Libby v. Estabrook

• Decision Date: 19 May 2020
• Docket Number: Docket: Cum-19-392
• Citation: 234 A.3d 197
• Parties: Timothy R. LIBBY v. Kyle ESTABROOK
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

234 A.3d 197

Timothy R. LIBBY

v.Kyle ESTABROOK

Docket: Cum-19-392

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: April 14, 2020

Decided: May 19, 2020

Revised: June 23, 2020

Sarah C. Mitchell, Esq., and Amy Dieterich, Esq., Skelton Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, for appellantTimothy R. Libby

Kim Pittman, Esq., and Suzanne E. Thompson, Esq., Vincent, Kantz, Pittman & Thompson, LLC, Portland, for appelleeKyle Estabrook

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

Majority: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

Concurrence/Dissent: JABAR, J.

HORTON, J.

[¶1]Timothy R. Libby appeals from a judgment of the District Court(Portland, J. French, J. ) dismissing, for lack of standing, his petition to establish de facto parentage of his stepson, the biological child of Kyle Estabrook.Libby contends that the court abused its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine disputed facts relevant to his standing.We vacate the judgment and remand for such a hearing.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following factual assertions are taken from Libby's affidavit in support of his petition and from the procedural record, except where otherwise indicated.SeeYoung v. King , 2019 ME 78, ¶ 2, 208 A.3d 762.

[¶3] The child was nine years old when Libby filed his petition to establish de facto parentage.Libby is the child's stepfather, and Estabrook is the child's biological father.The child's mother died in March 2019.

[¶4] Libby and the child's mother met and began dating in 2012, when the child was three years old.Shortly thereafter, Libby moved in with the mother and the child, and the three "spent time together as a family."While Libby was deployed to Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014, the mother and the child participated in events with Libby's family.When Libby returned, he and the mother purchased a house together in Lewiston and eventually married in September 2017.While living together, Libby and the mother shared responsibility for caring for the child.

[¶5] According to Libby, Estabrook's contact with the child during this time was "sporadic and inconsistent," and he did not have "more frequent contact" with the child until 2017.

[¶6] The child considers Libby's family to be his family, and he refers to Libby's family members as his "Pop-Pop,""Grandma," uncles, aunts, and cousins.Likewise, Libby's family considers the child to be part of their family.Libby, the mother, and the child celebrated holidays and birthdays with Libby's family and attended all of the "Family Day" events held by Libby's National Guard unit.

[¶7]The mother died unexpectedly in March 2019.Estabrook took custody of the child after the mother's death.Neither Libby nor the mother's family has seen the child since the mother's funeral.

[¶8] In May 2019, Libby filed a petition to be adjudicated the child's de facto parent.See19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2020).With his petition, Libby included an affidavit alleging facts to support the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child.Seeid.§ 1891(2)(A).

[¶9] As permitted by statute, Estabrook filed his own affidavit, seeid.§ 1891(2)(B), and he requested that Libby's petition be dismissed.Estabrook's affidavit contravenes many of Libby's factual assertions and presents a very different picture of the parties' respective relationships with the child.Estabrook denies that he had only sporadic contact with his son before 2017; he instead asserts that the child consistently resided with him roughly half the time.He also contends that Libby "often kept [the child] from me and isolated [the mother and the child] from their extended family, instead making them ‘adopt’ his family as their own."Finally, Estabrook rejects the notion that Libby has taken on a parental role, stating that the mother left Libby and lived with the child in a motel shortly before she died and that any relationship between Libby and the child is due solely to "the fact that [the child] spent half his time with [the mother]" while Libby and the mother were together.

[¶10] After reviewing the parties' affidavits, the court dismissed Libby's petition for lack of standing.In concluding that Libby was not entitled to a hearing to resolve disputed facts in the parties' affidavits, the court focused on one element of standing: whether the mother"understood, acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as though" Libby was a parent to the child.Id.§ 1891(3)(C).In its decision, the court reasoned,

[Libby] has not shown that [the mother] acknowledged his role as being anything other than a support system for her and [the child].[Libby's] attestations, even taken as true, fail to establish that [the child's] parents understood, acknowledged, accepted, or behaved as though [Libby was the child's] parent.

....

... While it appears that [Libby] has provided care to [the child], the court finds that he has done so as [the mother's] husband, not as a person who has fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed and responsible parental role in [the child's] life ....

(Footnote omitted)(quotation marks omitted).The court thus determined that Libby could not establish a necessary element of standing even if the facts in his affidavit were true.

[¶11] Libby thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and for relief from the judgment.SeeM.R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b)(1), (3).With this motion, Libby attached affidavits from the child's maternal grandparents.The grandparents' affidavits contradict many of the statements in Estabrook's affidavit.¹The court denied this motion, and Libby timely appealed.See19-A M.R.S. § 104(2020);M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12]Title 19-A M.R.S. § 1891 allows a person to establish legal parentage of a child—and to obtain the rights of a legal parent—by a judicial decree acknowledging "the development of [a] parental relationship over time."Stitham v. Henderson , 2001 ME 52, ¶ 24, 768 A.2d 598(Saufley, J., concurring);see19-A M.R.S. § 1891(4)(B).

[¶13]"[T]o protect against unwarranted intrusions into an intact family's life,"Davis v. McGuire , 2018 ME 72, ¶ 14, 186 A.3d 837(quotation marks omitted), a party who seeks to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child "must make an initial showing of standing that will determine whether the court will hold a plenary hearing on the ultimate question of whether that person is a de facto parent,"id.¶ 13.By statute, standing must be addressed pursuant to the following three-step process:

First, the claimant is required to file an affidavit along with the complaint, stating specific facts that track the elements of a de facto parenthood claim.Next, the adverse party may file a responsive affidavit along with a responsive pleading.Finally, the court is to review the parties' submissions and either [determine] based on the parties' submissions whether the claimant has demonstrated standing, or, in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited basis, hold a hearing to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.

Id.¶ 15(citations omitted)(quotation marks omitted);see19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2).

[¶14]The petitioner has the burden of establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence, regardless of whether the court decides the issue on the affidavits or following an evidentiary hearing.SeeDavis , 2018 ME 72, ¶¶ 13-26, 186 A.3d 837.To prove standing, the petitioner must show the following:

A.The person has resided with the child for a significant period of time;

B.The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;

C.A bonded and dependent relationship has been established between the child and the person, the relationship was fostered or supported by another parent of the child and the person and the other parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as though the person is a parent of the child;

D.The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation; and

E.The continuing relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child.^[2]

19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C), (3)(A)-(E).

[¶15] When the trial court dismisses a de facto parentage petition for lack of standing without holding an evidentiary hearing, we review the court's decision not to hold a hearing for an abuse of discretion.SeeYoung , 2019 ME 78, ¶¶ 11-12, 208 A.3d 762.The court abuses its discretion in declining to hold a hearing if (1) the facts in the petitioner's affidavit "could have led to a finding that [the petitioner] ha[s] standing" and (2) there are "material facts that the parties have disputed in their affidavits."Id.¶ 11.

[¶16]We conclude that Libby's assertions, if believed, could have led to a finding that he has standing.Most importantly, Libby avers that he and the mother essentially coparented the child for a majority of the child's life and that Estabrook's involvement with the child was "sporadic and inconsistent" for most of this time.If true, these attestations could demonstrate that the mother understood that and behaved as though Libby occupied the parental vacuum that Libby says existed because of Estabrook's lack of engagement with the child for a significant period of the child's life.Cf.Kilborn v. Carey , 2016 ME 78, ¶¶ 18-21, 140 A.3d 461("[T]here was ample evidence in the record to support the court's finding that [the petitioner's] parental role was unequivocal, despite [the legal father's] peripheral presence [in the child's life] and objection to formal adoption ....").³

[¶17] Furthermore, Libby avers that (1) the child understands Libby's family to be his own family and (2) Libby, the mother, and the child have participated in family events with Libby's family and with Libby's National Guard unit.These assertions, if believed, also tend to show that the mother"understood, acknowledged or accepted...