Licata v. U.S. Postal Service
Decision Date | 24 August 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-5637,93-5637 |
Citation | 33 F.3d 259 |
Parties | Stephen B. LICATA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Burtis W. Horner (argued), Stryker, Tams & Dill, Newark, NJ, for appellant.
Michael Chertoff, U.S. Atty., Susan H. Handler-Menahen (argued), Asst. U.S. Atty., Newark, NJ, for appellee.
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge, and DIAMOND, * District Judge.
Stephen Licata appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit, which it treated as alleging a breach of contract, against the United States Postal Service for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude that we must reverse in light of Congress's specific grant to the district courts of original jurisdiction over such claims.
Because the district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) before the Postal Service filed an answer, we review only whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. See Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining Inc., 830 F.2d 494, 495-96 (3d Cir.1987); Cardio-Medical Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir.1983).
According to the complaint, the Postal Service has established a program which encourages employee participation by awarding 10% of the total economic benefit of any implemented suggestion, up to a maximum award of $35,000. Licata, a machinist employed by the Postal Service, submitted a suggestion in July 1989 for a modified roller for one of the Service's package sorters. Licata's suggestion was implemented at the local level and research indicated that if implemented nationwide, the modified roller could save the Service $500,000 in the first year. Although the modification was formally disapproved for national implementation in June 1991, Licata claims that the Service continued to authorize the manufacture and use of the rollers without paying him his share of the savings.
On March 31, 1993, Licata filed suit in the District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking $35,000 damages, as well as interest, costs, and attorney's fees. He alleged jurisdiction under 39 U.S.C. Sec. 409(a) (1988) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1339 (1988). Both parties and the district court read the complaint to allege some kind of common law breach of contract claim. App. at 16 n. 3, 73-74, 159. The Service filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment prior to filing an answer, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or that summary judgment should be entered based on the affidavit and exhibits attached to the motion.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that section 409(a) was insufficient to maintain jurisdiction without a cause of action, and that if the claim sounded in contract it was barred by the Tucker Act. See Licata v. United States Postal Serv., No. Civ.A. 93-1386, 1993 WL 388974, at * 3-4 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1993). This timely appeal followed. We exercise plenary review over questions of subject matter jurisdiction. See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 440, 126 L.Ed.2d 373 (1993). 1
Section 409 of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, entitled "Suits by and against the Postal Service," provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 3628 of this title [governing appeals of postal ratemaking], the United States district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal Service. Any action brought in a State court to which the Postal Service is a party may be removed to the appropriate United States district 39 U.S.C. Sec. 409(a) (1988).
court under the provisions of chapter 89 of title 28.
When interpreting a statute we look first to its plain meaning, and if the language is unambiguous no further inquiry is necessary. See Sacred Heart Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 545 (3d Cir.1992). The plain meaning of the first sentence of section 409(a) grants the district court "jurisdiction" over Licata's complaint, since it is an "action[ ] brought ... against the Postal Service" and does not fall within the exception at the beginning of the sentence. Thus we agree with the Eighth Circuit that the words of section 409(a) "are a clear and unequivocal grant of jurisdiction to the district courts ... [and that] the words of the first sentence of Section 409(a) convey a meaning as plain as any we can recall seeing." Continental Cablevision v. United States Postal Serv., 945 F.2d 1434, 1437 (8th Cir.1991). Indeed, we cannot imagine how Congress could grant jurisdiction more plainly.
Nor is there anything in our precedents that prevents us from attributing to section 409(a) its plain meaning. We have described section 409(a) as a "general grant of jurisdiction to the district courts," Air Courier Conference of America v. United States Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1217 n. 2 (3d Cir.1992), and, consistent with the Supreme Court's approach, have had no qualms about reviewing judgments against the Postal Service when jurisdiction was predicated on section 409(a). See Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 514, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 2551, 81 L.Ed.2d 446 (1984) ( ); Pearlstine v. United States, 649 F.2d 194, 195 n. 2 (3d Cir.1981) ( ).
Indeed, most courts of appeals to consider the question have found that section 409(a) is what it seems to be--a grant of jurisdiction to the district courts for suits in which the Postal Service is a party. See, e.g., Continental Cablevision, 945 F.2d at 1437; American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294, 313 n. 33 (D.C.Cir.1987); Insurance Co. of North America v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F.2d 756, 757-58 (5th Cir.1982); Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 954, 955 (10th Cir.1974); White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379, 1384 n. 6 (4th Cir.1974); see also 2 Government Contracts Sec. 8:226, at 153 ( )("With respect to contracts with the U.S. Postal Service, the Postal Reorganization Act confers jurisdiction on the District Courts."); 1 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice p 0.62, at 700.7 (2d ed. 1994) .
Despite the clear language and considerable precedent, there is a split of authority in the circuits as to whether section 409 provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Hexamer v. Foreness, 981 F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir.1993) ( split). 2 The Service relies primarily on Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. United States Postal Service, 658 F.2d 1182, 1189 (7th Cir.1981), which held that the purpose of section 409(a) was Peoples Gas also stated that neither section We believe the Postal Service conflates the issues of subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and a valid cause of action. Section 409(a) does not speak to sovereign immunity. It is 39 U.S.C. Sec. 401(1) that waives the Service's sovereign immunity by providing that it may "sue and be sued in its official name." See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 556, 108 S.Ct. 1965, 1969, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988) ; Franchise Tax Bd, 467 U.S. at 517, 104 S.Ct. at 2552 ( ). 3
409(a) nor 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1339 and concluded that section 409(a) "form[s] no basis for [such] a cause of action." Id.; see also Janakes v. United States Postal Serv., 768 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir.1985) ( ). We decline to follow Peoples Gas, for we do not find its reasoning persuasive.
Further, we believe that the Postal Service's argument, relying on Peoples Gas, that subject matter jurisdiction is absent without a cause of action is "seriously flawed" because "whether or not 'a cause of action' exists goes to the merits, not to the question of subject-matter jurisdiction." Continental Cablevision, 945 F.2d at 1438. In the seminal case of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing a complaint for want of jurisdiction when it was in reality ruling on the viability of the lawsuit. The Court held:
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on...
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