Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour
| Decision Date | 07 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1561,96-1561 |
| Citation | 108 F.3d 768 |
| Parties | LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF ILLINOIS, Mike Ginsberg, R.W. Baruth, Jr., Carrie Belt, Jeannette Clinkenbroomer, Greg Engstrom, Robert H. Franke, Robert J. Johnston, Charles Melalitz, John Nelson, Dan O'Connell, Paul Salander, Gale Teschendorf, Lyn Tinsley, Anne Wagner, and Martin G. Yasus, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Wanda L. REDNOUR, Hannelore Huisman, Kenneth R. Boyle, Judith A. Jones, Mitchell B. Kobelinski, David E. Murray, Langdon D. Neal, and Theresa M. Petrone, in their Official Capacities as Members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Gary Sinawski (argued), New York City, Andrew B. Spiegel, Wheaton, IL, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Mary E. Welsh (argued), Officer of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for defendants-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
This case resolves whether certain provisions of the Illinois Election Code unconstitutionally impair the ability of a new political party to place its congressional candidates on the general election ballot. The plaintiffs-appellants consist of one entity and two groups of individuals: the Libertarian Party of Illinois (including its chairperson), seven candidates who sought the party's nomination for United States Representative in the Illinois March 1996 general primary election, and several voters who wanted to vote for these candidate-plaintiffs. 1 The LPI sued defendants-appellees-members of the Illinois State Board of Elections ("the Board")--in their official capacities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would require the Board to include the Libertarian Party's congressional candidates on all primary election ballots across the state. The Board, however, successfully moved for summary judgment, thereby keeping the Libertarian candidates out of the primaries. Because we find that the Illinois ballot access requirements do not unconstitutionally impair the rights of the LPI, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The Illinois Election Code sets forth instructions detailing when candidates from a political party may be placed on the ballot in state, local, and congressional elections. See 10 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/1-5/30. In essence, the Code characterizes political parties in two categories: "established" and "new." If a party receives more than 5% of the vote in the last general election for governor, that party is considered an established political party for all state, local, and congressional races. 10 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/10-2. If a party receives more than 5% of the vote in certain other statewide elections, e.g., United States Senate, Illinois Attorney General, or the University of Illinois Board of Trustees, 2 that party is considered established only for statewide elections, and not for congressional or other non-statewide elections. Id. Finally, a party that receives more than 5% of the vote in the last election within any congressional district or other political subdivision, e.g., United States House of Representatives, is considered an established political party only for that district. Id. A party remains established only as long as it maintains the above criteria. Id. Parties that are not established are considered new parties.
The distinction between established and new political parties is significant because it affects the nomination process by which candidates are ultimately placed on the general election ballot. In general, an established party nominates its candidates for the general election through a primary election. To appear on a primary election ballot, a candidate seeking an established party's nomination must submit a petition with signatures from 0.5% of the qualified primary electors. 10 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/7-10. For the March 1996 primary election, Democratic congressional candidates needed to submit an average of 658 signatures, and Republican candidates needed to submit an average of 532 signatures. 3
If a political party is not established in a particular political subdivision, and thus considered new, its candidates can gain access only to the general election ballot. A group forms a new political party by submitting a complete slate of candidates for all of the offices to be filled in that political subdivision, as well as a petition containing a specified number of signatures. 10 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/10-2. If the new party is being formed for the entire state, the petition must contain signatures totaling the lesser of 25,000 or 1% of the voters in the last statewide general election. Id. If the new party is being formed only for a congressional district or other political subdivision, the petition must contain the lesser of 5% of the total number of voters in the district's last regular election or the number of signatures needed for statewide formation. 4 Id. In becoming a "new political party," a party gains the ability to place candidates on the next general election ballot for the offices to be voted on within the state or the particular political subdivision. 5 Id. Individual independent candidates must satisfy nearly identical nominating requirements to appear on the general election ballot. See 10 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/10-3. In 1996, the average number of signatures needed by a new political party to place its congressional candidates on the general election ballot was 7,610, and the average number in the congressional districts of the seven candidate-plaintiffs was 9,337.
Heading into the 1996 primary and general elections, the Libertarian Party of Illinois was an established party for all statewide elections, and a new party for all congressional elections. The LPI was able to gain established party status for all statewide elections because three Libertarian candidates combined to capture 5.5% of the vote in the 1994 election of the University of Illinois Board of Trustees. The LPI, however, could not obtain established party status for all elections within the state--i.e., state, local, and congressional--because it received only 1.68% of the vote in the last governor's race, well below the 5% threshold. Moreover, because no Libertarian candidate captured more than 5% of the vote in any of the 1994 congressional races, the LPI was not established in those districts in 1996.
On December 18, 1995, ten LPI candidates 6 for the United States House of Representatives attempted to file nominating petitions for seven congressional districts in the March 1996 general primary election. The Board, however, refused to accept these petitions because the LPI was not an established party in any of those congressional districts. In fact, the petitions, which consisted only of a Statement of Candidacy and a single page of signatures, did not appear to contain an adequate number of signatures even for an established party's candidate.
The LPI subsequently brought suit against the Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that these ballot access requirements violated their rights under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Qualifications Clause of the United States Constitution. The LPI asked the district court to enjoin the Board, and require it to include its candidates on all congressional primary ballots across Illinois. The district court denied this request, and granted the Board's motion for summary judgment.
We utilize a de novo standard of review in analyzing a district court's grant of summary judgment. Campbell v. Towse, 99 F.3d 820, 826 (7th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, neither "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, nor the demonstration of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), will sufficiently demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. In that regard, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. 7
The LPI complains that the nominating procedures applicable to "minor-established" 8 political parties--i.e., parties that are "established" for statewide elections and "new" for individual congressional elections- --are unconstitutional because they unduly impair the access of candidates to the general election ballot for congressional (and other non-statewide) elections. Specifically, the LPI argues that Illinois violates the rights of its citizens to vote effectively and to associate for the advancement of political ideas. The Party asserts that the Illinois Election Code accomplishes this goal through two "intimately-related" ballot access regulations: one that requires "new" political parties to meet a 5% petitioning requirement in order to gain access to the general election ballot, and the other that prohibits so-called "minor-established" parties from nominating congressional candidates via primary elections.
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