Liceaga v. Baez

• Citation: 126 N.E.3d 682,2019 IL App (1st) 181170,430 Ill.Dec. 594
• Decision Date: 29 March 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1-18-1170,1-18-1170
• Parties: Edward Michael LICEAGA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Isabel BAEZ, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (1st) 181170

126 N.E.3d 682

430 Ill.Dec. 594

Edward Michael LICEAGA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Isabel BAEZ, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-18-1170

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Opinion filed March 29, 2019

Matthew D. Elster, of Beermann LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.

Abraham T. Matthew, of Matthew & Drnovsek Law, LLC, of Chicago, for appellee.

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff Edward Michael Liceaga appeals the trial court's grant of defendant Isabel Baez's motion to dismiss and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On February 16, 2017, plaintiff filed a verified one-count complaint for replevin alleging that he was the rightful owner of, and entitled to the possession of, a diamond engagement ring. He alleged that he gave the ring to defendant on October 15, 2015, in contemplation of their marriage, and that she had "unlawfully retained it" since December 23, 2016.

¶ 4 Attached to the complaint was a form entitled "Insurance Replacement Appraisal," from a jeweler who estimated the ring's value to be $ 100,000, described the ring and included a photo.¹

¶ 5 In his brief to this court, plaintiff acknowledges that he was the one who broke off the parties' engagement and that, after defendant refused to return the ring, he filed this replevin action.

¶ 6 Since one of the issues in the appeal before us is whether plaintiff raised new arguments for the first time on a motion to reconsider, we describe in some detail the parties' extensive motion practice in the court below.

¶ 7 On May 1, 2017, defendant moved to dismiss the action pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016). The motion alleged that plaintiff and defendant became engaged on October 15, 2015, and plaintiff broke off the engagement in December 2016. The motion argued that an engagement ring is a gift in contemplation of marriage, that it is a gift conditional on the subsequent marriage and that, under well-established Illinois precedent, the party who fails to perform the condition has no right to the property. The motion argued that defendant intended to marry plaintiff, that plaintiff failed to perform and that defendant, thus, has a superior interest in the ring.

¶ 8 In his response to the motion, plaintiff acknowledged that he presented the engagement ring to defendant in contemplation of a marriage that did not occur. Plaintiff's response claimed that, after an argument, defendant moved out of their Chicago apartment and she asked plaintiff to pay her moving expenses from Chicago to San Diego. Plaintiff claims that he agreed to pay the moving expenses in exchange for the ring. However, defendant did not return the ring and moved to San Diego. Plaintiff made no claims that he paid the moving expenses.

¶ 9 In her reply, defendant observed that plaintiff did not plead that she, "at any time[,] breached her promise of marriage" or "defaulted on her promise or commitment."

¶ 10 On September 5, 2017, the trial court issued a two-page memorandum order addressing the arguments that both parties raised in their briefs. The trial court observed that plaintiff filed a one-count replevin action and that replevin is a statutory cause of action. Section 19-104 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that "[a]n action of replevin shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint which describes the property to be replevied and states that the plaintiff in such action is the owner of the property so described, or that he or she is then lawfully entitled to the possession thereof, and that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant." 735 ILCS 5/19-104 (West 2016).

¶ 11 Based on the case of Carroll v. Curry , 392 Ill. App. 3d 511, 514, 332 Ill.Dec. 86, 912 N.E.2d 272 (2009), which both parties cited, the trial court found:

"Defendant contends that the Complaint does not allege facts showing Plaintiff's right to return of the engagement ring. An engagement ring is a gift in contemplation of a marriage. Carroll , 392 Ill. App. 3d at 514 [332 Ill.Dec. 86, 912 N.E.2d 272]. ‘Gifts given in contemplation of marriage are deemed conditional on the subsequent marriage of the parties, and the "party who fails to perform on the condition of the gift has no right to property acquired under such pretenses." ’ " Id. [ (quoting Harris v. Davis , 139 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1048, 94 Ill.Dec. 327, 487 N.E.2d 1204 (1986) ).]

The Complaint alleges the conclusion that Defendant wrongfully retained the engagement ring but, despite Plaintiff's claims to the contrary, does not actually allege that the marriage did not take place or that it was Defendant who ended the engagement."

The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss but without prejudice, and granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

¶ 12 Plaintiff then filed an amended verified one-count complaint for replevin, which alleged that he purchased the ring "for the sole purpose of encouraging [defendant] to marry him," that he "ended the engagement due to irreconcilable differences," that the marriage did not take place, that he asked for the ring before filing suit, and that defendant had not returned the ring. Plaintiff argued that the question is "whether or not the marriage occurred, not why it did not occur or because of whom ." (Emphases in original.). In support of this propositions, plaintiff relied exclusively on Carroll v. Curry , 392 Ill. App. 3d 511, 514, 332 Ill.Dec. 86, 912 N.E.2d 272 (2009).²

¶ 13 On October 19, 2017, defendant once again moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint but this time she moved pursuant to section 2-619(c), rather than 2-615, of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(c) (West 2016). In some ways similar to a summary judgment motion, a section 2-619(c) motion provides a court the means to dispose of issues of law or easily proved issues of fact at the outset of a case. See Lipscomb v. Sisters of Francis Health Services, Inc. , 343 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1040, 278 Ill.Dec. 575, 799 N.E.2d 293 (2003). Defendant argued that no genuine issue of material fact existed, since plaintiff admitted in his verified complaint that he ended the engagement and that he was the one "who failed to perform on the condition of the gift."

¶ 14 In a verified response, plaintiff admitted that he ended the engagement but argued that this was irrelevant to the underlying matter. Plaintiff argued that Carroll was "the semin[al] and relevant case for the instant matter," and criticized defendant for citing a case that was "subsequently negatively discussed by Carroll ." Plaintiff claimed that, under Carroll , "fault is no longer an inquiry" in which courts engage.

¶ 15 On January 12, 2018, at the same time that plaintiff filed his response to defendant's motion to dismiss, he also filed his own motion for summary judgment which was based on the same grounds as his complaint and his response to the motion to dismiss.³ In her reply, defendant reiterated the same grounds that she had set forth in her motion to dismiss.

¶ 16 On February 14, 2018, the trial court issued a two-page written order that found in relevant part:

"In a replevin action involving an engagement ring, the correct inquiry in deciding which party is entitled to possession of the ring is which party's act conclusively ended the engagement. Carroll , 392 Ill. App. 3d at 518-19 [332 Ill.Dec. 86, 912 N.E.2d 272]. A court does not consider why an engagement ended, i.e. the underlying fault for the relationship's breakdown, but only which party performed the act actually ending the engagement. Carroll , 392 Ill. App. 3d at 519-20 [332 Ill.Dec. 86, 912 N.E.2d 272].

Plaintiff unequivocally alleges in his verified Amended Complaint that it was his act that ended the engagement with Defendant (Am. Compl. ¶ 9). Therefore, Plaintiff has no legal right to possession of the engagement ring under Illinois law and cannot maintain an action for replevin."

The trial court then granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice.

¶ 17 On March 12, 2018, plaintiff retained new counsel, who is the same counsel on this appeal, and he moved to reconsider in the trial court. Previously both parties had agreed that Carroll was the controlling law and argued solely over its meaning; and plaintiff, again in this motion, argued that Carroll was in his favor. However, for the first time, on this motion to reconsider, plaintiff argued that, if the court did not find for him under Carroll , then it should abandon Carroll , citing "new" Illinois legislation enacted in 2016 and decisions from other states between 1987 and 2007. Plaintiff also made new policy arguments for the first time.

¶ 18 On March 19, 2018, the trial court entered an order directing, among other things, that:

"4. Counsel for Defendant shall tender, within 14 days, any and all documents in their client's possession relating to the sale of the engagement ring, including those evincing when the ring was sold, the sale price, the date of sale, and the location of the sale proceeds.

5. Defendant shall on or before April 16, 2018, deposit the full amount of the sale proceeds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court or in her counsel's client trust account where said funds shall remain pending further order of Court."

¶ 19 On April 16, 2018, defendant brought an emergency motion to vacate the trial court's March 19, 2018, order because the ring was sold in January 2017, for $ 36,000, and plaintiff had used the proceeds for her "expenses." The ring was sold after plaintiff broke off the engagement in December 2016, but before February 16, 2017, when he filed this action. On April 17, 2018, the trial court granted defendant's emergency motion and vacated its March 19, 2018, order.

¶ 20 On April 23, 2018, defendant responded to plaintiff's motion to reconsider, observing that plaintiff was raising new arguments for...