Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth

• Citation: 969 N.E.2d 1095,462 Mass. 538
• Decision Date: 18 June 2012
• Docket Number: SJC–11109.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: LIBERTARIAN ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS & another v. SECRETARY OF the COMMONWEALTH.

462 Mass. 538

969 N.E.2d 1095

LIBERTARIAN ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS & another ¹

v.SECRETARY OF the COMMONWEALTH.

SJC–11109.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Submitted Feb. 9, 2012.

Decided June 18, 2012.

Andrew Palid (Matthew C. Baltay with him), Boston, for the plaintiffs.

Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

CORDY, J.

This case involves the proper interpretation of a Massachusetts election law that governs the filling of a vacancy where a candidate nominated for “state, city or town office” withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to an election, G.L. c. 53, § 14 (§ 14), and its application to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of a minor political party.

Background and procedural history. In early 2008, a pair of candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency of the United States of America began collecting the signatures of registered voters on nomination papers circulating throughout the Commonwealth.² The nomination papers bore the political designation “Libertarian.” These candidates, however, failed to secure the indorsement of the national Libertarian party at its convention in May, 2008. The Libertarian Association of Massachusetts (LAM) then contacted the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) and requested that the names of the persons who won the national party indorsement be substituted for the names of the candidates listed on the nomination papers being circulated in the Commonwealth. The Secretary refused.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, where a preliminary injunction was issued requiring the Secretary to include the names of the nationally indorsed candidates on the ballot. Barr v. Galvin, 584 F.Supp.2d 316 (D.Mass.2008)( Barr I ). The Federal judge who issued the injunction subsequently granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, ruling that § 14 was unconstitutionally vague and its application to the plaintiffs violative of the equal protection clause to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Barr v. Galvin, 659 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Mass.2009)( Barr II ). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit) reversed the judge's ruling with regard to the equal protection clause. Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99, 108–111 (1st Cir.2010)( Barr III ). It also abstained from interpreting § 14 or deciding the plaintiffs' “void for vagueness” claim, positing that any “clarification by judicial interpretation” was best left to “Massachusetts courts ... in the first instance.” Id. at 107–108, citing Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–502, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)( Pullman abstention). On remand, the District Court judge stayed the “void for vagueness” claim “pending a state court interpretive clarification of the state statute,” and dismissed all other claims without prejudice. Barr v. Galvin, 755 F.Supp.2d 293, 295 (D.Mass.2010)( Barr IV ). He also rejected the plaintiffs' subsequent request to certify a question to this court regarding the interpretation of § 14. Barr v. Galvin, 793 F.Supp.2d 463, 465 (D.Mass.2011)( Barr V ).

Consequently, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Secretary in the county court, seeking a declaration under G.L. c. 231A, § 1, that § 14 provides a minor party, which does not qualify as a “political party” under Massachusetts law, a means to “substitute” the names of presidential and vice-presidential candidates chosen at the minor party's national convention for those listed on nomination papers being circulated and signed by registered voters throughout Massachusetts. In the alternative, they sought a declaration that § 14 does not afford minor parties a substitution mechanism and that this failure violates art. 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that, were the single justice unable to explicate the meaning of § 14, he must deem that provision unconstitutionally vague. The Secretary moved to dismiss this action on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that they failed to establish an “actual controversy” for the purposes of G.L. c. 231A, § 1. The single justice reserved and reported the matter without decision to the full court.

Before us, the Secretary reiterates his threshold argument concerning G.L. c. 231A, § 1, and challenges the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. He contends that § 14 is limited in scope and, assuming arguendo it applies to presidential electors, requires only that vacancies be filled “in the same manner” as the “original nomination,” thereby obligating the plaintiffs and any candidates chosen at their national convention to fulfil the same requirements as the original candidates listed on the nomination papers—that is, by submitting nomination papers bearing the signatures of 10,000 registered voters. See note 2, supra. If the time between the national convention and the signature filing deadline is insufficient to complete this task, the Secretary contends, § 14 does not provide any additional recourse to minor parties or the candidates their members indorsed at a national convention. According to the Secretary, the lack of recourse in these circumstances is not unconstitutional because the protections of art. 9 are coextensive with those of the Federal equal protection clause, with which the Massachusetts ballot access provisions have been found to comport. See Barr III, supra at 108–111.

We conclude that this matter is properly before us. The plaintiffs have established an “actual controversy” because the initial dispute between the parties, while moot, is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” id. at 105, quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911), and because our decision today will have an immediate impact in the ongoing Federal proceedings between the parties. On the merits, we conclude that § 14 applies to presidential electors and assume (but need not decide) by extension to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates the electors have pledged to support. Although § 14, as written, is not a model of clarity and its meaning not without uncertainty, we interpret it in a manner largely consistent with the interpretation proffered by the Secretary. Finally, aligning our analysis under art. 9 with that of the equal protection clause, we perceive no constitutional deficiency in the election law scheme.

Statutory framework. Within the Commonwealth, only a certain subclass of active political organizations receives the formal label “[p]olitical party” and the corresponding benefits and privileges afforded that status. To attain that label, a political organization must either (1) have had a candidate for Statewide office garner at least three per cent of the votes cast in the most recent biennial election; or (2) enroll a number of voters “equal to or greater than one percent of the entire number of voters registered in the commonwealth.” G.L. c. 50, § 1. Once a political organization satisfies either requirement, it is eligible to conduct “primaries and caucuses for the nomination of city and town officers,” id., among other things. If a political organization does not satisfy either requirement, it receives no formal recognition under Massachusetts law but may serve nonetheless as a “[p]olitical designation.” ³

One of the privileges of attaining party status is the ease with which a recognized political party may place its candidates on the ballot for the general election. With regard to presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the party's State committee need only submit a certificate of nomination to the Secretary bearing the surnames of the party's chosen candidates by the second Tuesday of the September preceding the election. ⁴G.L. c. 53, § 8, first par. This certificate must include the names and residences of the selected presidential electors, along with a written acceptance and pledge by each to vote for the candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency named in the filing.⁵Id.

Other candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency, whether affiliated with a political organization or not, must follow a different path to the ballot. See G.L. c. 53, §§ 6–10. This class of candidates must file nomination papers for their chosen presidential electors, signed by at least 10,000 registered voters. G.L. c. 53, § 6. These nomination papers must include the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, as well as the names and residences of the candidates for presidential electors who have pledged to vote for them. G.L. c. 53, § 8, first par. The papers also may include “the political designation, if any, which [the candidate] represents.” ⁶Id.

The nomination papers must be submitted to election officials through a two-step process. First, they must be provided to the registrars of the cities or towns in which the signatories reside, so that the registrars can certify whether the signatures belong to registered voters. G.L. c. 53, § 7, second par. Next, the nomination papers—once certified—must be filed with the Secretary. G.L. c. 53, § 10, first par. The deadlines for these submissions are precise, and intertwined: nomination papers must be filed with the Secretary by the last Tuesday in the August preceding the election, id.; they must be submitted to the local registrars for certification at least twenty-eight days before the deadline for filing with the Secretary, G.L. c. 53, § 7; and certification must be complete no later than the seventh day before the deadline for filing with the Secretary. Id. “In 2008, the deadline for submitting such nomination papers to local [registrars] was July 29.... In turn, the deadline for transmitting them to the Secretary was ...