Libby Neill Libby v. United States

• Decision Date: 27 November 1950
• Docket Number: No. 37,37
• Citation: 95 L.Ed. 86,71 S.Ct. 144,340 U.S. 71
• Parties: LIBBY, McNEILL & LIBBY v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

340 U.S. 71

71 S.Ct. 144

95 L.Ed. 86

LIBBY, McNEILL & LIBBY

v UNITED STATES.

No. 37.

Argued Oct. 13, 1950.

Decided Nov. 27, 1950.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing Jan. 8, 1951.

Mr. Stanley B. Long, Seattle, Wash., for petitioner.

Mr. Samuel D. Slade, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a companion case to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 71 S.Ct. 135, decided this day. Here, as there, the Government insured petitioner's ship against war risks including 'all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations.' The ordinary marine risks were covered by a Lloyd's policy. The vessel, United States Army Transport David W. Branch, stranded on January 13, 1942, when an inexperienced helmsman made a mistake in steering. The Government admits that the Branch was engaged in the warlike operation of transporting military supplies and personnel between war bases, but denies that the warlike phases of the operation caused the stranding. The Court of Claims found as a fact that there was no causal connection between the 'warlike operation' and the stranding, and accordingly gave judgment for the United States. 87 F.Supp. 866, 115 Ct.Cl. 290. Petitioner's contentions for reversal here are substantially the same as those advanced in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, supra. The reasons given for our holding there require affirmance in this case.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS dissents for the reasons set forth in his dissent in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 70, 71 S.Ct. 135, 143, decided this day.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, joined by Mr. Justice JACKSON, dissenting.

This is another marine insurance case raising the same legal issue as Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 71 S.Ct. 135, and is to be decided in light of it. The facts of the case must be considered, for the question whether the loss was a 'consequence' of hostilities and warlike activities cannot be answered in the abstract.

The Branch, a combination passenger and cargo vessel having a gross tonnage of 5,544 tons, was chartered to the United States by her owners on September 15, 1941. The owners insured against marine risks, and the Government insured against 'all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations.' On January 11, 1942, the Branch departed from Seattle for certain Alaskan ports. She was operated by the Army and was loaded with materials and personnel destined for war bases in Alaska. The sailing orders issued by the Army Transport Service directed the Branch to follow the inside passage to Alaska because there was danger of submarine attack if the outside route across open seas were followed. On the night of January 13, the Branch, running on a course 350 yards off Hammer Island, diverged from the course and headed toward the island. The helmsman, who was found to be incompetent, turned in an opposite direction from that ordered by the pilot when the divergence was noticed, and the vessel ran aground on a partially submerged reef.

Here, as in the Standard Oil case, it is clear that the vessel was engaged in a warlike operation, and the Court of Claims so concluded. The only question is whether in the circumstances the running aground is fairly to be considered a 'consequence' of the warlike activity. The court below concluded that it could not look beyond the fault of the helmsman although it found specially a number of facts indicating that the collision grew out of the warlike activity of the vessel.

(1) The court found that the 'deperming process to which the vessel was subjected created an unstable and variable magnetic condition in the vessel which in turn created an...