Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 47060,47060
• Citation: 62 Ill.2d 77,338 N.E.2d 857
• Parties: LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS MACHINE & TOOL CO., Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 857

338 N.E.2d 857

62 Ill.2d 77

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS MACHINE & TOOL CO., Appellant.

No. 47060.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 25, 1975.

Howard & French, Chicago (Richard G. French and Stuart N. Litwin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Gerard E. Grashorn, Chicago (Edward J. Wendrow, Frank L. Butler, and Winston & Strawn, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice.

In this indemnity action, plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, as subrogee for its insured, Charles Machine Works, Inc. (hereinafter Charles), sued defendant, Williams Machine & Tool Co., seeking reimbursement for monies paid in settlement of suits instituted against Charles by American Glass Company (hereinafter American) and its employees. A jury in the circuit court of Cook County returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $69,800. The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed (21 Ill.App.3d 510, 316 N.E.2d 255) and we granted leave to appeal.

Plaintiff settled the suits against Charles after tendering the defense of those suits to defendant. Those suits arose out of an accident which occurred at Chicago's O'Hare Airport in March, 1961. To facilitate its installation of the window glass in several terminal buildings then under construction, American was utilizing an adjustable work platform, known as a 'Skywitch,' manufactured by Charles and designed to raise hydraulically loads not exceeding 2000 pounds to heights up to 24 feet. Hydraulic power to lift the Skywitch was generated by a hydraulic pump, manufactured by defendant and installed without alteration by Charles in assumbling the Skywitch. Within each pump was a relief valve, supposedly preset by defendant at Charles' request to activate whenever hydraulic pressure exceeded 2000 pounds per square inch. If activated, the valve would shut off the flow of hydraulic oil into the hydraulic cylinders, thus relieving the pressure on the piston rods should the Skywitch encounter an obstruction or have additional weight, in excess of the 2000 pound load limit, placed on it while being raised. It was undisputed that American, in order to install glass at heights greater than 24 feet, had affixed 20 feet of scaffolding to the top of the Skywitch.

According to plaintiff's evidence, the accident at O'Hare occurred when one corner of the Skywitch was obstructed by an aluminum mullion on the terminal building as American employees were raising the Skywitch, loaded with men, glass and scaffolding, to its maximum extension in order to install the glass in the second floor windows of the buildings. A failure of the hydraulic pump's relief valve permitted pressure far in excess of 2000 pounds per square inch to be transmitted to the piston rods which, being unable to lift the Skywitch further due to the obstruction, became overstressed to the point that they were severely bent, causing collapse of the Skywitch and injury to a number of American employees. Defendant presented no evidence. All three counts of plaintiff's complaint, based on breach of warranty, negligence and strict liability, were submitted, without separate forms of verdict for each count, to the jury, which returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff.

Although raising a number of issues before the appellate court defendant states the only issue before us is whether the misconduct of plaintiff's insured precludes an indemnity claim by plaintiff based on strict products liability. Defendant argues that Charles, by failing to warn American that its planned addition of scaffolding to the Skywitch could cause the platform to tip, is guilty of misconduct which was a concurrent cause dof the accident, since defendant's relief valve would not have been needed had the Skywitch not tipped and struck the side of the terminal building. Because defendant speaks of that misconduct in terms of both negligence and misuse, we will consider the effect of both categories of conduct upon plaintiff's claim. First, defendant urges that such misconduct is active rather than passive negligence, and that Charles, as a joint tortfeasor guilty of active negligence, should be barred from indemnity in a strict liability action just as it would be in a negligence action. Defendant contends, therefore, that to instruct the jury, as was done here, that as to both the breach of warranty and strict liability counts 'any negligence on the part of plaintiff Charles Machine Works that may have contributed to cause injuries through the employees of Charles Machine Works would not be a defense,' constituted reversible error necessitating outright reversal or in the alternative a new trial before a jury instructed that any misconduct of Charles which was a cause of the initial injury would bar recovery by plaintiff against defendant.

We have previously considered the applicability of negligence concepts to strict liability actions, but not in the context present here. In Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, establishing strict products liability in this State, plaintiffs, the purchasers of a reconditioned tractor-trailer unit, were held to have stated a cause of action for indemnification from the manufacturer of a defective brake for sums paid by plaintiffs in settlement of claims against them resulting from an accident caused by the defective brake. We there noted: "(Indemnity) is not, however, limited to those who are personally free from fault. A similar rule has been applied to indemnity against a supplier of goods when a retailer or user of the goods incurs liability by reason of negligent reliance upon his proper care.' Indemnity here is not, however, premised on any theory of active and passive negligence. (To require proof that Bendix was actively negligent would be the antithesis of strict liability.)' (32 Ill.2d at 624, 210 N.E.2d at 188.) In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305, persuaded by the policy considerations which led us to adopt strict tort liability in Suvada, we held that 'contributory negligence, as it is known in this State, is not a bar to recovery in a strict product liability tort action in Illinois, and the plaintiff need not plead and prove his exercise of due care.' (45 Ill.2d at 427, 261 N.E.2d at 310.) We did hold, however, that misuse of the product or assumption of risk would bar recovery in a strict liability action. Williams was not an indemnity action, but an action in strict liability brought directly by the injured user of the product against the manufacturer.

Unlike either Suvada or Williams, the present case involves the question of indemnification between two manufacturers, the producer of the defective component part and the assembler of the finished product, both of whom could have been sued directly in strict liability by the injured party. Defendant urges that since the compensation of a consumer injured by a defective product or held liable for injury caused by the product is not involved in such a situation, the two manufacturers should simply be treated as joint tortfeasors, with no indemnity allowed unless one's negligence is active and the other's passive. We cannot agree. The major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss caused by defective products on those who create the risk and reap the profit by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce, regardless of whether the defect resulted from the 'negligence' of the manufacturer. We believe that this...