Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pine Bluff Sand & Gravel Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-31038,95-31038
• Citation: 89 F.3d 243
• Parties: LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; Gust K. Newberg Construction Co./Hardaway Co., A Joint Venture, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PINE BLUFF SAND & GRAVEL CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 243

89 F.3d 243

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; Gust K. Newberg Construction Co./Hardaway Co., A Joint Venture Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PINE BLUFF SAND & GRAVEL CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-31038.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 26, 1996.

James A. Bolen, Jr., Bolen, Erwin & Johnson, Alexandria, LA, Stacy C. Auzenne, Alexandria, LA, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Russell L. Potter, Andrew Parker Texada, Stafford, Stewart & Potter, Alexandria, LA, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants Gust K. Newberg Construction Company (Newberg) and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), ¹ appeal from the district

                court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Pine Bluff Sand and Gravel Company, Inc.  (Pine Bluff) on their indemnification claim.   Concluding that (1) an ambiguity in the indemnity provision of the contract between Pine Bluff and Newberg prevents the contract from being interpreted as a matter of law, and (2) Newberg is entitled to a post-settlement determination of its fault, if any, with regard to the underlying suit that gave rise to the indemnification claim, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
                

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1988, in conjunction with an ongoing project designed to render the Red River navigable, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) contracted with Newberg for the construction of a lock and dam near Colfax, Louisiana. Newberg then subcontracted the dredging work for the lock and dam to Pine Bluff. The contract between Newberg and Pine Bluff (the Subcontract Agreement) provides that Pine Bluff will indemnify Newberg for specified claims arising out of Pine Bluff's performance of its dredging operations, "provided that any such claim ... is caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of [Pine Bluff] ... except to the extent [the claim] is caused in part by [Newberg]." ²

Pursuant to its contract with Newberg, Pine Bluff excavated a channel through the Red River and deposited the dredged silt from the excavation in six different disposal areas around the location selected for the construction of the lock and dam. In July 1990, one of those disposal areas was the site of an automobile accident involving Zane Lemoine, who was allegedly injured when the car in which he was riding collided with one of Pine Bluff's dredge pipes. In March 1992, Lemoine filed suit in federal district court against, inter alia, Pine Bluff, the Corps, and Newberg. Newberg demanded that Pine Bluff indemnify and defend it in the Lemoine suit; however, Pine Bluff refused. Newberg's defense was provided instead by Liberty Mutual.

The Lemoine suit settled before trial. Under the terms of the settlement, Pine Bluff contributed $100,000; Newberg--through Liberty Mutual, and after expressly reserving its rights to pursue a contractual indemnity claim against Pine Bluff--contributed $100,000; and the Corps contributed $25,000. The suit was then dismissed.

Subsequently, in June 1994, Newberg filed this diversity action in federal district court, seeking recovery, pursuant to the indemnification provision of the Subcontract Agreement, of the $100,000 that it had contributed to the Lemoine settlement and the costs that it had incurred in defending against the Lemoine action. Eight months later, the district court granted a summary judgment

                of dismissal in favor of Pine Bluff.   Newberg timely appealed to this court.
                

II.

ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We will affirm a grant of summary judgment only if we are "convinced, after an independent review of the record, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." ³ Fact questions must be considered with deference to the non-movant; questions of law are reviewed de novo. ⁴ Our de novo review of legal questions includes the interpretation and application of indemnity agreements. ⁵ The preliminary determination whether an agreement is ambiguous also constitutes a question of law that is reviewed de novo. ⁶

B. THE MERITS

Under Louisiana law, indemnity provisions are construed in accordance with general rules governing contract interpretation. ⁷ When the terms of a contract are unambiguous and lead to no absurd consequences, we interpret them as a matter of law. ⁸ On the other hand, ambiguity in the terms of a contract gives rise to a fact question concerning the intent of the parties. ⁹

Here, the indemnity provision of the Subcontract Agreement specifies that Pine Bluff will indemnify Newberg

from and against all claims, damages, causes of action, losses and expenses, including attorney's fees, arising out of or resulting from the performance of the work, provided that any such claim, damage, loss or expense (1) is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, ... and (2) is caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of [Pine Bluff] ... except to the extent it is caused in part by [Newberg].

At the heart of this appeal is a dispute over the meaning and significance of the indemnity provision's stipulation that Pine Bluff is not required to indemnify Newberg "to the extent that" Newberg causes the loss.

1. The Dispute

The two parties proffer antithetical interpretations of the pertinent language from the Subcontract Agreement. Pine Bluff argues that under the terms of the Subcontract Agreement, it is required to indemnify Newberg only if Newberg is not in any way responsible for an underlying claim. Stated differently, Pine Bluff reads the indemnity provision as freeing it from any obligation to indemnify Newberg if an underlying claim is caused in any part by Newberg. In a related argument, Pine Bluff asserts that Newberg's decision to participate in the Lemoine settlement For its part, Newberg contends that the indemnity provision incorporates the principles of comparative negligence. Specifically, Newberg argues that Pine Bluff is required to indemnify it for the total sum of its expenses or losses resulting from an underlying claim, less the portion of those expenses or losses that corresponds to Newberg's degree of fault. Additionally, Newberg urges that it did not waive its right to seek indemnification from Pine Bluff by participating in the Lemoine settlement. Instead, insists Newberg, the case should be remanded for proceedings on the issue of its fault, if any, for Lemoine's injuries, and if fault be found, then to what degree.

amounts to a waiver of its right to seek indemnification from Pine Bluff, as the settlement precluded a trial on the merits to determine whether Newberg was free from fault.

2. Assessing the Issues

a. Interpreting the Indemnity Provision

We examine first the issue of the meaning of the indemnity provision's stipulation that Newberg is not entitled to indemnification from Pine Bluff "to the extent that" a claim is "caused in part" by Newberg. As detailed above, both Pine Bluff and Newberg have advanced reasonable interpretations of this language. Each interpretation is consistent with the substance of the Subcontract Agreement as a whole; neither produces an absurd result; and the intent of the parties to the contract "cannot be ascertained from the language employed." ¹⁰ Accordingly, the indemnity provision is "ambiguous and uncertain as to the intention of the parties" ¹¹; and the district court erred in interpreting the provision as a matter of law. ¹² For these reasons, the issue must be remanded to the district court for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

b. Waiver of Right to Pursue Indemnity

(1) Pine Bluff's Contribution Theory

Pine Bluff urges that remand is not necessary. Specifically, it insists that, irrespective of how the contested language is interpreted, Newberg waived its right to seek indemnification by participating in and contributing to the Lemoine settlement. Pine Bluff presents two formulations of this waiver argument. It first argues as follows: (1) the Subcontract Agreement actually incorporates a contribution provision, rather than an indemnification provision, because the contract requires an apportionment of fault between Pine Bluff and Newberg; (2) under general principles of Louisiana tort law, a settling party is not entitled to seek contribution from joint tortfeasors ¹³; (3) therefore, as a settling party, Newberg is not entitled to seek contribution from Pine Bluff.

Although we applaud Pine Bluff's creativity, we decline to impose this novel approach on the law of Louisiana that governs indemnity agreements. First, as a fundamental matter, indemnity agreements are controlled by the law of contracts, not torts. ¹⁴ Thus, tort principles governing contribution and indemnification are inapplicable to the instant case. ¹⁵

Second, we note that under Louisiana law, "an indemnification agreement will not be construed to cover losses arising from an indemnitee's negligence unless a mutual intent to provide such indemnification is expressed

                in unequivocal terms." 16  In effect, then, under Louisiana law indemnity agreements are frequently presumed to contemplate some apportionment of fault.   Yet Pine Bluff has not cited, and independent research has failed to reveal, any authority for the proposition that indemnity provisions that apportion fault should be treated as "contribution provisions" and subjected to general tort-based contribution principles.   All in all, we are not persuaded by this formulation of Pine Bluff's argument
                

(2) Pine Bluff's Alternate Theory

Not to be so easily deterred, Pine Bluff contends in the alternative that, even if the Subcontract Agreement is not governed by general contribution...