Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adcock

Citation353 S.W.3d 246
Decision Date20 October 2011
Docket NumberNo. 02–11–00059–CV.,02–11–00059–CV.
PartiesLIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation, Appellants, v. Ricky ADCOCK, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

353 S.W.3d 246

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation, Appellants,
v.
Ricky ADCOCK, Appellee.

No. 02–11–00059–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

Oct. 20, 2011.


[353 S.W.3d 247]

Greg Abbott, Atty. Gen., Daniel T. Hodge, First Asst., Bill Cobb, Deputy for Civil Litigation, Barbara B. Deane, Chief, and Nicholas Canaday, III, Asst., Environmental Protection and Administrative Law Division, and Hanna & Plaut, L.L.P. and Robert F. Josey, Austin, for Appellants.

Durkin Law Office, P.C. and Joan Durkin, Hurst, for Appellee.

PANEL: DAUPHINOT and McCOY, JJ.; and CHARLES BLEIL (Senior Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment).
OPINION
BOB McCOY, Justice.
I. Introduction

In one issue, Appellants Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation assert that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Appellee Ricky Adcock, arguing that the Division had jurisdiction in 2009 to review a 1997 award of Lifetime Income Benefits (LIBs) to Adcock. We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

This is the Once–In–A–Lifetime case. Because this case turns on statutory construction, we need not conduct an extensive recitation of the factual and procedural background. Suffice it to say that in 1991, Adcock received a compensable on-the-job injury, and in 1997, the Division's Appeals Panel held that Adcock was entitled to LIBs due to the total and permanent functional loss of use of his right foot above the ankle and right hand up to and including the right wrist. This decision was not appealed.

Several years later, Liberty Mutual, the workers' compensation carrier, sought to reopen Adcock's case, asserting that Adcock was no longer entitled to LIBs because he no longer had the total and permanent functional loss of use that was the basis of his award. The issues certified by the hearing officer and agreed to by the parties were:

(1) Is Claimant entitled to lifetime income benefits (LIBs) as of this date based on total and permanent loss of use of his hands and legs?

(2) As a result of the decision and order of the Appeals panel in Appeal No. 970981, does the Division have jurisdiction to determine continuing entitlement to lifetime income benefits (LIBs)?

After a hearing officer determined that Adcock was entitled to continued LIBs, the Division's Appeals Panel found that the Division had jurisdiction to reopen the case but that Adcock continued to be entitled to LIBs.

On appeal to the district court, Adcock argued that based on the statutory language in labor code section 408.161 and on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the case could not be reopened. The Division intervened, asserting that it had jurisdiction. The trial court agreed with Adcock's premise that the Division could not reopen the 1997 case and granted Adcock's summary judgment. In its final judgment, it stated, “[T]he Court enters judgment that the Texas Department of Insurance—Division of Workers' Compensation, and by extension this Court, lacks jurisdiction to revisit the issue of [LIBs] awarded to Plaintiff in 1997.” This appeal followed.

III. Jurisdiction

Labor code section 408.161 states that “lifetime income benefits are paid until the death of the employee” for the loss of

[353 S.W.3d 248]

certain, statutorily specified body parts. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.161(a) (West 2006). It also provides that “the total and permanent loss of use of a body part is the loss of that body part.” Id. § 408.161(b) (West 2006).

Liberty Mutual and the Division argue that the Division can revisit whether the loss of use of a body part is permanent, asserting that “lifetime” as used in the statute refers to eligibility and duration, not entitlement. They contend that because the legislature has vested the Division with exclusive jurisdiction to resolve workers' compensation disputes, “[n]either the nature of the income benefit nor the existence of a prior order bars the Division from exercising its exclusive jurisdiction,” and that this is consistent with the legislature's recognition that an employee's entitlement to benefits can change over the life of the claim. And they add that to hold otherwise would be nonsensical because an injured worker who improved would continue to receive LIBs, even though he no longer met the statutory criteria.1

Adcock responds that once he became eligible for LIBs, no further review was permitted because no such review is provided for in the statute's plain language. He points out that given the severity of injuries to which LIBs apply,2 it would violate due process and be “inherently cruel and unfair to subject such frail individuals to the stress and uncertainty of what amounts to a lifetime of litigation.”

A. Standard of Review

We review an issue of statutory construction on the same basis that we review a summary judgment: de novo. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.2010); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.2008). Further,

[i]n construing statutes, we ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the language of the statute. We use definitions prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or particular meaning the words have acquired. Otherwise, we construe the statute's words according to their plain and common meaning, unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. We presume the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result by enacting the statute. When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the language.

City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 625–26 (citations omitted). Our practice when construing a statute is to recognize that “the words [the Legislature] chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent,”

[353 S.W.3d 249]

Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex.2010), and we must “ ‘take statutes as [we] find them.’ ” RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985) (quoting Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66, 70 (1920)).

B. Analysis

We begin our analysis with the well-established principle that an administrative agency may exercise only those powers that the legislature “confers upon it in clear and express language, and [that it] cannot erect and exercise what really amounts to a new or additional power for the purpose of administrative expediency.” Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. Lakeshore Util. Co., 164 S.W.3d 368, 377 (Tex.2005). This is because an administrative agency is a creature of the legislature, with no inherent authority of its own. Id. However, when the legislature expressly confers a power on an agency, “it also impliedly intends that the agency have whatever powers are reasonably necessary to fulfill its express functions or duties.” Id. at 378.

In this case, the agency is the Division, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction regarding claims arising under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA). See In re Metro. Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding). “ ‘Construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute.’ ” Mid–Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex.2007) (quoting Tarrant App. Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.1993)); State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex.1994) (“[T]he contemporaneous construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight.”). But see TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex.2011) (stating that...

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    ...procedure to re-open LIB determinations in 1989 and the current Act only provides for ongoing review of temporary income benefits. 353 S.W.3d 246, 249–52.II. Discussion “Enforcing the law as written is a court's safest refuge in matters of statutory construction, and we should always refrai......
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    ...procedure to re-open LIB determinations in 1989 and the current Act only provides for ongoing review of temporary income benefits. 353 S.W.3d 246, 249-52.II. Discussion "Enforcing the law as written is a court's safest refuge in matters of statutory construction, and we should always refrai......

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