 (2010) ( MURRAY , J., dissenting) ("Although parents traditionally enjoyed immunity from suit by their minor child should they breach the duties owed to the child, the modern rule is that a child may sue his parents for negligence.

Plumley , 388 Mich. at 8, 199 N.W.2d 169. An exception to this rule in Michigan, however, extends immunity to parents ‘where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.’ " Id. ). The pivotal question for resolution here is whether the allegations against Liang fall within the first Plumley exception.

"In determining whether a defendant was exercising reasonable parental authority, the question is not whether the defendant acted negligently, but whether the alleged act reasonably fell within one of the Plumley exceptions," Phillips v. Deihm , 213 Mich. App. 389, 395, 541 N.W.2d 566 (1995), and this Court has repeatedly held that a claim for negligent parental supervision falls under the first exception, Paige v. Bing Constr. Co. , 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975) ("A parent’s exercise of authority over his or her child involves more than discipline. It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being."); McCallister v. Sun Valley Pools, Inc. , 100 Mich. App. 131, 139, 298 N.W.2d 687 (1980) ; Goodwin , 325 Mich. App. at 144, 923 N.W.2d 894.

Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige , 61 Mich. App. at 481, 233 N.W.2d 46, a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister , 100 Mich. App. at 133, 298 N.W.2d 687, a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun while on a fishing trip with her father, Wright v. Wright , 134 Mich. App. 800, 803, 351 N.W.2d 868 (1984), and a child injured himself on a dirt bike given to him by his father, Haddrill v. Damon , 149 Mich. App. 702, 703-704, 386 N.W.2d 643 (1986).

We see no meaningful distinction between the cases cited above and the circumstances and claims at issue here. Despite plaintiff’s efforts to plead in avoidance of parental immunity, the gravamen of his complaint consists of claims grounded in negligent supervision. See McCallister , 100 Mich. App. at 139, 298 N.W.2d 687 ("The gravamen of plaintiff’s pleadings can only be construed as an action for negligent parental supervision."). Specifically, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Liang failed to secure the meat grinder, protect him from the foreseeable risk of harm posed by the dangerous meat grinder, and warn him of the danger. These allegations focus exclusively on Liang’s alleged failure to properly supervise plaintiff by preventing him from roaming, unsupervised, into a separate room that led to his injuries or to instruct plaintiff regarding apparent dangers on the premises. These actions (or inactions) fall squarely within the first Plumley exception.

That the injury occurred at Liang’s...