Liddle v. State
| Decision Date | 02 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 471S91,471S91 |
| Citation | 260 Ind. 548,297 N.E.2d 801 |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | James LIDDLE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
James L. Brand, Greenfield, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Darrel K. Diamond, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was charged with the crime of theft of property of the value of less than $100. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty. Appellant was fined $500.
The record reveals the following facts:
On September 30, 1967, James Person was arrested by Indianapolis Police Officers, including Officer James Liddle, Jr., the appellant in this case.
At the time of his arrest Person claimed he had in excess of $20 in his billfold. Officer Liddle searched him, took his billfold from his pants pocket and returned it moments later. Later, when Person examined his billfold, he discovered that $25 was missing. The appellant was accused and stands convicted of taking the money from Person's billfold.
Among the errors claimed by the appellant in this appeal is the contention that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to poll the jury concerning their knowledge of an article which appeared in 'The Indianapolis Star' on August 26, 1970, concerning appellant's trial. This article contained information which would have been inadmissible at appellant's trial. The article stated that appellant had been charged as an accessory to the shooting of a fellow police officer; that the arrest of another man was delayed fifteen months by the appellant's false alibi and that the defendant had been found not guilty on another charge of theft in the Hancock Circuit Court.
The State concedes that this newspaper article 'contained information which may well have been improper for the jury to consider,' but claims there was a waiver on the part of the appellant in that he objected to polling the jury to determine if they had been exposed to the article.
An examination of the entire record in this case reveals that when it was first discovered on the morning of the trial that the article was in the newspaper, it was unknown to the appellant and the State as to whether or not any juror had seen the article. At that time in conversation between counsel and the court, counsel for appellant stated reluctance to bring the matter to the attention of the jury, but asked the court to declare a mistrial simply because of the existence of the article.
At that time the court refused to grant a mistrial in the absence of any showing that any juror had, in fact, seen the article.
Later in the day as the trial progressed, one of the jurors was seen to have in his possession a newspaper containing the questioned article.
At that time counsel for appellant called this fact to the attention of the court and the State, and then made a motion that the jurors be polled as to the extent of their knowledge of the article, which motion was denied by the trial court.
At that time the appellant again renewed his motion for mistrial.
We hold the trial court did not err in refusing appellant's first motion for mistrial at the time when appellant was objecting to the polling of the jurors to determine their knowledge of the newspaper article. However, when it later became apparent that at least one juror had a copy of the newspaper in his possession, the trial court did err in refusing to poll the jury upon appellant's request and to question them concerning any possible bias and prejudice which they may have acquired as a result of the article. It may well be that at that time a proper examination of the jury would have disclosed either that they had not, in fact, read the article or, if they had read the article, it had no influence upon them. However, be that as it may, we cannot at this time say that the appellant had a fair trial leading to his conviction in view of the existence of the article containing information not admissible in his trial and obviously detrimental to him.
We must, therefore, reverse this case and remand it to the trial court for a new trial to afford the appellant the opportunity of being tried before a jury which has not been unduly influenced by improper...
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Bruce v. State
...Lindsey does not explicitly define the qualities rendering publicity prejudicial, but an examination of that case and Liddle v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 548, 297 N.E.2d 801, reveal two categories of publicity with which we are concerned. See also Sacks v. State, (1977) Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 21......
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Little v. State, 2-1278A419
...Having failed to avail himself of this corrective action, Little may not now base error on his speculations. See Liddle v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 548, 297 N.E.2d 801. Defendant maintains that other witnesses were aware of the arrests and may have slanted their testimony against him because t......
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Ridenour v. State
...Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1, 7. The court is not required to initiate an inquiry as a "fishing expedition." Id. See also Liddle v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 548, 297 N.E.2d 801, 802. Because the trial court did not examine the remaining jurors as to conversations they may have had with Juror Brown, we ......
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Jarvis v. State
...to sequester, therefore, is moot. With regard to the motion to interrogate the jury, the authority cited by Defendant, Liddle v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 548, 297 N.E.2d 801, does not support his position. That case requires such action by the court only if there has been presented some basis......