Liberty Ins. Corp. v. LSP Prods. Grp.
Decision Date | 21 May 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-12814 |
Parties | LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION and THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiffs, v. LSP PRODUCTS GROUP, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
On September 14, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Saginaw County Circuit Court against Defendant LSP Products Group, Inc. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs are subrogors who paid insurance claims arising out of the alleged failure of two water supply pipelines manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiffs' Complaint includes one count each of negligent design, negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn/instruct or inadequate warning/instruction, breach of implied warranty, and willful disregard of known defect creating a substantial likelihood of injury due to a faulty plastic coupling nut. Id. The case was removed by Defendant on October 20, 2020. Id. Defendant answered the Complaint a week later. ECF No. 3.
On November 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a document entitled "Opposition to Severance and Remand" that was docketed by their attorney as a motion. ECF No. 6. The Court found the pleading to not be a motion and denied it. ECF No. 7.
On February 2, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to remand. ECF No. 9. Plaintiffs filed a timely response. ECF No. 14. No reply was received. In addition, the Case Management Order was extended by stipulation on April 5, 2021. ECF No. 15. Discovery is due by October 15, 2021. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 provides that persons "may be joined in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). Thus, to join plaintiffs in a single action the two independent requirements of Rule 20 must be met: (1) their claims must be asserted "with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences," and (2) there must be a "question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). If a party or claim is improperly joined, on motion or on its own, the Court may drop a party or sever a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.
The "transaction-or-occurrence" test of Rule 20(a) "is similar to the transaction-or-occurrence test of Rule 13(a) for compulsory counterclaims, which has been construed as requiring a 'logical relationship' between the claims." In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d at 1357-58 (quoting Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)). The "logical relationship" test, in turn, "is satisfied if there is substantial evidentiary overlap in the facts giving rise to the cause of action." Id. Courts have applied the "logical relationship" test when interpreting the "same transaction or occurrence" standard not only under Rule 20(a)(2) for joinder of defendants and Rule 13(a) for compulsory counter claims, but also to joinder of plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1). See, e.g., Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974) ().
Doubts are to be resolved in favor of joinder. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). That is, "[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." Id.; see also LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni of Lasa, Italy v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1969) ().
"Rule 20 clearly contemplates joinder of claims arising from a 'series of transactions or occurrences'—a single transaction is not required." In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)).
ECF No. 9 at PageID.164 (emphasis omitted). Defendant also states that these two claims were previously part of a "mass action" subrogation lawsuit in Nevada state court. ECF No. 9 at PageID.164.
Id. Defendant also explains how Plaintiffs' Complaint is boilerplate in nature, broadly alleging that defects may arise from the testing and design, manufacturing, installation and use, and/or alleged deterioration over time. Id.
In support of its argument that the two claims are not part of the same series of transactions, Defendant cites five out of circuit cases. In McGrew v. Howmedica Osteonics Corporation, the court held joinder of claims and plaintiffs was improper. 2015 WL 159367 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2015). The plaintiffs in McGrew had the same medical device implanted in their spine but suffered from different injuries. In addition, the devices were implanted by different physicians at different hospitals. Id. at *2-3. Likewise, in In re Diet Drugs, the court found that "the claims of plaintiffswho have not purchased or received diet drugs from an identical source, such as a physician, hospital or diet center, do not satisfy the transaction or occurrence requirement." 1999 WL 554584 at *4 (E.D. Penn. July 16, 1999).
In Saval v. BL Ltd., multiple plaintiffs with similar vehicle problems brought action against various defendants within the chain of distribution. 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983). However, the vehicles had "unique histories" and therefore did not satisfy requirements for joinder under FRCP 20. Id. The Fourth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs "had 'not demonstrated that any of the alleged similar problems resulted from a common defect." Id. at 1031-32. Further, plaintiffs were given different warranties for their vehicles. Id. Similarly, in Rubio v. Monsanto Co., a district judge severed claims from multiple plaintiffs alleging that RoundUP caused their cancer because of dissimilarities in exposure and application of the pesticide. 181 F. Supp.3d 746, 758 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
Finally, Defendant analogizes the instant case to Texas Farmers Insurance Company v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, 321 F.R.D. 561 (E.D. Tex. 2017). In that subrogation action, the court concluded two claims were properly joined under FRCP 20 where lightning struck and destroyed two buildings, allegedly due to a TechShield product manufactured by the defendant. However, the court concluded that the claims should be severed because of differing damage calculations and additional claim specific witnesses that were likely to cause confusion for a jury. Id. at 563-64.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that they properly joined the claims because...
To continue reading
Request your trial