Liberty County Officers Ass'n v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 20 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1:94-CV-0404.,1:94-CV-0404.
• Parties: LIBERTY COUNTY OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Gerald Bagwell and Tom Davenport, Plaintiffs, v. Sheriff O.J. STEWART, Individually and in his Capacity as Sheriff of Liberty, County, Texas; Lee Groce, Individually and in his Capacity as Liberty County Commissioner; and Melvin Hunt, Individually and in his Capacity as Liberty County Commissioner, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

903 F. Supp. 1046

LIBERTY COUNTY OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Gerald Bagwell and Tom Davenport, Plaintiffs, v. Sheriff O.J. STEWART, Individually and in his Capacity as Sheriff of Liberty, County, Texas; Lee Groce, Individually and in his Capacity as Liberty County Commissioner; and Melvin Hunt, Individually and in his Capacity as Liberty County Commissioner, Defendants.

No. 1:94-CV-0404.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

July 20, 1995.

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Julie Kareé Cain, Liberty, TX, Ted B. Lyon, Jr., Ted B. Lyon, Jr. & Associates, Mesquite, TX, for Liberty County Association of Deputy Sheriffs and Correctional Officers, Gerald Bagwell and Tom Davenport.

Karen Renee McNair, Taylor & Norwood, Liberty, TX, for O.J. Stewart.

Christian J. Gros, San Antonio, TX, for Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COBB, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Liberty County Officers Association (LCOA) a/k/a Liberty County Deputy Sheriffs and Correctional Officers Association (LCDSCOA), Gerald Bagwell (Bagwell), and Tom Davenport (Davenport) filed this action contending that defendants Sheriff O.J. Stewart (Stewart), Lee Groce (Groce), and Melvin Hunt (Hunt) violated the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Texas Labor Code by attempting to frustrate the formation of a union of law enforcement deputies in Liberty County. Plaintiffs also brought claims against defendants for breaching employment contracts and for violating 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985(3). Defendants Stewart, Groce, and Hunt filed a Motion to Dismiss, and in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment contending that the LCOA, Bagwell, and Davenport lack standing to assert a claim for "union busting" and fail to allege sufficient facts to overcome various governmental and qualified immunity defenses raised by these defendants. Finding some genuine issues of material fact in dispute, this court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Bagwell and Davenport were employed as law enforcement officers for the Liberty County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department), Liberty County, Texas. Deputy Sheriff Bagwell began working for the Sheriff's Department in February, 1988. During his four and one-half years of service, Bagwell acted as the department's juvenile crimes officer. Captain Davenport worked for the Sheriff's Department for ten years and had been assigned to the department's narcotics division.

These officers actively participated in the LCDSCOA from its inception in February, 1992, to the present. Bagwell was the president and Davenport was a member of the board of directors of the LCOA a/k/a LCDSCOA. Problems began in July, 1993, when Bagwell and Davenport aided the LCOA in filing a petition with the county clerk for a special election to adopt the Texas Fire and Police Employee Relations Act (Act), codified at Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 5154c-1 (Vernon 1987). The Liberty County Commissioners' Court refused to set an election date. Consequently, plaintiffs filed a writ of mandamus in state district court to obtain a date for this election.

The election was held on November 2, 1993. The Liberty County citizens voted to allow the Sheriff's Department deputy sheriffs and county jailers to organize and collectively bargain with the Sheriff and the Commissioners' Court pursuant to the Act. The campaign leading to this election received extensive coverage by the media. Bagwell and Davenport appeared on television and were heard on radio broadcasts extolling the benefits of voting to permit deputy sheriffs and jailers to collectively bargain for their employment benefits. After the election, Bagwell and Davenport allegedly heard rumors that Sheriff Stewart and certain members of the Commissioners' Court intended to terminate four of the elected officers of the LCOA, Bagwell, Davenport, Deputy Patrick Hardin, Sgt.-at-Arms, and Deputy LeeAnn Wheat, Secretary-Treasurer.

In February 1994, Bagwell and Deputy Hardin met with Stewart and advised him that the LCOA intended to vote on whether to affiliate itself with the Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas (CLEAT).¹ Sheriff Stewart allegedly stated that he did not approve of CLEAT. Stewart also expressed his disdain for CLEAT's tactics and reminded plaintiffs that Liberty County was not a union county. He then advised Bagwell and Hardin that it would be a mistake for them to join CLEAT. Notwithstanding Stewart's objections, the LCOA aligned itself with CLEAT Local Union No. 6100 of the Communication Workers of America (CWA) (AFL-CIO). After the vote, Bagwell and Hardin again met with Stewart at which time Stewart reiterated his displeasure with CLEAT and stated that this affiliation was a mistake.

Bagwell and Davenport were elected to the LCOA's collective bargaining committee. This committee acted as the bargaining agent for all members of the LCOA and prepared proposals for inclusion in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). At this time, the CBA consisted of recommendations that could have altered the Sheriff's policies and/or the Commissioners' Court's wage and benefit scales.

Sheriff Stewart fired Captain Davenport on March 31, 1994. Davenport was allegedly fired as Captain of the drug task force for being "uncooperative" and a "danger to the officers and citizen-informants working with the task force." Davenport also was alleged to have made derogatory comments about Sheriff Stewart's qualifications and effectiveness as sheriff.

Five days later, Sheriff Stewart fired Officer Bagwell. Bagwell was allegedly fired for deficiencies in his job performance. Stewart contended that Bagwell was abusive to juveniles and uncooperative with other persons handling juvenile matters within the department. However, neither Davenport or Bagwell had prior disciplinary records or were involved in police misconduct of any kind prior to their termination.

Plaintiffs' maintain that Stewart and certain members of the Commissioners' Court formulated a scheme to disrupt the LCOA's activities and destroy the union's ability to organize the employees and engage in negotiations for a CBA. This scheme allegedly involved spreading rumors that four ring-leaders would be terminated before they could send notice of intent to collectively bargain. Sheriff Stewart fired both Bagwell and Davenport shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs contend that County Commissioners Lee Groce and Melvin Hunt also participated in this conspiracy.

ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred by the operation of 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1343(a) and claims brought under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985.

Before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant is able to demonstrate that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); and see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). It is unnecessary for the movant to negate elements of the nonmovant's case. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885-886, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3187, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).

If the movant shows that no genuine fact issues exist, the nonmovant "must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54). The nonmovant's burden is not satisfied with

"some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, by "conclusory allegations," Lujan, 497 U.S. at 871-73, 110 S.Ct. at 3180, by "unsubstantiated assertions," Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994), or by only a "scintilla" of evidence, Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir.1994).

Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. At this point, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to come forward with sufficient facts and law demonstrating a basis for recovery. Little, 37 F.3d at 1071.

The court must view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 457-58, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2077, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. However, this favorable presumption for the nonmovant exists only when the nonmovant presents an actual controversy of fact. The court will not assume controversy when insufficient facts exist to sustain the party's complaint. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; and see Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888, 110 S.Ct. at 3188.

In the present case, plaintiffs allege that they were wrongfully terminated from their employment as deputies of the Sheriffs' Department in retaliation for their efforts in gaining and asserting collective bargaining rights for the employees of the Liberty County Sheriffs' Department. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment contending that plaintiffs have no standing to bring a private cause of action for "union busting" under state or federal law. Defendants also contend that governmental and/or qualified immunity act as valid defenses to plaintiffs' claims.

1. Standing to assert a private cause of action for "Union Busting" under the Texas Labor Code section 101.051 and the Labor Management Relations Act, section 301 et seq.

Defendants contend that these general legislative acts do not give rise to...