Liberty Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Halliburton

• Decision Date: 16 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. A14A0333.,A14A0333.
• Citation: 328 Ga.App. 422,762 S.E.2d 138
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: LIBERTY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al. v. HALLIBURTON.

328 Ga.App. 422

762 S.E.2d 138

LIBERTY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

v.HALLIBURTON.

No. A14A0333.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 16, 2014.

Christian J. Steinmetz III, Savannah, Phillip L. Hartley, for Appellant.

Maurice Luther King Jr., Albany, for Appellee.

BRANCH, Judge.

After Laverne Halliburton's contract as a school principal in the Liberty County School District was not renewed for the 2011–2012 academic year, Halliburton sued the District and a number of its officers, including Superintendent Dr. Judy Burton Scherer and seven members of the county school board (collectively, “defendants”), for racial discrimination. Halliburton sought a writ of mandamus, other injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees. Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds including that defendants were entitled to sovereign and/or qualified immunity. On appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss, defendants argue that their motion should have been granted because Halliburton had no right to a renewed contract and because her claims are barred by sovereign and qualified immunity. We conclude that although the District itself is exempt from suit under sovereign immunity, due to the very early stage of this litigation, it is conceivable that Halliburton could produce facts consistent with her claim that Scherer and/or one or more board members acted with actual malice such that they would not be entitled to qualified immunity. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently reiterated how a trial court should treat a motion to dismiss:

“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor.”

Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774–775, 755 S.E.2d 796 (2014) (citation omitted), quoting Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997). In other words,

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.

Austin, 294 Ga. at 775, 755 S.E.2d 796 (citation and punctuation omitted). On appeal, we review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss de novo. Chandler v. Opensided MRI of Atlanta, 299 Ga.App. 145, 682 S.E.2d 165 (2009).

On September 26, 2011, Halliburton filed a verified complaint in Liberty County Superior Court alleging that during Scherer's tenure as superintendent of the county school district, Scherer treated Halliburton “differently from similarly situated white employees” in that she “made a recommendation” to the Board “to non-renew” Halliburton's contract as principal for the 2011–2012 school year. The complaint alleged that when the Board voted 4–3 along racial lines not to accept Scherer's recommendation, Scherer “illegally,” “ without legal authority” and “unilaterally” refused to renew Halliburton's contract. According to the complaint, Scherer took these actions in “ retaliation” for Halliburton's complaints to Scherer about the job performance of a white assistant principal, which retaliation violated Halliburton's right to freedom of speech. The complaint also alleged that Scherer had “allowed white employees [of the District] to undermine [Halliburton's] authority and position,” had replaced Halliburton with a white principal, and later transferred the white assistant principal rather than declining to renew or terminating that person's contract; that Scherer had discriminated against Halliburton “on the basis of her race” in violation of her constitutional rights; and that Scherer had acted “oppressively, maliciously, corruptly, or without authority of law” and with the intent to injure Halliburton. Finally, the complaint alleged that as a result of defendants' acts, including the board members' ratification of Scherer's acts, Halliburton suffered damages including lost past and future wages, mental anguish, emotional distress, and “physical discomfort.”

On October 26, 2011, defendants filed their verified answer, which included a motion to dismiss the District and the individual defendants in their official capacity under sovereign immunity and the individual defendants personally under qualified (also known as “official”) immunity because their actions “were discretionary and done in good faith in the performance of [their] official duties.” The answer also alleged that “all actions taken by any [d]efendant with respect to [Halliburton's] allegations” were “legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and unprejudiced” and that no defendant had acted with “discriminatory intent.” After Halliburton requested a hearing, defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss with a supporting brief arguing for the application of sovereign and qualified immunity. Between December 12 and December 16, 2011, Halliburton served nine discovery requests on the defendants, who immediately moved to stay discovery ¹ on the ground that the motion to dismiss “raise[d] exclusively legal issues as to which no discovery is necessary.” On February 17, 2012, after a hearing which was not transcribed, the trial court stayed discovery pending its ruling on the motion to dismiss. More than a year later, on August 30, 2013, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss without explanation and lifted the stay on discovery. This appeal followed.

1. Halliburton has moved to transfer this appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia on the ground that this Court is not authorized to decide an appeal involving relief by writ of mandamus. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(5) (giving Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over “all cases involving extraordinary remedies,” which category includes mandamus); Lamar County v. E.T. Carlyle Co., 277 Ga. 690, 692–693(1), 594 S.E.2d 335 (2004) (Georgia Supreme Court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over plaintiff developer's action for declaratory relief and mandamus when the trial court had granted plaintiff mandamus relief). The only issue on this appeal, however, is whether the trial court erred when it denied defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign and qualified immunity. As this trial court did not grant or deny a writ of mandamus, see Mid Ga. Environmental Mgmt. Group v. Meriwether County, 277 Ga. 670, 594 S.E.2d 344 (2004), we conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, and we therefore deny Halliburton's motion to transfer. See City of Tybee Island v. Live Oak Group, 324 Ga.App. 476, 477, n. 1, 751 S.E.2d 123 (2013) (Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over appeal concerning only whether trial court erred in its ruling on an inverse condemnation claim even when that claim asked for mandamus relief).

2. Halliburton has also moved to dismiss this appeal as not among the categories of direct appeals authorized by OCGA § 5–6–34(a). We disagree.

In general, a party seeking to appeal an interlocutory ruling who fails to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5–6–34(b) deprives this Court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga.App. 505, 506(1), 672 S.E.2d 471 (2009). “A small class of decisions, however, are excepted” from this rule “by the collateral order doctrine.” Id. In order to obtain an appeal on a collateral order, the order “must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 507, 672 S.E.2d 471 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Although this trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss did not explain its ruling, the unambiguous posture of this case, including the grounds of sovereign and qualified immunity raised in the answer and repeated in the motion to dismiss, suggests that the trial court's rejection of the defenses of sovereign and qualified immunity was “conclusive” such that defendants were entitled to a direct appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Eshleman v. Key, 326 Ga.App. 883(1), 755 S.E.2d 926 (2014) (asserting jurisdiction over denial of summary judgment motion asserting defense of qualified immunity to a suit brought by a plaintiff bitten by a police dog that escaped its kennel). Halliburton's motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.

3. Defendants argue that the District and the individual defendants in their official capacities are entitled to sovereign immunity as to Halliburton's claims. We agree.

The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies “can be waived only by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of the waiver.” Wellborn v. DeKalb County School Dist., 227 Ga.App. 377, 379(4), 489 S.E.2d 345 (1997), citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); see also Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 602(2), 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014) (“sovereign immunity [can] only be waived by the General Assembly”). Because the Liberty County School District is a political subdivision of the State, Crisp County School System v. Brown, 226 Ga.App....