Libertarian Party Of Los Angeles v. Bowen
| Decision Date | 03 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 10-2488 PSG (Opx) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Libertarian Party of Los Angeles v. Debra Bowen |
CIVIL MINUTES-GENERAL
Present: The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge
Wendy K. Hernandez Deputy Clerk
n/a Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s): Not Present
Pending before the Court is Defendant Debra Bowen's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the moving and opposing papers, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiffs Libertarian Party of Los Angeles, Theodore Brown, and Christopher Agrella (collective, "Plaintiffs") filed suit on April 6, 2010 against Defendant Debra Bowen ("Defendant" or "Secretary of State") in her official capacity as the Secretary of State of California. Plaintiffs are politically active and "would like to support candidates for state offices by circulating nominating papers or petitions in Los Angeles County using circulators who are not residents of Los Angeles County or the State of California." First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 3. Preventing Plaintiffs from doing so are California election laws. Defendant is responsible for enforcing those laws. Id.¶ 7.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of two California statutes establishing residency requirements for circulators of nominating petitions for candidates for political office: (1) Cal. Elec. Code § 8066; and (2) Cal. Elec. Code § 8451. Id. ¶ 9. The two provisions both providethat "[c]irculators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate is to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision." See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 8066, 8451. Plaintiffs allege that the two provisions "severely burden[ their] political speech and political association rights... in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983." FAC ¶ 23.
The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' original Complaint after concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish their standing to bring the lawsuit. See Dkt. #25 ("November 2 Order"). On November 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), adding allegations that Plaintiffs argue show the Secretary of State's intent to enforce the laws challenged in this lawsuit. See id. ¶ 14. The Secretary of State filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), once again arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the lawsuit and that there is no live case or controversy that is ripe for review. See Mot. 2:15-18. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings WITH PREJUDICE.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides: "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the defendant clearly establishes that, even if all material facts in the complaint are true, no material issue of fact remains for trial and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The court may not go beyond the pleadings to resolve the motion without converting into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Id.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "are functionally identical." Pac. West Group, Inc. v. Real Time Solutions, Inc., 321 Fed. Appx. 566, 569 (9th Cir. 2008). "[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). If a plaintiff hasfailed to satisfy that obligation, "leave to amend should be granted even if no request is made unless amendment would be futile." Pac. West Group, 321 Fed. Appx. at 569.
Defendant argues that dismissal of Plaintiffs claims under Rule 12(c) is warranted because Plaintiffs lack standing and the lawsuit is not yet ripe for review. See Mot. 2:15-18. The Court agrees.1
A. Constitutional Standing
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only adjudicate actual "cases" or "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 947 (1968); Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1972) (). At an "irreducible minimum, " Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that (1) the plaintiff has personally suffered a cognizable injury, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's alleged unlawful conduct, and (3) the injury is redressable by judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992); see also Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envt'l. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed 2d 610 (2000). The party asserting federal court jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1997). In a motion to dismiss, however, a court must still "accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." See Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted).
"Unique standing considerations" are presented when First Amendment rights are impacted by state action. See Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003). "In an effort to avoid the chilling effect of sweeping restrictions, the Supreme Court has endorsed what might be called a 'hold your tongue and challenge now' approach rather than requiring litigants to speak first and take their chances with the consequences." Id. Simply stated, First Amendment considerations "lower the threshold, " Lopez v. Candaele, _____F.3d___-, 2010 WL 5128266, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2010) and "tilt[ ] dramatically toward a finding of standing, " LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing"—injury, causation and redressability—must still be met. Lopez, ___F.3d_____, 2010 WL 5128266, at *1.
1. Injury
Despite the Secretary of State's insistence that Plaintiffs lack standing, Plaintiffs argue that there is a "genuine question of material fact as to the standing elements, " and that the Court should not dismiss the case at this stage of the litigation. See Opp'n 1:23-25 (quoting Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 524 F.3d 957, 065 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have still not met their burden of alleging a realistic threat of prosecution and, thus, standing to bring the case.
A plaintiff "does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief." Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 143, n.29, 95 S. Ct. 335, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1974). But, "when plaintiffs seek to establish standing to challenge a law or regulation that is not presently being enforced against them, they must demonstrate 'a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.'" LSO, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis added) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979)). "[N]either the mere existence of a proscriptive statute nor a generalized threat of prosecution satisfies the requirement." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). There are a number of related factors a court can consider to determine whether there is a "credible threat of adverse state action sufficient to establish standing" including (1) whether there is a "reasonable likelihood that the government will enforce the challenged law, " (2) "whether the plaintiffs have failed to establish, with some degree of concrete detail, that theyintend to violate the challenged law, " and (3) "whether the challenged law is inapplicable to the plaintiffs, either by its terms or as interpreted by the government." Lopez, 2010 WL 5128266, at *6.
As before, the parties do not dispute the second or third factors, instead focusing the Court's inquiry on the first. A reasonable likelihood that the government will enforce the challenged law can be shown by, inter alia, "past enforcement, " an indictment or arrest of the plaintiffs, a "specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings under the challenged [law], " or a "history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute." Id. at *6-7. "General threats" by a public official to "enforce those laws which they are charged to administer" is not sufficient to establish an actual injury necessary for standing. Id. at *7 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Court recognizes that a plaintiff with the burden to establish standing need only "plead general factual allegations of injury in order to survive a motion to dismiss." LSO, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). When the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' original Complaint, it was, in large...
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