Lickfield v. Lickfield

• Citation: 614 A.2d 1365,260 N.J.Super. 21
• Parties: Grace LICKFIELD, Plaintiff, v. E. Gilbert LICKFIELD, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 21 September 1992
• Court: Superior Court of New Jersey

Page 21

260 N.J.Super. 21

614 A.2d 1365

Grace LICKFIELD, Plaintiff, v. E. Gilbert LICKFIELD, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division,

Family Part, Camden County.

Sept. 21, 1992.

James H. Waller, Camden, for plaintiff (Sufrin & Zucker, attorneys).

Richard A. Shapiro, Cherry Hill, for defendant (Shapiro & Shapiro, attorneys).

OPINION

SEGAL, J.S.C.

The court is faced with an issue of first impression. The subject is the interpretation of the entire controversy doctrine as it applies to The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in June 1991. Thereafter she filed a complaint under The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act alleging that defendant had sexually assaulted her. A temporary restraining order issued and the matter proceeded to final hearing. At the final hearing the trial judge made a finding of domestic violence (defendant sexually assaulted plaintiff). At the very end of that proceeding counsel for plaintiff remarked to the court: "Thank you Your Honor. All the collateral issues can be done in the "FM", Judge, when they happen." There was no assent or opposition from defendant's counsel regarding this apparent reservation. The reservation according to plaintiff was a request that the issue of damages be reserved for the divorce proceeding.

Thereafter, consistent with a prior order of the court, plaintiff amended her divorce complaint to include a claim for damages inflicted as a result of defendant's violence. In the divorce action plaintiff has moved for summary judgment as to liability and defendant has cross-moved to have plaintiff's claim barred under the entire controversy doctrine or the doctrine of res judicata. The court finds that plaintiff's request for damages is not barred by either the entire controversy doctrine or res judicata and grants summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

The entire controversy doctrine (or single controversy doctrine) ... is a preclusionary principle intended to prevent fractionalization of litigation by requiring all claims between the same parties arising out of or relating to the same transactional circumstances to be joined in a single action. The effect of the doctrine is to preclude a party from withholding from the action for separate and later litigation a constituent component of the controversy.

....

[Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J.Super. 372, 377-378, 506 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1986).]

The doctrine is one of judicial fairness. Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 476 A.2d 250 (1984).

The purposes of the doctrine include the needs of economy and the avoidance of waste, efficiency and the reduction of delay, fairness to the parties, and the need for complete and final disposition through avoidance of 'piecemeal decisions.'

Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 15, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989).

Our Supreme Court in Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 400 A.2d 1189 (1979) indicated that the entire controversy doctrine is applicable to family actions and to tort claims between spouses. The Court specifically noted that an intentional tort committed by one spouse against the other is ordinarily a constituent element of their divorce action. Id. at 434, 400 A.2d 1189. However, "[T]o judge whether the application of the doctrine is appropriate, the court will determine whether the omission of the subject claim will result in the same parties engaging in a second action to resolve claims not disposed of in the first action...." Peskin v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 214 N.J.Super. 686, 701, 520 A.2d 852 (Law Div.1986).

While the entire controversy doctrine has a long history, The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act only came into being in 1981. The Legislature passed the act to ensure the maximum protection to victims of domestic violence by providing access to emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies and sanctions. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Under the Act, an order for emergency relief shall be granted upon good cause shown and shall remain in effect until a judge ... issues a further order. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(i). The Act mandates that a final hearing be held within 10 days of the filing of a complaint. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). At the hearing the court is empowered to grant relief necessary to prevent further abuse as well as an order requiring the defendant to pay to the victim monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the act of domestic violence ... Where appropriate, punitive damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4).

Defendant advances several arguments in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and in support of his cross motion to bar relief. Defendant argues that because The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act provides for money damages, and plaintiff did not properly articulate a reservation of her right to damages, she waived her right to damages by failing to pursue them during the domestic violence hearing. This court does not reach the issue of whether or not plaintiff's reservation of "all collateral issues" at the conclusion of the final hearing served to reserve her right to damages. Rather this court finds that the time restrictions imposed upon plaintiff by the Act are incongruent with a strict interpretation of the entire controversy doctrine.

A case cannot be made for damages in an action for personal injuries until the extent of the damages are known. The Act requires that a...