Liberles v. Daniel
| Decision Date | 10 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 73 C 3217.,73 C 3217. |
| Citation | 477 F. Supp. 504 |
| Parties | Max LIBERLES, as President of and on behalf of Illinois Union of Social Service Employees, American Federation of State and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Alice Allen, and all those persons listed in Appendix A of the Complaint (Sub-Class A), Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Wilhelmena Ashby and all other persons listed in Appendix B of the Complaint (Sub-Class B), Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Dorothy Bently, and all the persons listed in Appendix C of the Complaint, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Catherine Alexander, and other persons listed in Appendix D of the Complaint, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. David L. DANIEL, Director of the Cook County Department of Public Aid, George Dunne, President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, Joseph M. Solon, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission of Cook County, Joel Edelman, Director of the State of Illinois Department of Public Aid, Nolan B. Jones, Director of the State of Illinois Department of Personnel, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Charles J. Barnhill, Jr., Judson H. Miner, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty., William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
This is a class action for employment discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The plaintiffs are a group of black employees who worked for the Cook County Department of Public Aid (hereafter CCDPA) until it was merged into the Illinois Department of Public Aid (hereafter IDPA) effective January 1, 1974, at which time they became employees of IDPA. Defendants are those persons who were heads of the various local government agencies which had responsibility for administration of the public aid programs in Cook County during the period of time in question. These defendants are the Directors of the Cook County and State of Illinois Departments of Public Aid, the President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners and the Director of the Illinois Department of Personnel. Currently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs allege that the administration of public assistance programs in Cook County is carried out by "case-workers" whose job classifications are divided into seven levels. As to the three lowest levels, plaintiffs allege that a racially discriminatory classification system was established and maintained whereby the two lowest classification levels (Case Aide Trainee and Case Aide) were composed primarily of black workers while the next higher classification level (Caseworker I) was staffed primarily by white workers.1 This racial disparity, plaintiffs allege, was the result of the requirement that employees seeking promotion to the third level possess a college degree and pass a written examination. In December, 1972, the degree requirement was replaced with work experience. However, plaintiffs allege that the racial disparity continued. While apparently neutral on its face, plaintiffs allege that these promotion requirements had a disparate impact on black employees in violation of Title VII.
Further, plaintiffs allege that while on paper the third level jobs involved greater responsibilities, in fact Case Aides and Case Aide Trainees performed the same tasks as the higher paid Caseworkers I. While the most flagrant discriminatory elements of this system were eliminated in 1975 when the IDPA conducted a wholesale redefinition of job titles and reclassification of all employees, the continuing effects of the system are still felt by black employees.2 Accordingly, plaintiffs seek to be "made whole" in the form of a back pay award.
Initially, plaintiffs have the burden of proving that an otherwise neutral employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected class within the meaning of Title VII. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). This may be accomplished through a statistical showing without proof of intent to discriminate. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).
Plaintiffs have shown that as of December 31, 1973, 91% of the Case Aide Trainees and 81% of the Case Aides were black while 81% of the Caseworkers I were white. The discriminatory nature of these statistics is compounded by the fact that for all intents and purposes Case Aide Trainees, Case Aides and Caseworkers I were performing the same tasks. (State defendants Exhibit 30, p. 1; State defendants Exhibit 26, pp. 6, 8, 19, 22, 23). In fact the only significant difference between the two lowest and the third classifications was in salary. (State defendants' Exhibit 31, p. 1.)3
Unquestionably, plaintiffs have shown that defendants' employment practices resulted in a concentration of blacks in the low-paid positions and whites in the higher-paid position even though Case Aide Trainees, Case Aides and Caseworkers I all performed essentially the same tasks. The statistics presented by plaintiffs and unrefuted by defendants4 establish a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and the burden is shifted to defendants to prove that the disparities in the classification system were the result of a bona fide occupational qualification or a business necessity.
Once the adverse impact of a job requirement on a protected group has been demonstrated, the employer must show that the requirement is job related. This is a particularly heavy burden where, as here, the requirement acts as a complete bar to employment in the sought-after position, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). To show that a challenged job requirement is job related, an employer must prove that the business purpose of the requirement is sufficiently compelling as to override any discriminatory impact, that the requirement effectively serves the business purpose and that there is available no less discriminatory alternative. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir., 1974).
The challenged job requirements in the present case are, of course, the college degree and the written examination. Plaintiffs argue and defendants do not contest, that the disproportionate number of black in the two lowest classifications was the result of the college degree requirement for advancement into the third level. Until 1972, a prerequisite for promotion was a bachelor's degree. This requirement, plaintiffs argue, worked a proportionately greater hardship on blacks than on whites. Defendants do not dispute that in 1971 only 4.17% of Cook County's blacks over age 25 had attended four or more years of college while 12.39% of all others had similar educations. Further, when in 1972 the degree requirement was dropped, defendants continued to require that applicants for promotion pass a written examination. Plaintiffs argue that this test, never validated as being related to job performance, worked an added hardship on black employees and perpetuated rather than ameliorated the challenged discriminatory system.
As to the college degree requirement, defendants argue that in imposing5 the requirement they were merely complying with federal regulations and standards.6 Defendants cite 45 C.F.R. §§ 220.5 and 220.6 which require the State, in the administration of welfare programs, to use "professional" and "sub-professional" staff. Sub-professional is defined as "persons with less than a college education." By implication, defendants argue, professional must mean persons with a college education. Further § 225.1(a) delineates the duties of sub-professionals and includes "tasks that are an integral part of the agency's service responsibilities to people and that can be performed by persons with less than a college degree."
Based on these sections defendants argue that the Case Aide Trainees and Case Aides, as sub-professional positions, were created to assist the professional Caseworkers. This is consistent, according to defendants, with the federal government's stated purpose to provide welfare recipients and other persons of low income with employment as sub-professionals. 45 C.F.R. § 225.1(a). In Cook County, a large percentage of welfare recipients are poorly educated and black. This, argues defendants, is the sole reason behind the disproportionately large number of black Case Aide Trainees and Case Aides.
Preliminarily, the fact that the degree requirement was set by federal regulation does not entitle it to any greater deference than typically given private employer-established job qualifications. Title VII principles are applied to governmental and private employers alike.7 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). Moreover, defendants' reliance on the cited federal regulations...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Contreras v. City of Los Angeles
...reh. granted, 625 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1980); Boyd v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 54 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977); Liberles v. Daniel, 477 F.Supp. 504, 508 (N.D.Ill.1979).Even if we were to assume that the employers in Dothard failed to properly raise the public/private distinction at trial, a......
-
Liberles v. Cook County
...Aid ("CCDPA") and the Illinois Department of Public Aid ("IDPA"). The district court entered summary judgment for the employees, 477 F.Supp. 504 (N.D.Ill.1979), and ordered backpay and injunctive relief. We affirm the district court's disposition of the merits, but reverse two aspects of th......